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CONFLICTS
A SURVEY ON NORDIC STUDIES ON 
PEACEMAKING 

13
1.  Introduction
Peace diplomacy and peace mediation in particular have taken 
new shape as well as gained visibility and acceptance in the post-
Cold War world. The number and availability of mediation cases 
have dramatically increased since the mid-1990s and it has become 
a widely accepted global norm that international community has 
a responsibility to support peacemaking in order to prevent the 
continuation of humanitarian crisis. The United Nations as well 
as the European Union has adopted their own peace mediation 
agendas and organizations. For Nordic countries, peace diplomacy 
has offered a new kind of opportunity to gain an important role in 
global politics. Norway was a pioneer of new peace diplomacy in 
the early 1990s but Sweden, Denmark, and Finland have all, in one 
form or another, adopted peacemaking and conflict resolution in 
their foreign policy agendas. In addition to the activity of states and 
international organizations, the last two decades have borne witness 
to the emergence of peace mediator as a new international profession 
and the involvement of several non-governmental-organizations 
to peace diplomacy which, indeed, challenges states’ ownership to 
diplomacy. The extension of the scope of traditional state-centric 
diplomacy and the increase of the amount of mediation cases has 
evoked broader scholarly interest towards peace mediation. The 
issue has been approached from various perspectives; some scholars 
have concentrated on mediation practices and styles while others 
have taken a more critical look towards the whole peace process. 
The overall objective of this study is to map Nordic studies 
on peace mediation, facilitation, and conflict resolution published 
during the past fifteen years as well as to examine further what the 
major thematic questions discussed by Nordic scholars are and how 
these scholars have approached these questions. Beyond that, the 
aim is to research if it is possible to discuss more broadly about 
a specific Nordic approach or tradition. Right from the start it is 
14
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essential to give attention to how distinctions are drawn on a larger 
field of studies on peacebuilding and peacemaking and studies which 
focus on peace mediation, facilitation, and conflict resolution, in 
particular.  Even though peace mediation, as such, is considered a 
frame of study amongst certain scholars, this has not been the case 
with most of the studies analysed in this survey. 
This survey approaches ‘Nordicness’ through institutional 
affiliation. Thus a scientific profile on most important and well-known 
research institutes and departments in the Nordic countries has been 
closely sought.  If we take a look on the overview in all Nordic 
countries, the obvious conclusion is that even though the amount 
of studies is rather satisfactory, almost all scholars specializing in 
this field are affiliated either to Swedish or Norwegian institutes. 
Swedish studies outnumbered Norwegian ones and a true giant of 
the study on peace mediation is the Department of Peace and Conflict 
Research in the Uppsala University. In Sweden, Lund University’s 
Peace and Conflict Studies has to be also mentioned when it comes 
to research carried out on mediation and related issues. It is justified, 
with certain reservations, to talk about the existence of Uppsala 
and Lund traditions in relation to studying peacemaking. In recent 
years, several Swedish scholars have concentrated on questions 
related to peace mediation. Among them could be mentioned Karin 
Aggestam, Cecilia Albin, Kristine Höglund, Isak Svensson, and Peter 
Wallensteen. 
In Norway, research specializing on peace mediation and peace 
process has centred in particular at the University of Oslo, with a 
study background in history. In addition, there are some research 
institutes, such as the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 
(NUPI) and The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) where 
mediation related themes have been analysed. However, the notion 
of ‘mediation’ is not necessary mentioned in their studies. The most 
productive contemporary Norwegian scholars under scrutiny in 
this survey are Mona Fixdal, Iver Neumann, and Hilde Henriksen 
Waage; however, other Norwegians are also mentioned.
In Finland, Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) and 
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) have, in recent years, 
shown keen interest in peace mediation but despite few sporadic 
15
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studies serious academic research on peace mediation is lacking in the 
Finnish case. In addition, it is noteworthy to mention that challenges 
have emerged in the process of acquiring relevant literature for this 
survey, as many of the publications are not available in Finland, 
and this portrays the lack of interest on these issues. If there are 
only few studies made by Finnish scholars, none could be found 
by Danish ones if two Finns (Pertti Joenniemi and Timo Kivimäki) 
who were previously affiliated to Danish institutes are not taken 
into consideration in the Danish case. However, Danish situation 
may quickly change along with the new Centre for Resolution of 
International Conflicts (CRIC), headed by Professor Ole Wæver. The 
agenda of the new centre does not include the notion of ‘mediation’ 
as such but as the Centre’s broad understanding of conflict resolution 
and emphasis on ‘the role of the past in protracted conflicts and third 
party possibilities for breaking spirals of escalation’ in practice, the 
focus is on peace mediation process in broad terms.1 
This survey concentrates mainly on peer-reviewed academic 
publications. Most of the evaluated texts have been published in 
academic journals (Journal of Conflict Resolution; Negotiation 
and Conflict Management Research; International Negotiation; 
International Journal; Baltic Journal of Political Science; International 
Journal of Conflict Management; Cooperation and Conflict; Journal 
of Palestine Studies; British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies) or in 
edited volumes published by well-known international publishers. 
Bibliography also includes a few relevant monographs among which 
Svensson’s and Wallensteen’s The Go-Between: Jan Eliasson and the 
Styles of Mediation is the most recent. In other words, this is not 
a survey on broader debate on peace mediation but focus is kept 
on the main academic publications on peace mediation written by 
Nordic academic scholars.
‘Peace mediation’ is conceptualized in this survey as an 
intervention by a third party in a conflict to support, in peaceful 
ways, the achievement of peace, and this kind of mediation can 
take different forms at different stages of the peace process. A more 
precise definition on mediation and other relevant concepts to this 
survey can be found in the following chapter on key concepts. 
1  http://cric.ku.dk/
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Conceptualization made in this survey is based mainly on the 
publications by Nordic scholars and found in the bibliography. The 
main challenge with the selection of studies has been that the term 
‘peace mediation’ has not been used systematically by all scholars. 
Among Nordic scholars, Peter Wallensteen and Isak Svensson 
are the ones who in most systematic terms use the notion ‘peace 
mediation’ while others often prefer to use other related terms, such 
as peacemaking, peace negotiations, and just peace even though 
they are scrutinizing third party intervention to promote peace in 
peaceful ways. It seems that only those scholars who are interested 
in mediation in particular as a practical diplomatic skill use the term 
‘mediation’ in systematic terms while ‘mediation’ is not necessary a 
key term for scholars studying the whole peacemaking process and 
the role of third-party intervention within that peace process. 
Finally, it must be clarified that this survey is, above all, a general 
description of kind. Instead of an all-inclusive approach, the aim of this 
survey is to give an overview on the study made on peace mediation in 
Nordic countries but it does not aim to mark exhaustively every single 
study on peace mediation even though the bibliography at the end of 
this survey strives to be as extensive as possible. Unfortunately, some 
shortages might exist. Instead the study strives to represent the whole 
phenomena of peace mediation as it is presented and discussed in 
Nordic scholarly debate. Furthermore, it aims to bring up the essential 
research themes that the writers of this survey have regarded as the 
most interesting ones within Nordic research. 
It is possible to identify certain themes which are typical to 
research carried out on peace mediation by Nordic academics. 
Several studies analyse the development of peace diplomacy and its 
challenges in asymmetrical conflicts. Among all studies there is a 
clear emphasis on case studies providing a more practical approach 
to mediation in asymmetrical conflicts. Most of the case studies are 
based on Norway’s and Sweden’s active involvement in the arena of 
international peace mediation efforts. Obviously Norway’s efforts 
on Middle East peace talks or the Sri Lankan civil war have created a 
lot of research interest among the Nordic academics. The Norwegian 
model of cooperation between governmental and non-governmental 
actors in the field of peace mediation has also gained attention as a 
17
Mediating Asymmetric Conflicts
research theme. In addition, there are some studies where a single 
Nordic mediator and their personal mediation practice are explored. 
Studies (also) representing theoretical approaches to mediation 
questions such as just peace and different roles of a third party in 
a conflict and concepts such as academic diplomacy have drawn 
attention. 
The themes selected for closer scrutiny do not cover all possible 
focusses on peacemaking that Nordic scholars have studied but they 
are regarded by the writers of this survey as the most interesting and 
significant ones that have also introduced a fresh perspective to the 
study on peace mediation. 
18
2. Defining (Peace) Mediation
2.1. Mediation
‘Peace mediation’ or just ‘mediation’ is a core term of this survey 
but as a concept it opens possibilities for several interpretations 
and thus escapes strict and fixed definitions. In the simplest form, 
‘mediation’ is referred to as ‘a way of resolving disputes between 
two or more parties’ by a third party, the mediator, who assists 
the parties in negotiating a settlement. Mediation is not limited 
to conflicts among states, neither to armed conflicts in general but 
mediation is a commonplace practice ‘in a variety of domains, such 
as commercial, legal, diplomatic, workplace, community and family 
matters’.2  However, this survey is solely interested in mediation as a 
part of a peace process to end or prevent violent (or armed) conflicts 
among states (inter-state war) or civil war kind of a situation within 
which a state or states are one of warring sides (intra-state war). 
The scope of peace mediation could also be expanded to include 
mediation of armed conflicts among non-governmental parties but 
so far these kinds of cases have not been studied by Nordic scholars. 
However, according to Professor Peter Wallensteen this would be 
one of the future challenges on the study of peace mediation to be 
explored3.
Even though mediation is a commonplace practice in various 
spheres of society, there is seemingly no cross-disciplinary forum of 
discussion among scholars studying mediation in armed conflicts, 
labour disputes, schools, or family affairs. If we regard mediation 
as a practical skill used to solve disputes, the creation of a cross-
disciplinary discussion forum on practices and styles of mediation 
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mediation
3 Peter Wallensteen’s keynote lecture at ‘Approaches to Peace Mediation: Is There 
Space For a Nordic Approach’ seminar held at Tampere 14.8.2013
19
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could be fruitful in order to gain a deeper understanding of peace 
mediation practices and styles because the volume of mediation cases 
is much greater, for example, in labour markets than in the case 
of international armed conflicts. However, so far academic study 
on peace mediation has taken place mainly within a framework 
of peace and conflict studies or international relations. That is a 
justified solution when peace mediation is understood as one part 
of a broader peace process in which mediation is intertwined with 
several other questions of peace and war. 
Because of the broad and vague scope of the term ‘mediation’, it is 
necessary to have a useful definition on ‘peace mediation’. According 
to the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation, ‘mediation is a process 
whereby a third party assists two or more parties, with their consent, 
to prevent, manage or resolve a conflict by helping them to develop 
mutually acceptable agreements’.4 ‘A central aspect to any peace 
process is incompatibility’ and mediation is one particular practice 
used in order to find a solution for these incompatibilities that once 
triggered the violence.5 It is imperative to define particular features 
of peace mediation in comparison to other practices of peacemaking. 
Three fundamental and essential elements characteristic to the 
process of mediation can be recognized. However, none of these 
are solely characteristic to mediation process but still their presence 
is crucial for peace mediation. Firstly, mediation, is ‘a normative 
practice embedded in a violent context that, through a structured 
process, intends to resolve an incompatibility by achieving an 
agreement between two or more participating belligerent parties, 
providing for a positive outcome and lasting peace’.6 Even though 
it sounds simple, it is important to remember that a primary goal of 
mediation process is always to create sustainable peace. However, 
defining the concept of ‘peace’ is not as simple a question as it 
sounds and thus a more profound discussion on fundamental terms 
4 http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GuidanceEffective 
Mediation_UNDPA2012%28english%29_1.pdf
5 Mikael Eriksson & Roland Kostić (2013a), ‘Peacemaking and peacebuilding: 
Two ends of a tail’, in Eriksson & Kostić (eds.) Mediation and Liberal Peacebuilding. 
Peace from the Ashes of War? London: Routledge, 13.
6 Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 11.
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on defining ‘peace’ can be found only in a few studies on peace 
mediation. Kristine Höglund and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs have 
done groundbreaking work in their article Beyond the absence of 
war: the diversity of peace in post-settlement societies in which they 
note that ‘the current focus on the simple dichotomy of “failed” and 
“successful” peace…is unable to provide answers to … why some 
post-war societies appear to face greater obstacles than others in 
establishing a more sustainable peace’. According to them, different 
war-endings contribute to different post-war societies but also that 
negotiated war-endings ‘generate different types of peace’. 7
Secondly, ‘mediation is a non-violent mechanism for conflict 
resolution’8 by its nature and thus it radically differs from violent 
tools of peacemaking including all kind of military intervention 
and policies of coercion. The question of how peace mediation is 
interlinked with violent tools of peacemaking is not discussed by 
Nordic scholars. Still, as Karin Aggestam and Annika Björkdahl 
mention, ‘the appropriate and timely use of force can make a 
difference in preventing outbreak of massive violence’ and could 
bring the parties to the negotiation table.9 However, it is obvious 
that the use of force even in order to receive a positive outcome does 
not bring peace and thus it needs to be accompanied by a political 
process of peacemaking, including mediation and negotiation.
Thirdly, mediation is one form of a third-party intervention to 
conflict but without military means. All forms of intervention are 
based on voluntariness and an assumption that the third party 
shares no part in the conflict. Mediation process can be domestic 
without a third-party involvement from outside although ‘most 
mediation processes are externally led’10 but, in any case, mediator 
cannot take a side in the conflict. Prerequisites for humanitarian 
7 Kristine Höglund & Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs (2010), ‘Beyond the absence of 
war: the diversity of peace in post-settlement societies’ Review of International 
Studies, 36 (2): 369, 374.
8 Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 11
9  Karin Aggestam and Annika Björkdahl (2009), ‘Introduction: War and Peace in 
Transition’, in Aggestam & Björkdahl (eds.) War and Peace in Transition. Changing 
Roles of External Actors. Nordic Academic Press, 19–20.
10 Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 11–12.
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intervention by military means have been examined in various 
studies but the issue is seen predominantly as belonging to the sphere 
of international law (question of legal action) or to the sphere of 
morality (question of legitimate action).11 Non-violent third-party 
intervention in peaceful terms based on volunteer participation is 
not seen in similar terms as an issue belonging to internal law but, 
vice versa, it is primarily understood as the moral responsibility 
of the international community. Still, even this kind of peaceful 
intervention may undermine local ownership of peace process and 
‘the self-interest of individual mediators and of political mediators 
such as the state is likely to play an important role in shaping the 
ensuing peace. For example, there is often an underlying ideological 
agenda or normative tradition in which the mediator operates.’ This 
normative element of a peace process is rarely publicly articulated 
and it has, in recent years, become an important question in Nordic 
studies on peacemaking.12 
Furthermore, it is useful to make a distinction between mediation 
and arbitration, on the one hand, and mediation and negotiations, 
on the other hand. In legal terms, mediation ‘differs from arbitration 
in which the third party (arbitrator) acts much like a judge but in an 
out-of-court less formal setting but does not actively participate in 
the discussion’.13 Difference between mediation and arbitration is, 
from a historical perspective, an important division as arbitration 
was seen as an essential practice to solve all wars among states from 
the mid-nineteenth century until the interwar era when mediation 
was, in practical terms, adapted to the diplomatic toolbox to solve 
several border disputes from the Baltics to the Balkans.14 However, 
the Åland case was still solved through arbitration and not that of 
mediation. The League of Nations, to whom Finland and Sweden 
gave the case to solve, passed it on to the Permanent Court of 
11 See for example J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane (eds.) (2003) Humanitarian 
Intervention. Ethical, Political and Legal Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
12 Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 10
13 http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/mediation
14 See for example David Cortright (2011), Rauha. Ajatusten ja liikkeiden historia. 
Helsinki: Gaudemaus/Helsinki University Press.
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Arbitration and the Åland people were the largest population whose 
fate was decided by arbitration.15
Mediation is often regarded as a form of peace negotiations but 
the way these two are related differs among scholars. Following 
Svensson, a mediation process and negotiations differ on the level 
of communication among the parties involved in a conflict. In 
negotiations, the primary parties communicate directly with one 
another, whereas in a mediation process, communication takes place 
either via or with the assistance of a third party.16 
Another Uppsala scholar Kristine Höglund, who has studied the 
relationship between (peace) negotiations and violence, does not 
use the term mediation at all even though a third-party mediator 
has participated to facilitate or mediate peace negotiations she has 
scrutinized. The general term Höglund uses is peace negotiations 
which is defined as a negotiation process to end conflict involving 
two or more parties. Negotiation is ‘a strategic situation, since the 
decisions of the actors are interrelated’. In Höglund’s view peace 
negotiations are part of a broader peace process and, even if not 
explicitly defined, Höglund considers mediation as a one-kind of 
negotiation situation involving third-party interventions.17 
Mikael Eriksson and Roland Kostić emphasize in their 
terminology ‘sensual participation, ownership of the agenda and 
process legitimacy’ and along these criteria define three types 
of peace negotiation processes: a) domestically owned, b) third-
party mediation, and c) pure third-party mediation. Thus for them 
mediation represents one form of negotiations. However, the way 
how they draw a distinction between ‘third-party mediation’ and 
‘pure third-party mediation’ is interesting. According to them, third 
party often uses its power ‘to cajole to start negotiations or accept 
a certain outcome from the talks’. Thus it is necessary to make a 
15 Håkan Wiberg (2004), ‘Nordic Peace – Another Dimension of Nordic 
Exceptionalism’ Kosmopolis 34, Special Issue UV 60, 208.
16 Isak Svensson (2012a), ’Medling och förhandling’, in Aggestam, Karin 
& Höglund, Kristine (eds.) Om krig och fred: en introduktion till freds- och 
konfliktstudier. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 178.
17 Kristine Höglund (2008), Peace Negotiations in the Shadow of Violence. Leiden 
& Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 15.
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distinction between those mediation cases that represent ‘force 
and persuasion in peacemaking’ like Bosnia or Kosovo and those 
belonging more to a pure third-party mediation situation in which 
peace agreement is more locally owned.18 
Furthermore, in studies and guides defining mediation process 
several demarcation lines are drawn between mediation, facilitation, 
dialogue, or diplomacy in general. However, there is no universally 
agreed definition or any consensus on how mediation differs from 
other styles of dialogue that support peace negotiations.19 In a UN 
report on Guidelines on Effective Mediation, mediation is seen 
‘alongside facilitation, good offices and dialogue’ as a method to 
support peacemaking. This kind of technical division between good 
governance, mediation, dialogue, and facilitation or moderated direct 
talks is more common to practitioners than to scholarly literature 
where it is rarely used, and scholars focus more on mediation as part 
of the whole peace process.
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) defines good offices 
as practice of a third party when they facilitate talks, for example, in 
the form of providing venue and facilities instead of actively engaging 
in talks as a go-between.20 The difference between mediation and 
facilitation is a question of form and style of mediation. Facilitation 
is more about supporting discussion among parties by offering a 
forum and acting as a messenger. Facilitator does not necessary 
physically participate in peace negotiations. Mediator, in contrast, 
is more intensively engaged in discussion and actively participates 
in peace negotiations.21 Birger Heldt makes a distinction between 
18 Mikael Eriksson and Roland Kostić (2013b), ‘Rethinking peacemaking: Peace at 
all costs?’, in Eriksson & Kostić (eds.) Mediation and Liberal Peacebuilding. Peace 
from the Ashes of War? London: Routledge, 158-159.
19 Peter Wallensteen & Frida Möller (2008), ‘Third parties in Conflict Prevention: 
A Systematic Look’, in Mellbourn, Anders & Wallensteen, Peter (eds.) Third Parties 
and Conflict Prevention. Anna Lindh Programme on Conflict Prevention, 2008 
edition. Stockholm: Gidlunds, 59.
20 Wallensteen & Möller 2008, 64.
21 Isak Svensson, Isak (2008), ‘Democracies, Disengagement and Deals: Exploring 
the Effect of Different Types of Mediators in Internal Armed Conflicts’, in Öberg, 
Magnus & Strøm, Kaare (eds.) Resources, Governance and Civil Conflict. London: 
Routledge, 234.
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mediation, moderated direct talks, and good governance, and calls 
them different peacemaking strategies. She notes that all these 
tools are used often and they do not necessarily follow each other 
in a planned order and thus make, in several cases, the whole 
peacemaking process distorted. She also explores how the change of 
a tool to another influences the peace process and how the change 
can also be a tactical tool.22
Instead of a nuanced categorization, Wallensteen and Möller 
define modes of a third party’s involvement in negotiation between 
belligerents as bilateral or indirect talks. The more common one 
of these two is bilateral talks in which the third party facilitates 
separate talks with the conflicting parties, but no serious negotiations 
or bargaining is involved. In indirect talks, instead, a third party is 
active in the exchange of information between the conflicting parties. 
Shuttle diplomacy is one example of indirect talks in practice.23 
2.2.  Peace Processes
Although there are several definitions available on mediation 
situations, following elements are essential for them all: a) parties in 
conflicts, b) a mediator, c) a process of mediation, and d) the context 
within which mediation takes place.24  All four elements require further 
explanation: what is the broader peace process of which mediation is 
part and how this broader process should be recognized in mediation 
situation, who can participate in mediation process and what are the 
strategies the mediator can use to persuade warring parties to peace. 
While practitioners often concentrate on particular methods and 
practices in their writings, scholarly view approaches peace mediation 
as ‘one among many practices in the peacemaking toolkit’ which 
22 Birger Heldt (2009), ‘Sequencing of Peacemaking in Emerging Conflicts’, in 
Aggestam & Björkdahl (eds.), War and Peace in Transition. Changing Roles of 
External Actors. Nordic Academic Press, 134–5.
23 Wallensteen & Möller 2008, 63–4.
24 Jacob Bercovitch (2002) ‘Introduction: Putting Mediation In Context’, in 
Bercovitch (ed.) Studies in international mediation: essays in honor of Jeffrey Z. 
Rubin. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 8.
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‘takes place in the midst of other social and political contexts in 
which peacekeeping; bilateral, regional and systematic intervention; 
or sanctions may also be used’. ‘Mediation’ is part of a larger 
peacemaking process but so are also specific kinds of ‘methods of 
preventing, managing and resolving conflicts’.25 Thus, peace mediation 
should be seen as one dimension and one particular practice of a 
broader process of peacemaking, peace process, or conflict resolution. 
These three terms are used as overlapping ways to describe the overall 
process and the semantic difference between terms is far from clear. 
Peace process as a term was introduced in the 1970s to describe 
the transition from war to peace, usually through various kinds 
of negotiated settlements. Peace process is a multi-layered and 
multi-phased process but the most essential issue is a willingness 
of primary parties to solve the conflict issues through negotiated 
settlement.26  Following the general definition for conflict resolution, 
it is referred to as ‘the methods and processes involved in facilitating 
the peaceful ending of a conflict’ and methods and procedures of 
conflict resolution include, but are not limited to, ‘negotiation, 
mediation, diplomacy, and creative peacebuilding’.27 
Peacemaking is an often used but rarely clearly defined general 
notion in scholarly studies describing the broader process from 
war to peace but perhaps it provides more emphasis on questions 
dealing with post-conflict societal peace. Following Wallensteen 
‘peacemaking refers to the efforts to peacefully settle an ongoing 
armed conflict, including negotiation and mediation between the 
parties. Such efforts can be assessed in the immediate short term, 
that is, whether they actually served to end an armed conflict (or 
other types of armed behavior). The long-term perspective brings 
attention to its importance for the relationship between the warring 
parties, and potentially for peacebuilding after a conflict.’28 Despite 
25 Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 12.   
26 Höglund 2008, 15–17.
27 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conflict_resolution
28 Peter Wallensteen (2012) ‘Academic Diplomacy: The Role of Non-Decision 
Makers in Peacemaking’, in Nan, Susan Allen & Mampilly, Zachariah Cherian & 
Bartoli, Andrea (eds.) Peacemaking: From Practice to Theory. Santa Barbara: ABC-
CLIO, 458.
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the term selected to describe the whole process it is important to 
comprehend peacemaking process as a whole and avoid making 
artificial exclusions and one-sided definitions while still questioning 
the role of mediation within a larger process. 
A fundamental and also dividing issue is the question whether 
peace process ends in negotiated peace agreement or whether a 
negotiated agreement is just one, even if important, phase towards 
sustainable peace. Galtungian division between negative and positive 
peace provides an explanation for different interpretations. If peace 
is merely understood as the absence of war or violence, then peace 
process comes to its conclusion in ceasefire and negotiated peace 
agreement. Even though not always explicitly pinpointed, many 
Nordic studies on peace mediation or negotiations have chosen this 
kind of interpretation as they examine mediation solely as a process 
to bring a war and violent activity to an end. However, if peace 
is understood to cover a multitude of positive content, such as the 
restoration of relationships, the creation of social systems that serve 
the needs of the whole population, and the constructive resolution 
of conflict, then negotiated or mediated agreement is not the end but 
only a culmination in a long process towards peace. 
Peacebuilding is another term used to describe the whole 
peace process. In 1976, Johan Galtung defined peacebuilding as 
a promotion of sustainable peace by addressing the ‘root causes’ 
of violent conflict and supporting indigenous capacities for peace 
management and conflict resolution.29 During the last two decades, 
peacebuilding has referred to international peace-support operations 
which are in place in order to reconstruct collapsed states or societies 
after peace agreement is achieved. In the post-Cold War years, the 
previously hegemonic logic of peacekeeping was replaced by the 
logic of peacebuilding that includes the idea that after the end of 
an armed conflict international community does not just guarantee 
peace but that the establishment of a truly sustainable peace would 
require supporting the whole post-conflict societal development. The 
29 Johan Galtung (1976), ‘Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking 
and Peacebuilding’, in Galtung, Essays in peace research , vol. 2. Copenhagen: 
Ejlers, 282–304.
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Brahimi Panel Report30 from August 2000 defined ‘peace-building as 
including, but not limited to rebuilding civil society, strengthening 
the rule of law, through police restructuring and judicial and penal 
reform; improving the human rights situation by monitoring, 
educating and investigating abuses; democratic development 
including election and media regulation; tackling corruption; HIV/
AIDS education and control; and promoting conflict resolution and 
reconciliation’. Several large international peacebuilding operations 
have been established from the 1990s onwards in order to support 
failed and weak states after armed conflicts or humanitarian crisis. 
Scholarly debate has recently criticized strongly international 
peacebuilding operation by noticing the so-called peacebuilding 
paradox: peacebuilding involves intervention on the establishment 
of sovereignty, indoctrination for the sake of enlightenment, and 
political coercion in the name of political freedom. It is emphasized 
that peacebuilding cannot be neutral as it reflects certain norms of 
good society and undermines local ownership.31 Still, according to 
scholars like Ioannis Tellidis, we should not forget, while critiquing, 
that ‘peace is desperately needed’. Therefore, the recent debate has 
concentrated on the discussion on a hybrid model of peacebuilding 
that would take more into consideration local experiences and 
ownership and cherish further ‘dignity and quality of life…what is 
actually needed in post-conflict scenarios’.32 Oliver Richmond has 
emphasized the importance of local and indigenous agency in peace 
process and has introduced the notion of ‘peace formation’ which 
he defines as a conceptual framework that ‘attempts to understand 
the local “formation” of peace’. According to him, ‘peace formation 
processes, where indigenous or local agents of peacebuilding, conflict 
resolution or development, in customary, religious, cultural, social or 
local political or local government settings, find ways of establishing 
 
30 http://www.unrol.org/doc.aspx?n=brahimi+report+peacekeeping.pdf
31 Neil Cooper, Mandy Turner & Michel Pugh (2011) ‘The end of history and the 
last liberal peacebuilder: a reply to Roland Paris’ Review of International Studies, 
37(4): 1998–2003.
32 Ioannis Tellidis (2012), ‘The End of the Liberal Peace? Post-Liberal Peace vs. 
Post-Liberal States’ International Studies Review, 14(3), 429–435.
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peace processes and dynamic local forms of peace, which are also 
constitutive of their state’.33  
Peacebuilding debate brings up a significant question on the role 
and position of peace mediation in peace process. On the one hand, 
mediation has gained a broader meaning as an important element 
of the whole peace process and not just a tactic to end an armed 
conflict.  Mediation is currently seen as valuable practice or skill 
throughout the whole peacemaking process. On the other hand, 
criticism towards third-party intervention in the form of large-scale 
peacebuilding operations and Richmond’s emphasis on local peace 
process brings up one question: what would be the position of 
mediation that represents a soft form of a third-party intervention? 
That question has not yet been studied but one suggestion is that 
even peace formation would need, in crucial times, third-party 
support, but at the same a broadened model of mediation is needed 
to offer new solutions.
Several Nordic scholars have recently challenged traditional 
focus on conflict mediation belonging solely to a peace process 
which leads to a negotiated agreement ending an armed conflict 
and instead called for approaches to understand peace mediation 
as a part of a boarder peacebuilding process. In particular, peace 
mediation is examined as part of a broader peacebuilding process in 
recent books Rethinking Peacebuilding. The Quest for Just Peace in 
the Middle East and the Western Balkans, edited by Karin Aggestam 
and Annika Björkdahl, and Mediation and Liberal Peacebuilding. 
Peace from the Ashes of War, edited by Mikael Eriksson and Roland 
Kostić. Eriksson and Kostić argue that ‘contemporary studies play 
only limited attention to the connection between peacemaking and 
peacebuilding and its implications for a more durable post-conflict 
peace’ and if we want to study why some peace agreements fail and 
some last it is important to concentrate on analysing the position 
and implication of mediation in the whole peacebuilding process.34 
In similar terms, Professor Ole Wæver explained his understanding 
of conflict resolution and the part the mediation plays in that. 
33 Oliver Richmond (2013) ‘Failed statebuilding versus peace formation’ 
Cooperation and Conflict, 48(3), 384–7.
34 Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 5.
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Mediation is not just needed for ending armed conflict but, in the 
best case, it is used to prevent conflict but also throughout the post-
conflict peacebuilding process, for example, to reconcile conflicting 
identities and collective memories.35  
That is not to argue that previous studies on peace mediation 
have had no interest in post-conflict situation but that new studies 
present the role of peace mediation in peace process differently. 
Previously, mediation success was examined by studying if an 
agreement was achieved and, secondly, if the agreement has been 
sustainable. Success is usually measured by checking if an armed 
conflict has renewed within the following five-year period. New 
approaches concentrate on how mediated solution sets premises for 
building sustainable peace for years onwards and how the question 
of just peace should be recognized in mediated solution. 
2.3.  The Role of the Third Party
Peace mediation process requires several actors. The number of 
parties involved in conflicts has increased but the same can also 
be said about the parties involved in mediation process. Still, all 
mediation processes involve a mediator and primary parties and/or 
representatives or advisers thereof. Primary parties of a conflict are 
the ones in disagreement, or, in other words, seeking control over 
a common or a limited resource. The so-called secondary parties 
in a conflict are not directly involved in a conflict, but do, in some 
way, support either one or some of the primary parties involved. 
Furthermore, there are third parties of a conflict, which refer to the 
ones whose aim is to make an effort to find a solution for the conflict 
at hand. It is also valuable to note that actors related to a conflict 
may vary their roles in different phases of a conflict.36 
Mediation situation requires ‘a form of intervention by a third 
party in a conflict or some other kind of a matter of dispute’.37 When 
35 Ole Wæver’s keynote lecture at ‘Approaches to Peace Mediation: Is There Space 
For a Nordic Approach’ seminar held at Tampere 14.8.2013
36 Svensson 2012, 178.
37 Ibid.
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defining a third party to a conflict, Wallensteen and Möller refer to 
the definition used by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) 
which defines a third party as ‘a party that is involved in either helping 
the warring parties to regulate the incompatibility or the level of the 
violence and work as an intermediary between the two’.38 
Mediation can be pursued by a single person like Martti Ahtisaari 
or Jan Eliasson, an non-governmental organization like the Carter 
Centre or the Crisis Management Initiative, a state like the United 
States or Norway, a regional body like the African Union or the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), or an 
international body like the United Nations or the European Union.39
Individuals in a role of a mediator/a third party to a conflict 
are ‘people with particular status who can transcend the conflict 
divides, such as individuals with religious roles, retired statesmen or 
even businessmen’.40 Traditionally, individuals practicing mediation 
are known as official representatives of their government who 
aim to assist formal interaction between high-level representatives 
of the parties in conflict.41 In recent years, two important studies 
focusing on Nordic peacemakers have been published. Svensson 
and Wallensteen have scrutinized the styles and modes of mediation 
through the experiences of Swedish diplomat Jan Eliasson. Mona 
Fixdal has edited a book Ways Out of War: Peacemakers in the 
Middle East and Balkans (2012) which focuses on several Nordic 
peacemakers including Martti Ahtisaari, Jan Egeland, and Thorvald 
Stoltenberg. It is worth to mention that despite Ahtisaari’s reputation 
in Finland there is no academic study on his work as a mediator 
written by a Finnish scholar. 
Non-governmental actors’ activity in peace processes has 
dramatically increased. There are plenty of roles for non-governmental 
actors to take, such as the one of a pressure group. Roles of a facilitator, 
mediator, or an implementer of a peace process are also available for 
non-governmental actors. In addition, NGOs can play an important 
38 Wallensteen & Möller 2008, 58−9.
39 Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 12. 
40 Peter Wallensteen (2007), Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and 
the Global System. 2nd Edition. London: Sage, 266.
41 Bercovitch 2002, 10.
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role as donor groups who take part in the transformation of social 
structures that are crucial for any peace process to be successful.42 
However, especially the impact of non-governmental actors’ third-
party activity is mostly hard to ascertain. In spite of this, third-party 
activities of non-governmental actors may have stronger effect on 
lower levels of decision making compared to ultimate decision 
makers.43 
Timo Kivimäki and David Gorman emphasize the great variety 
and usefulness of activities that non-governmental actors may 
provide for peace processes. Roughly speaking, in all situations 
where exchange of ideas, information, and critical analysis is needed, 
non-governmental actors have a lot to give. On the other side, the 
authors recognize that whenever large scale power and persuasion 
is needed, official international institutions are likely to be more 
useful than non-governmental actors.44 Furthermore, NGOs are 
useful ‘in matching people, creating forums where enemies can meet’ 
and helping ‘brainstorming ideas on peace processes and peaceful 
solutions’.45 Despite the growing presence and the significance 
of NGOs in peace processes, their role is not thoroughly studied 
and one major challenge is the fact that despite a growth in non-
governmental third-party activity their impact on peace process 
is difficult to pinpoint as NGOs ‘have impacts on lower levels of 
decision making rather than the ultimate decision makers’.46 
The arising interest of the international organizations on peace 
mediation has been noticed in Nordic studies and, in particular, 
the EU’s role has been the target of Finnish studies.47 Still, there 
42 Timo Kivimäki & David Gorman, David (2008), ‘Non-Governmental Actors in 
Peace Processes: The Case of Aceh’, in Mellbourn, Anders & Wallensteen, Peter 
(eds.) Third Parties and Conflict Prevention. Anna Lindh Programme on Conflict 
Prevention, 2008 edition. Stockholm: Gidlunds, 181.
43 Wallensteen 2012, 457.
44 Kivimäki & Gorman 2008, 183. 
45 Ibid., 182.
46 Wallensteen 2012, 457.
47 Tanja Tamminen (2011), ‘Strengthening European peace mediation capacities: A 
more proactive EU in the making?’, in  Piiparinen, Touko & Brummer, Ville (eds.) 
Global networks of mediation: Prospects and avenues for Finland as a peacemaker. 
FIIA report 32. Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 45–52.
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could have been more studies on closer scrutinization on the role 
of international or regional organizations. Somehow surprisingly 
a state has preserved, in peace mediation literature, a key actor 
role and, in particular, Norway’s role as a peace mediator has been 
approached from various perspectives. However, for example, 
despite the emphasis on peace mediation at the Uppsala University 
no single study on Sweden’s role as a peace mediator exists.
In regard to the role of states Svensson made a controversial 
observation when he compared democracies’ and non-democracies’ 
role as a mediator. He discovered that non-democracies are likely to 
be more successful in costly conflicts. As the successful outcome of 
a mediation process is not guaranteed, democracies’ need to please 
internal audiences may hinder the strength of their mediation efforts. 
Instead, non-democracies have more freedom to use the withdrawal 
card in their mediation efforts, for they are not accountable to their 
internal audiences in the same sense.48 
48 Svensson 2008, 242.
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3.  Mediation in     
 Asymmetrical Conflicts 
3.1.  Transnational Warfare 
As long as there have been wars and conflicts there has been a need 
for peacemakers and mediators among conflicting sides but as wars 
have changed during the past decades and centuries so have also 
the forms of peacemaking and peace diplomacy. As Mona Fixdal 
reminds, ‘peacemaking is not a uniform activity; unvarying and 
consistent over time. Rather, the nature of a conflict – the parties 
to it, what they fight about, and the way the war is being fought – 
will define the constraints within which a peacemaker operates, and 
tasks and challenges he or she faces.’49
Peacemaking itself has a long history, and there have been 
various efforts to introduce and establish international systems that 
would solve and, in the best case, prevent wars, and perhaps in the 
future not just end one particular war but all wars. Before post-
Cold War era the most intensive period of searching for mechanism 
of peacemaking was the end of the imperial age from the late 19th 
century to early the 20th century. During those times the aim was 
to establish a permanent system of arbitration that was the major 
agenda of the Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907.50 
Peacemaking was then understood as a regulated system among 
sovereign states. However, the collapse of old multiethnic Empires 
of Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman created new challenges when 
49 Mona Fixdal (2012a) ‘Introduction: Peacemaking in Asymmetrical Conflicts’, 
in Fixdal (ed.) Ways Out of War: Peacemakers in the Middle East and Balkans. 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2.
50 John Gittings (2012) The Glorious Art of Peace. From the Iliad to Iraq. Oxford 
University Press, 142–9.
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several ethnic conflicts spread, stretching from the Baltic Sea to Syria, 
which had a lot of common elements with current asymmetrical 
conflicts. International community and, in particular, the League of 
Nations were involved in mediating and solving many of these.51 
Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen was involved in several early mediation 
cases among which the most famous is the Turkish–Greek peace 
treaty of 1922 that was based on massive exchange of population. 
The treaty, in practice, destroyed centuries-old multiethnic societies 
but was celebrated in its time, and Nansen was awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize and has been considered a national hero in Norway.52 
During the Cold War era international community was ‘rather 
successful in preventing, avoiding and resolving conflicts between states’ 
even though there were serious conflicts in Southeast Asia and Africa. 
Simultaneously, the proportion of conflicts within states – not between 
them – increased steadily; however, the international community 
was incapable to cope with these as ‘the principles and practices of 
international law and diplomacy with their emphasis on sovereignty 
and non-intervention’ prevented international community to intervene 
in these conflicts. ‘Hence the realities of the Cold War restricted 
opportunities for peace diplomacy.’53 That is not to say that states did 
not negotiate at all with non-state actors like rebel or terrorist groups 
even though that might have been rare but that these discussions can 
be defined merely as peace overtures without a possibility of a public 
process of peace mediation among state and non-state actors. Niall 
Ó Dochartaigh and Isak Svensson have discussed the mediators’ role 
in indirect negotiations by focusing on overtures between the British 
government and the IRA in the 1970s and early 1980s,54 but as non- 
 
51 Gittings 2012, 150–158; Martyn Housden (2012) The League of Nations and 
the Organisation of Peace. Pearson Education Limited. 
52 Carl Emil Vogt (2005) ‘Fritjof Nansen and the Norwegian Peace Tradition’ 
http://www.hum.au.dk/forskerskoler/historiephd_old/papercarlemil2005.pdf
53 Vidar Helgesen (2007) How Peace Diplomacy Lost Post 9/11. What Implications 
are there for Norway? Oslo Files on Defence and Security 03/2007, 6–7.
54 Niall O. Dochartaig & Isak Svensson, (2013) ‘The exit option: mediation and the 
termination of negotiations in the Northern Ireland conflict’ International Journal 
of Conflict Management, 24(1), 40−55.
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state actors were not recognized as agents of war there was no open 
mediation to end this kind of a conflict. 
International community’s efforts and ability to mediate conflicts 
concentrated mainly on conflicts between states like in the case of the 
Iran–Iraq War in which the Swedes played an important role twice in 
the 1980s. First Olof Palme was nominated Special Representative of 
the UN’s Secretary-General on November 1980 and mediation efforts 
took several years. However, there were long periods without active 
mediation and only low-level contacts were in place. The conflict finally 
ended in ceasefire in August 1988 two and a half years after Palme was 
murdered. Jan Eliasson, who took already part in the Palme mission, 
was appointed as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to 
Iran–Iraq in September 1988 and finally in 1991, over a decade after the 
beginning of the mediation process, Iran and Iraq signed an agreement 
which included the withdrawal of forces, demining, and the creation of 
a buffer zone as well as allowed the UN to start monitoring it.55 
In the post-Cold War era, the amount of intra-state wars has 
decreased in drastic terms but ‘yet at the same time powerful 
states are projecting power and conducting military interventions 
in Afghanistan, Iraq and Georgia’.56 Large majority of war-kind 
conflicts have not any more occurred between states but rather have 
taken place within states and thus they can be defined as civil wars 
as most of the violent activity has been limited within the territory of 
a collapsing state. However, simultaneously transnational violence 
has spread its influences far away from the war zone. These conflicts 
are distinct from inter-state conflicts since they often take place 
within collapsing or weak states or, in other words, in cases where a 
state is loosening legitimacy for given territory. States are not fading 
away but in several conflict areas states have lost ‘the monopoly on 
the legitimate use of physical force in a given territory’.57 Typical 
55 Isak Svensson & Peter Wallensteen (2010) The Go-Between. Jan Eliasson and 
the Styles of Mediation. Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
137–47.
56 Aggestam & Björkdahl 2009, 16.
57 Jay Winter (2012) ‘Postscript: War and Peace in a Transnational Age’, in Fixdal, 
Mona (ed.) Ways Out of War: Peacemakers in the Middle East and Balkans. Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2. See also Aggestam & Björkdahl 2009, 17–18.
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examples from the 1990s are Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda but new 
cases have continuously appeared and the Syrian War is the latest 
example. 
Classical Westphalian dichotomy and approach between internal–
external, but also that of local–global, has appeared in blurred form. 
Several conflicts, in particular in the Balkans and the Middle East in 
the 1990s, challenge the Westphalian understanding of warfare as 
sole monopoly of states and instead of classical inter-state warfare 
the current violent conflicts represent a new kind of transnational 
warfare.58 In studies focusing on peacemaking these conflicts are 
often defined as asymmetrical wars. The term is used to pinpoint how 
warring parties are not anymore only states but involve parties other 
than established governments like different rebel, paramilitary, and 
terrorist groups. The confusion on who the parties of the war are and 
thus who should be allowed to participate in peace negotiations are 
characteristic to new wars. The situation is often more blurred when 
it is examined closer as the rebel group can be, in practice, divided 
into several subgroups without any clear commanding hierarchies. 
The distinction between a soldier and a civilian that appears clear in 
classical Westphalian wars has also blurred and is also intertwined 
with targets and motivation of violence.
Asymmetrical wars ‘concern most essentially the claim to 
independence or statehood of an ethnic or national group initially 
ruled by others’ and, therefore, ‘the question of identity – whether it 
is conceived of in ethnic, religious, or national terms – is thus at the 
heart of these wars’.59 Claims to power and political arguments are 
frequently based on identity discourses and ethnic homogeneity. As 
these conflicts are identity-based, they draw heavily on discourses 
of historical enmity, hatred, and insecurity, which trigger basic 
existential fears of group survival, expulsion, and ethnic cleansing.60 
As wars are about ‘identities’ and ‘memories’, the role of civil 
population has changed from a passive observer and a source of 
support into one of a main target of war, and the struggle is over the 
58 Winter 2012.
59 Fixdal 2012a, 4.
60 Aggestam & Björkdahl 2009, 17.
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minds of people.  The notion of ‘ethnic cleansing’ was introduced in 
the 1990s to describe the character of wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Rwanda which ended in brutal effort to physically destroy 
another ethnic group.  Ownership of territory and expression of 
authenticity of one’s own community was seen required through the 
destruction of contradicting historical sites – sites of memory – as 
well as people themselves. 
Furthermore, considering these ‘new wars’ it is difficult to make 
a distinction between warfare and organized crime, and large-scale 
violation of human rights has become commonplace in new wars. 
Thus the conflict often generates an extensive refugee problem that 
is transnational by nature. According to Winter, ‘war outside of the 
Westphalian state system appears to be increasingly intractable and 
frighteningly interminable’ as ‘subnational or transnational warfare at 
its worst is war without rules or ethnical conventions’.61 She pinpoints 
three specific features of the landscape of asymmetrical wars and how 
they play a significant role in peacemaking. All these three questions 
have been approached by several Nordic scholars. The first thing to note 
is that due to the amount of several sides in a conflict ‘multiple actors 
have to be involved in peacemaking’. Previously, peace negotiations 
took place only among states and non-state actors were excluded from 
peace diplomacy. Furthermore, there could have been a demand of a 
change of regime even before the negotiations start. Currently there 
is no possibility to this kind of luxury and it is important to involve 
all warring parties in negotiations. Secondly, in asymmetrical conflicts 
‘those who sign the accords do not control all of those engaged in 
the conflict’ as was the case in state-centric diplomacy. Rebel and 
terrorist groups do not represent the whole population and they 
have not received their legitimacy through democratic procedures. 
Thirdly, the abuses of human rights have become commonplace in 
new conflicts and it is necessary to note in the process of peacemaking 
the question of justice and how war criminals are punished. Still, most 
of those who participate in peace negotiations have soiled their hands 
in blood. Thus, she concludes that ‘post-Westphalian peacemaking is 
not a matter for the faint hearted, but for those who can look war 
in the face, and see it as the abomination it is, whatever form it 
61 Winter 2012, 254–5.
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takes. For this, they deserve our attention, our respect, and our 
understanding.’62
3.2.  Peace Diplomacy
Several scholars have contested the notion of ‘new wars’ introduced 
by Mary Kaldor63 in the 1990s as a justifiable term to describe the 
wars in the post-Cold War era. However, criticism is barking up the 
wrong tree. All features of new wars are certainly not new as such and 
this kind of idea of ‘new wars’ can already be found from the Cold 
War era and, in particular, from interwar and colonial era. However, 
although freedom movements and terrorist activists have existed 
since the 19th century, classical wars were seen to be the privilege of 
sovereign entities. The nodal point of the Westphalian system has been 
the monopolization of foreign policy and army to territorial sovereign 
states. Logical conclusion to that is that states have a privilege to wars 
and wars in Clausewitzian terms can be seen as one, even though 
extreme, tool in a political system. Peacemakers have to recognize 
the nature of war but also prevailing hegemonic discourse on what 
is understood as war or, as Fixdal writes, it is ‘war’s quintessential 
image’64 that sets a frame for peacemaking itself. 
The end of the Cold War changed, in drastic terms, international 
norms and practices and it enabled the development of a new kind 
of peace diplomacy. Simultaneously the understanding of the limits 
of state sovereignty and human rights has drastically changed.  The 
integrity of a state was a dominating norm throughout the Cold 
War era but since the 1990s the intervention set by international 
community to end a humanitarian conflict was regarded as legitimate 
and even as an obligation for international community.65 Several 
humanitarian interventions like Bosnia and Kosovo express a new 
62 Winter 2012, 254–6.
63 Mary Kaldor (2007) New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era. 
2nd edition. Stanford University Press.
64 Fixdal 2012a, 3.
65 David Chandler (2002)  From Kosovo to Kabul. Human rights and International 
Intervention.  Pluto press. 
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norm which the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) has modified in 2000 into a form according to 
which sovereignty entails a responsibility to protect civilians, and 
the international community has a secondary responsibility if a 
sovereign state fails to fulfill its duty. However, there are not many 
cases in the 2000s when Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has been 
applied and only in the Libyan case it was used for legitimating 
international intervention. Scholars argue about its importance and 
some like Alex Bellamy emphasize that it is the single most important 
development of international diplomacy66 while others like Aidan 
Hehir call it the Emperor’s new clothes67. 
Peacemaking and peace diplomacy have been also redefined 
as part of this drastic change of international norms.  The 1990s 
was in particular a golden age of new peace diplomacy and some 
forty conflicts were successfully solved through peace negotiations. 
Third-party intervention to negotiations and peace mediation 
became accepted as wide-spread practices of international peace 
diplomacy but simultaneously diplomacy was not anymore limited 
exclusively among states but instead the states facilitated and 
mediated negotiations among various warring parties. In contrast to 
the Cold War norms, the change was drastic but it took place step 
by step through individual cases among which the Israel–Palestinian 
negotiations in 1993 in Oslo were a groundbreaking event (to be 
analysed in chapter 5.1.). 
The Rwanda genocide in 1994 challenged the overwhelming 
optimism towards new peace diplomacy but according to Vidar 
Helgesen the date which marked the beginning of a new era was 
11 September 2001.  If the Oslo Peace Process in 1993 was a 
groundbreaking event for opening peace mediation also towards 
asymmetrical conflicts and allowing rebel or even terrorist 
organizations like PLO, which was at that time labelled as a terrorist 
organization, to participate in peace process, in the post-9/11 era 
‘terrorism has become policy making’s mental Berlin Wall’. The 
66 Alex J. Bellamy ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Added value or hot air?’ 
Cooperation and Conflict, 48(3), 333–357.
67 Aidan Hehir (2010) ‘The Responsibility to Protect: “Sound and Fury Signifying 
Nothing”?’ International Relations, 24(2), 218–239.
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effects of this change have been drastic for conflict resolution efforts 
as ‘in the era of global terrorism, asymmetrical conflicts at the 
national level have increasingly come to be seen through the prism 
of global campaign against terrorism’. The result of this has been 
that attention is not paid to the dynamics of each conflict anymore 
but primarily the concern is the tactics of rebels and whether they 
use terrorist methods in their method of war. This kind of activity 
delegitimizes them as potential participants of peace discussion.  In 
the post-9/11 era, it has not been anymore possible to negotiate, for 
example, with the terrorist-labelled Hamas, and therefore ‘Norway 
is caught between international anti-terrorist policies which it 
cannot influence and peace diplomacy ambitions it cannot live up to 
precisely’ because of the EU and US policies. 68  
In contrast to Helgesen, Kristine Höglund pinpoints that even 
though the ‘need to stop violence’ calls for negotiations with terrorists, 
these negotiations are a risky business for states as they are widely seen 
as a sign weakness and irresponsibility. Vice versa, violence for terrorist 
groups is a prime form of acting and, thus, seeking peaceful dialogue 
between states and other parties is difficult for them and participation 
in negotiations may unbalance the credibility of the terrorist group. 
Nonetheless, labelling rebels as terrorists is also a rhetorical tool used 
to deny the rebels’ legitimacy and possibility to negotiate for peace.69 
The questions that require more research are how the war on terror 
has set new limits to peace diplomacy as well as how much global 
security framework defines what cases are mediated and what cases 
are not grasping the attention of the international community. 
3.3.  Paradox of Asymmetric Negotiation 
‘There are different types of wars evident today and the peacemaking 
during and after asymmetrical conflicts poses its own distinct 
68 Helgesen 2007, 9–11, 14–16.
69 Kristine Höglund (2011) ‘Tactics in Negotiations between States and Extremists. 
The Role of Cease-Fires and Counterterrorist Measures’, in Zartman, I. William & 
Faure, Guy Oliver (eds.) Engaging Extremists. Trade-Offs, Timing, and Diplomacy. 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 222–4.
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challenges and dilemmas’ and thus asymmetrical conflicts require 
asymmetrical diplomacy.70 Or, as Helgesen notes, ‘if asymmetric 
conflicts are to be resolved then asymmetric diplomacy is needed 
meaning that states should learn to negotiate with terrorists’.71 The 
main question is how asymmetric diplomacy differs from state-
to-state diplomacy and what kind of new practices it requires. 
Helgesen, in his turn, takes a rather practical viewpoint by pointing 
out that asymmetric diplomacy provides what negotiators need in 
order to have a better understanding of the rebels’ political interests, 
to assure rebels that participation in diplomatic process is the best 
way to influence the future, and to also negotiate with terrorist to 
end terrorist activity. As all this is certainly important, other Nordic 
scholars have either examined asymmetric negotiation situations 
from a more general point of view or then studied the particular 
toolbox of a mediator to equalize the negotiations situation. 
As Fixdal points out, asymmetric negotiation situation holds 
a paradox as ‘best negotiation situations are among equals and 
thus efficient negotiations is not possible in asymmetric situation’. 
Some minimal equality between the negotiating parties is required 
because if the negotiating parties are very unequal ‘the party with 
more power have an undue advantage’ and in that situation peace 
negotiations are merely able to continue with the unilateral actions 
of the stronger party.72  
Even though asymmetric negotiation is in theory a paradox, the 
acceptance of an asymmetric situation is also reality if a third party 
intervenes to end an asymmetric conflict. What strategies does the 
mediator use to balance the asymmetric negotiations and to moderate 
power asymmetry? Following Fixdal, the principal requirement 
for a successful negotiation situation among asymmetric parties is 
that negotiating parties have a basic respect for the people they are 
negotiating with and on behalf of.73 In current asymmetric conflicts 
this not necessarily the case and the mediation situation holds 
70 Fixdal 2012a, 4.
71 Helgesen 2007, 13–14.
72 Mona Fixdal (2012b) Just Peace. How Wars Should End. Palgrave Macmillan, 
35–8.
73 Fixdal 2012b, 27.
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discrepancy of expectations by parties and often ‘the bargaining 
situation is inevitably unfair’. Mediation may also be used by 
parties who are not committed to negotiations and compromises. 
Mediation, therefore, becomes a cover for more ‘devious objectives’ 
such as enhancing international legitimacy or gaining time. The 
parties in conflict must have a certain degree of recognition towards 
each other in order for official negotiations to take place.74 
Participation in mediation process offers as a by-product for 
a non-state actor (international) recognition and grants certain 
legitimacy for its position as the opponent (participating state) and 
the international community agrees on non-state actor’s agency. 
Thus, gaining this international recognition may be enough for 
rebels. However, although the non-state actors lack a legal status 
they still have the burden of proving their acceptance to be included 
to peace process and ‘if such a group cannot claim popular support 
or if it has engaged in violation of the laws of war, its plea to be 
brought into the negotiations process is often ignored’.75 Mediation 
situation may offer for a state actor an opportunity to preserve 
status quo. Sri Lanka’s case (to be analysed in chapter 5.1.) offers 
a good example of these contradicting interests participating in a 
peace process. 
In recent years, the spoiling problem has gained some attention 
within peace mediation literature. Spoiling refers to international or 
national acts of violence aimed at derailing a peace process. Yet in 
academia it has remained a relatively unexplored area of research 
and thus the role of a spoiler as one of the players influencing the 
mediation process should be noticed in the study of mediation 
process. Still, peace process almost by definition produces spoiling 
behaviour since it challenges established assumptions of who is a 
patriot and a traitor, an enemy and a friend, and who becomes the 
winner and the loser when peace agreement is to be implemented.76 
Höglund concentrates in her study on how incidents of violence 
influence the course of peace negotiations. High-profile incidents of 
74	 Svensson	2012,	177−8.
75 Fixdal 2012a, 17.
76 Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 28.
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violence ‘may serve as a reminder of the cost and risk of continued 
fighting’ and then strengthen efforts to achieve peace, but in the most 
cases influences are negative and peace talks are postponed, stalled, 
or cancelled altogether. If violence affects either inter-party mistrust 
among negotiating partners or intra-party opposition to peace talks, 
effects are damaging for negotiations.77 Höglund does not examine 
how a third party could manage this kind of a situation. 
Höglund and Svensson have closely studied several practices 
that mediators have in an asymmetric situation. According to 
them, ‘asymmetry is a multidimensional and dynamic concept’ and 
for example in the case of Sri Lanka legal asymmetries, material 
imbalances, imbalance in negotiations’ capacities, and tactical 
asymmetries can be recognized. In regard to legal asymmetry the 
case pinpointed that the state has the ability to sign treaties, and 
participation in negotiations does not offer the state any further value. 
Rebel groups lack international recognition and thus similar legal 
status to sign treaties. The mediator needs to accept the imbalance as 
it is but then the mediator could apply equalizing strategies towards 
the parties to manage the asymmetric situation. They could either 
disregard the asymmetries (even-handedness) or seek to empower 
the weaker side (equalizing). The latter is challenging if the mediator 
tries to preserve their impartiality at the same time.78 During the 
Oslo Back Channel Norway more or less even-handed the Israelis 
and the Palestinians but in Sri Lanka both methods were in use as it 
will be more closely analysed in chapter 5.1..
77 Höglund 2008, 5, 13, 154.
78 Kristine Höglund & Isak Svensson (2008a) ‘Damned if You Do, and Damned if 
You Don’t: Nordic Involvement and Images of Third-Party Neutrality in Sri Lanka’ 
International Negotiation, 13(3), 345−6.
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4.  Mediator’s Styles    
 and Practices
Regarding studies on peace mediation, there can recognized a 
division between those scrutinizing peace mediation situation as part 
of a broader conflict resolution process and those who approach 
peace mediation as a practical diplomatic skill. The first grants more 
attention to the whole process and focuses on (long-term) influences 
of peace mediation situation as the latter emphasizes more mediator’s 
perspective and concentrates on styles and practices available for 
mediation situation. However, the division is far from simple and 
clear. Among Nordic scholars, particularly Isak Svensson and Peter 
Wallensteen have in their studies emphasized that scholarly interest 
should also focus on ‘the styles of international mediation’ because 
‘style is crucial for understanding how the mediation process 
unfolds’.79 
4.1.  Mandate
According to Wallensteen, the appointment and mandate of the 
mediator as well as the approach taken by the third party when 
dealing with all the parties in a conflict are two crucial issues when 
it comes to the work of a third party in a conflict.80 Mediator’s 
mandate is essential in defining the approach of the mediator to 
peace process. Svensson and Wallensteen remind that ‘no mediator 
end up by chance in a conflict’ and also mediation has its history. 
‘All mediators operate under a mandate’ but who sets the mandate 
and what the mandate says are pivotal questions to pose in order to 
79 Svensson & Wallensteen 2010, xi.
80 Wallensteen 2007, 267.
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examine the whole mediation process, which, following Svensson 
and Wallensteen, is underestimated in peace mediation literature. 
‘While the mandating agency can be an asset to the mediator, it may 
also restrict what the mediator can do, because the mediator must 
navigate between the primary parties and the mandating agency.’ 
Furthermore, the mandating agency ‘shapes the way the primary 
parties view the third party’.81 
Mandates can be given by parties themselves or by an external 
actor. In the first case, the mandate is usually given ‘through an 
informal process’ and formal invitation follows later. In this case the 
work of the mediator is confidential by nature and only when ‘results 
are achieved the world knows what has been going on’. However, the 
parties retain a veto and thus the position of the mediator is weaker. 
The external actor mandating the mediator could be ‘a major power, 
an international or regional organization, or some other body or 
group to which the country in question formally belongs or whose 
authority it has to respect’. Even though the parties have to accept 
mediation process, they can remain unhappy with the objective or 
the mediator and strive to ruin the process in different ways.82 
Most commonly the mediator to an international conflict 
has been chosen, for example, by the UN Security Council or the 
Secretary-General. In general, the UN appointment procedure is 
seen as impartial and the conflicting parties may have an influence 
on who is chosen. The mandate given by the UN Security Council 
guarantees in the best way the required international support and 
cohesion for the mediator to enter into a conflict. Furthermore, 
following Svensson and Wallensteen, regional context is important 
for all conflicts and, in particular, for protracted conflicts and third-
party interventions which require regional support.  However, 
Wallensteen emphasizes that the primary parties to a conflict have 
to accept and agree on the third party’s role in conflict in all cases. 83
  
81 Svensson & Wallensteen 2010, 11–15.
82 Ibid., 12–14.
83 Wallensteen 2007, 267; Svensson & Wallensteen 2010, 115.
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Bercovitch makes a distinction between formal and informal 
mediation activities by an individual mediator. In addition to formal 
mediation activity carried out by government officials or political 
incumbents, there is information mediation practice, which may 
refer to either well-experienced mediators specialized in international 
mediation, or to other scholars who, with their professionalization, 
have a possibility to give an input to the negotiation process between 
the belligerents.84 It is worthwhile to notice that most often the cases 
of this so-called ‘unofficial third-party intervention’ are carried out 
by independent non-governmental institutions like the Carter Centre 
or the CMI.85
In her analysis on Norway’s involvement in the Oslo Back 
Channel, Aggestam defines the mediation practiced as ‘quasi-
informal’ in kind. The term ‘quasi-informal’ refers to mediation, 
which is not strictly formal or informal, but more like a combination 
of the two. The Oslo Back Channel gives a good illustration of what 
kind of results the coordination of informal and formal processes 
of mediation might cause. The networking of officials at Norway’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and academics from the NGOs provided 
flexibility and made it possible to offer a suitable negotiation milieu 
for the belligerent parties according to their preferences at different 
stages of the negotiation process. Instead of the traditional way of 
focusing on a multitude of dichotomies and distinction between 
formal and informal mediation activities, more interest should be 
given to the possible interplay between different actors practicing 
mediation.86 Furthermore, as Kivimäki and Gorman note, ‘good 
ideas, analyses and innovations on solutions do not require mandate 
and thus can be offered by anyone, also non-governmental entities’.87
Svensson and Wallensteen also make a distinction between 
‘primarily political and humanitarian mediation’ and they continue 
84 Bercovitch 2002, 10.
85 Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 12.
86 Karin Aggestam (2002) ‘Quasi-Informal Mediation in the Oslo Channel: Larsen 
and Holst as Individual Mediators’, in Jacob Bercovitch (ed.) Studies in international 
mediation: essays in honor of Jeffrey Z. Rubin. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 58, 72−4. 
87 Kivimäki & Gorman 2008, 183.
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to argue that ‘the significance of humanitarian mediation has been 
disregarded in the international mediation literature’. They follow 
with their definition that ‘political mediation involves diplomatic 
negotiations between conflicting parties to find a way to solve an 
incompatibility or to develop procedure for settling the conflict’. 
Mediation in humanitarian crisis situation ‘does not aim at resolving 
underlying political issues but serves to manage a humanitarian 
situation’ and it concentrates on achieving temporal ceasefires, 
delivering sufficient assistance and, in general, managing emergency 
situation. Because ‘humanitarian issues may be less sensitive’ than 
conflicts dealing with ‘national issues of power and territory’, 
they can constitute ‘an entry point’ to expand negotiations also to 
politically crucial issues.88  
4.2.  Mediation styles
When it comes to practices and styles of peace mediation, the focus 
has traditionally been on one particular peace mediation case or on 
working practices of an individual mediator. The role of an individual 
mediator should not be overestimated, even if the mediator’s 
personality, without a doubt, affects the styles of mediation as some 
mediators ‘may appear tough, rude, uncompromising, principled, 
and even dull’ while others, in contrast, are ‘open, attentive, culturally 
sensitive, flexible, or even charming’ because ‘a bit of artistry and 
acting skills’ are required from all mediators. Nevertheless, the 
mediation practices are not based on the activity of an ‘individual 
star’, mediation is always team work and thus instead of focussing on 
one particular mediator the focus should be more on the mediation 
team as Svensson and Wallensteen remind.89
Mediation teams consist of qualified individuals representing 
different professional fields who work in unity under one mandate 
in order to gain a successful mediation outcome. While introducing 
mediation team as a recommended way of practicing mediation, 
the advantages related to a well-known and experienced individual 
88 Svensson & Wallensteen 2010, 15, 131.
89 Ibid., 117–8.
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mediator are not forgotten. Mediators’ personal connections to 
world politicians and their ability to draw public attention to the 
process can be of great support for the continuation of the mediation 
process. Still, the complex nature of today’s conflicts demand 
larger resources and knowledge in order to be resolved than any 
single, even the most successful mediator can bring forth. Besides, 
mediation teams are an easy access for young diplomats to gain 
valuable experience on mediation in practice. Eliasson himself is a 
good example as he first participated in top Iran–Iraq negotiations 
as part of Olof Palme’s team and then later took full responsibility 
of peace negotiations.90
A mediator’s level of experience is connected to the outcome 
of a mediation process, but on the other hand, it is obvious that 
every mediation case is unique and methods and style of mediation 
must be chosen according to the case in hand. For that purpose, it 
is important to recognize specific styles in mediation that are based 
on exhaustive empirical studies on peace mediation cases. Therefore, 
recent studies on mediator’s styles and practices utilize experiences of 
one mediator to outline a more general categorization of mediation 
styles and practices. Svensson and Wallensteen particularly search 
for generalizations and call for more comparative approach in 
their study on Jan Eliasson.91 They recognize four key dimensions 
of mediation style: scope, methods, mode, and focus.92 They have 
examined these dimensions through various mediation cases in 
which Eliasson has been engaged but they also briefly compare him 
with other mediators. The question of scope is primarily linked to 
an entry to mediation process as the other three are connected to 
an actual mediation situation but also the way how to exit from 
mediation. Additionally, they identify opposing policies in each 
dimension that are not necessarily exclusive but each mediator can 
apply their own mix of options. 
Concerning the scope of mediation, ‘the support from key 
international actors and the acceptance of the main parties in the 
90 Ibid., 129.
91 Ibid., 128–9.
92 Ibid., 114.
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conflict’ has been crucial for Eliasson as well as for many other 
mediators. Primary question when setting mediation in current 
asymmetric conflicts is to ‘whether to include all parties or exclude 
some’ but also how to define who relevant parties are and how long 
the process will remain open for new parties as in asymmetrical war 
non-state actors change all the time. It is also difficult to recognize 
who could represent who as there is no legal or democratic 
procedure on which this right is based. The mediator has to deal 
with the complexity of the asymmetrical conflict but Svensson and 
Wallensteen call for simpler arrangements and suggest that the 
mandating organizations would already decide on participation.93 
In contrast, Fixdal emphasizes that it should be the mediator who, in 
the final state, decides who is invited to participate in negotiations. 
Even though the mediator decides to be as inclusive as possible, all 
parties do not necessarily want to participate and might altogether 
contest the legitimacy of the mediator.94 
Eriksson and Kostić approach the same questions from 
another angle and emphasize how representation and involvement 
of the primary parties is crucial for a successful peace mediation 
process. However, as they continue, ‘the degree of participation 
and involvement in negotiations by the primary parties is clearly 
influenced by type and practices of the mediator. In particular, 
procedural issues are intimately linked to ownership of the process 
in the post-agreement phase.’95 
Confidential and open mediation appear to Svensson and 
Wallensteen as opposite modes of mediation. Their particular target 
of study, Eliasson, had varied these methods in his mediation cases 
– from confidential mediation in the Iran–Iraq War to emphasis 
on openness and public attention in the Darfur case. It seems that 
more open approach is easier to apply in humanitarian mediation 
cases. However, these options do not seem to be either–or but in 
all peace negotiations the actual conduct remains confidential and 
the mediator cannot ‘publicly reveal much beyond that to which 
93 Ibid., 133.
94 Fixdal 2012a, 17.
95 Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 160–2.
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the parties can agree, if the mediation is to continue’. Question of 
openness is intertwined with media publicity of mediation and what 
is informed and for what reason. Often the situation is personified 
with one star mediator in media that enables wider publicity and 
may restrict the understanding of the complexity of mediation 
situation.96 
Alternative options for methods of mediation are, following 
Svensson and Wallensteen, forcing and fostering. Their case Eliasson 
‘has primarily used a fostering style’ alike most of the other Nordic 
mediators but, for example, Richard Holbrooke, an American 
mediator for Bosnian War, ‘chose a more forcing approach’ and 
‘explicitly threatened the Serbian side during the negotiation with 
coercive methods’. The latter method was based on developing 
leverage as fostering was based more on efforts to create momentum 
through confidence building measures.97 
Several distinctions are used in mediation literature in order to 
describe different methods of mediation, and they are referred to 
as ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ mediation, ‘power-based’ or ‘trust-orientated’ 
mediation, or then mediator’s strategies are defined with terms like 
‘facilitation’, ‘formulation’, and ‘manipulation/directive strategies’. 
Wallensteen sees it important to make a fundamental distinction 
between mediators with much power, ‘muscle’, and those with 
less or no physical power.98 Traditionally inter-group negotiations 
and neutral mediation has been seen as the most effective form of 
peacemaking as ‘in the past two decades members of the international 
community have resorted more frequently to third-party power 
mediation’.99 
The issue of ‘power mediation’ is intertwined with another 
classical question in peace mediation literature – the role and 
legitimacy of biased mediators and mediators with profound 
self-interest. Impartiality towards the incompatibility is seen as 
96 Svensson & Wallensteen 2010, 118–9.
97 Ibid., 116–8, 123.
98 Wallensteen 2007, 269.
99 Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 6.
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an essential characteristic in defining the third party100 but while 
examining various mediators and mediation processes closer with 
a critical eye the requirement of impartiality seems problematic 
and difficult to delineate. Wallensteen names the United States of 
America as an example of a player in the field of international peace 
mediation, which, in the strictest sense, cannot always be cited as a 
third party to a conflict. The USA has itself appointed an actor, such 
as the President, the Secretary of State or some other high-ranking 
official of the administration to several international conflicts over 
a long period of time. According to Wallensteen, the USA cannot 
be seen as a third party in the true sense, as it often has its own 
interests in the outcome of the mediation effort. In addition, the 
USA’s capability to resort to military power emphasizes its interests 
in the playground of international conflicts. Due to this appearance 
of the USA, only few Americans have been appointed as special 
representatives for mediation by the UN.101 
Following Eriksson and Kostić, ‘the interests and motives of the 
intervening liberal powers are framed around the humanitarian ethos 
of peacebuilding and the alleviation of human suffering. Yet, as the 
cases of the USA-led Western-power interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo 
and Afghanistan show this is highly questionable.’  Power negotiator 
enters into the peace process with ready-made solutions and 
therefore ‘the powerful third party provides most of the normative 
and practical solutions intended to promote a durable settlement’. 
That is why they seriously arise a question whether ‘locally arranged 
peacemaking processes are always the better alternative’ even 
though home-grown peace negotiations are rare.102 Svensson and 
Wallensteen take a more cautious position but they also emphasize 
that long-term and stable international mediation support requires 
some local institutional settings in the conflict area.103
According to Wallensteen, the level of power a mediator holds 
is directly related to the format of the peace talks. The methods of 
100 Wallensteen & Möller 2008, 58−59
101 Wallensteen 2007, 268–9.
102 Eriksson & Kostić 2013b, 159–162.
103 Svensson & Wallensteen 2010, 132.
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leading peace talks used by a mediator with little or no physical 
power are characterized by persuasion, confidence development, 
and deal-making. On the one hand, these kinds of efforts tend to 
demand a lot of effort and are often time-consuming. On the other 
hand, the activities demand real action from the conflicting parties 
and commit the parties in a long-term peacebuilding process. In a 
case when a mediator holds a greater amount of power, a permanent 
ceasefire or a constitution seems more likely to be achieved in a 
shorter period of time compared to the format of talks mentioned 
first.104 In contrast to power-based meditation, ‘neutral mediation and 
negotiations are often more protracted, achieving peace takes longer, 
and in the meantime suffering and destruction continue’.  However, 
if we examine durability of a peace agreement or the quality of peace 
solutions achieved, in power mediation weak legitimacy and weak 
commitment by the primary parties often suffer.105 
Nordic countries are often seen as having a reputation of being 
neutral and impartial, or non-biased in a mediation situation. Some 
Nordic mediators have followed this principle of impartiality very 
strictly even so that this kind of ignorance to question war crimes 
has raised harsh criticism later. For example, Fixdal notes that 
Stoltenberg may have ‘exaggerated the instrumental importance 
of his neutrality’ when he rejected to agree on Bosnia’s role as a 
victim of the Serbs’ aggression.106 Even if a mediator is not a judge 
they cannot altogether escape or ignore questions on aggressive 
and immoral warfare. Although there is a lot of experience which 
supports the importance of the idea of mediators’ impartiality 
in their position, this does not mean that this position should be 
entirely neutral. In a case where the mediator is known to have a 
close relationship with one of the parties of a conflict, it may help to 
place some pressure on this or, like in the case of the famous Oslo 
Back Channel in the early 1990s, Norway’s close relationship with 
Israel made it easier for Israel to accept Norway as a mediator rather 
104 Wallensteen 2007, 270–1.
105 Eriksson & Kostić 2013, 7.
106 Fixdal 2012a, 13 and in more details Mona Fixdal (2012c) ‘The Priority of 
Peace: Thorvald Stoltenberg’, in Fixdal (ed.) Ways Out of War: Peacemakers in the 
Middle East and Balkans. Palgrave Macmillan, 119–138.
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than Sweden which has traditionally taken a more critical view 
towards Israel’s policy against the Palestinians. However, Norway 
even abandoned its strict reading of impartiality principle during 
the peace process as it informed and listened to Washington’s advice 
throughout the peacemaking process and, in the end of the process, 
heavily pushed the agreement on the direction the U.S. supported.107 
Still, this did not harm Norway’s brand as a peace nation.
The termination tactic of a mediator is one particular form of 
forcing method. Svensson finds support for the claim that not all 
types of actors can imply a termination-threat in a credible manner. 
Although the termination tactic can be applied by strong and weak 
mediators alike, it is more challenging for weak mediators, since their 
strength is based on the commitment to the peace process itself. If 
the mediator using the termination tactic has been invited to provide 
assistance with the peace process by the belligerents themselves, 
the threat of termination is likely to be more effective.108 Also the 
credibility of a threat of termination is an important factor affecting 
its applicability. In addition, the termination tactic has turned out 
to be more effective in cases where the negotiation channel seemed 
feasible compared to the ones where the threat of war is obvious.109
Svensson has also studied the credibility of third-party mediators. 
In the study on the occurrence of third-party security guarantees 
in internal armed conflicts, he examines the relationship between 
the promise to enforce or verify post-treaty behaviour and the 
provision of expected services. Svensson takes into consideration all 
internal armed conflicts from 1989 to 2003 according to the list of 
conflicts from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP, 2005). 
The aim of placing the research focus on promises and requests 
besides the actual peacekeeping is to gain a deeper understanding on 
107 Waage 2007, 163, 170–4.
108 Isak Svensson (2008) ‘Democracies, Disengagement and Deals: Exploring the 
Effect of Different Types of Mediators in Internal Armed Conflicts’, in Öberg, 
Magnus & Strøm, Kaare (eds.) Resources, Governance and Civil Conflict. London: 
Routledge, 242.
109 Kristine Höglund & Isak Svensson (2011) ‘Should I Stay or Should I Go? 
Termination as a Tactic and Norwegian Mediation in Sri Lanka’ Negotiation and 
Conflict Management Research, 4(1), 25−8.
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the processes of peacekeeping actions. The premature assumption 
in Svensson’s research is that due to its traditionally honest and 
credible reputation the UN is more credible in its commitments 
to safeguard peace agreements compared to the non-UN peace 
guarantors. A third-party security guarantee often refers to the 
verification and monitoring of the process of national recovery, 
controlling and supervising the disengagement of forces, and the 
deterrence of violators of agreements. Previous research results 
show a clear evidence of the strong linkage between third-party 
security guarantees and the likelihood of peace. The outcome in the 
Svensson’s study is that the UN’s role as a third party in the field of 
peace mediation is strong and it still can be seen as the main agency 
responsible for maintaining global peace and security. Reputation is 
named as the one ultimate resource for the UN to act in its role of a 
peace guarantor. Therefore, the UN should be serious in its efforts to 
protect and strengthen its reputation and practical capability to act 
as a peace guarantor, for it is not something that is unbreakable. 110
The fourth and last dimension of mediation styles that Svensson 
and Wallensteen list is the focus of peace negotiations. The mediator 
has to encounter in their work a normative question on narrow or 
wide peace. Thus, whether the focus on peace negotiations is on ‘the 
immediate war-related issues or on broader dimensions, including 
justice’, it is good to notice that ‘peace may contradict justice in a 
number of ways’. A challenging question is how to relate justice with 
peace from mediator’s perspective. How much and in what way the 
issues that are regarded as reasons for the war should be noticed 
in the peace process? What questions are attached to humanitarian 
law including the question of war crimes? And then, is it right that 
peace agreement ‘corresponds to principles of legality and justice’? 
The mediator has limited opportunities to ‘pursue a justice-based 
approach’ if they wish to talk with all parties. Still, the mediators are 
expected to act from a moral high ground and are usually mandated 
110 Isak Svensson (2009) ‘Guaranteeing Peace: The Credibility of Third-Party 
Mediators in Civil Wars’, in Bercovitch, Jacob & Gartner, Scott (eds.) International 
Conflict Mediation. New approaches and findings. London: Routledge, 
116–118, 122, 129. About the Uppsala Conflict Data Program see http://
uppsalaconflictdataprogram.wordpress.com/ 
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by and represent ‘an organization based on international law and 
humanitarian rules’. Therefore, balancing between broader and 
narrower understanding of peace is always difficult and omnipresent 
in all mediation situations. Lakhdar Brahimini, the well-known 
mediator in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, argues that it is ‘not 
mediator’s role to focus on human rights’ and that ‘peacemaking 
implied talking to people with blood on their hands’. Eliasson, in 
his term, has taken a more humanitarian ethos and, in particular 
in Darfur, his goal was to end human suffering of the population, 
and concentrating primarily on humanitarian questions may lead to 
quick and successful results as in Burma and Sudan.111  
Fixdal also notes differences among mediators who aimed merely 
to find a quick end to war and those who worked ‘for a particular 
kind of solution, one that is better than others from a moral point of 
view’. In contrast to Svensson and Wallensteen, Fixdal argues that as 
‘injustices gives rise to grievances, which in turn can lead to renewed 
conflict and violence’, the mediator should not regard justice in 
too simple a form, and it is essential that the mediator considers 
what could the role of a third party be in building just peace (this 
important phenomenon is discussed separately in chapter 6). 112  
111 Svensson & Wallensteen 2010, 120–2, 126.
112 Fixdal 2012a, 17–18.
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5.  Nordic Model: Norway as  
 a Peace Nation  
Distinguished Nordic politicians were, from time to time, used as 
peace mediators during the Cold War era but small (Nordic) states 
did not act in any role as mediators.  In the post-Cold War era new 
peace diplomacy opened up a possibility for non-state actors to 
participate in a peace process and thus states lost the monopoly of 
being the sole actors in peace diplomacy. Simultaneously various 
international organizations like the UN and regional as well as non-
governmental organizations were involved in peacemaking. As part 
of this process several small states like Norway have been profiled 
as peacebuilders and they have determinately built their brand of a 
peace mediator. Norway led the way to the new peace diplomacy 
and the Norwegian government set peace diplomacy as its priority in 
the 1990s. The Norwegian opening was followed by the Canadian, 
Swiss, and Swedish governments who stepped up ‘their support of 
peace efforts’ and a decade later also Finland followed their lead.113 
Nordic scholars have approached the emergence of new peace 
diplomacy and mediation practices in the 1990s through two 
cases in both of which Norway had a central role as a mediator 
or facilitator: the so-called Oslo Back Channel in 1993 and the Sri 
Lankan civil war in 2002. It is possible to examine the development 
of peace mediation practices by examining closer these two cases as 
well as critically evaluating the question on who should and who 
are allowed to participate in peace negotiations but also questions 
of impartiality and credibility of the mediator. 
113 Helgesen 2007, 8. See also Iver B. Neumann (2011) ‘Peace and reconciliation 
efforts as systems-maintaining diplomacy: The case of Norway’ International 
Journal, 66(3), 573; Pertti Joenniemi (2013) ‘Finland: a non-traditional peacemaker’ 
Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 19(1), 53–9.
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5.1.  The Oslo Back Channel
The Palestine–Israel conflict has deep roots reaching all the way 
to the mandate rule of interwar era but in the post-Second World 
War era it metamorphosed into a conflict between Israel state and 
Palestinians without their own state. As negotiations following the 
existing international norms were possible only among states, the 
Palestinians could not participate in negotiations on peace and 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) could not represent 
Palestinians in state-centric negotiations. This changed in the early 
1990s, and Norway had a significant role on the sidelines generating 
successful conditions for direct Israel–Palestinian discussions.114 
Norwegian scholar Hilde Henriksen Waage has explored in detail 
in her several articles Norway’s surprising role as a facilitator in 
the very first direct Israel–Palestinian discussion and the efforts that 
were made in order to begin the peace process.  This so-called Oslo 
backchannel diplomacy was groundbreaking in terms of negotiations 
even though it did not bring about a lasting peace to the Middle 
East. However, it challenged old practices of peace diplomacy and 
opened a door for negotiations with rebel and terrorist groups at 
least in certain cases.
The initiator for foray of peace was the U.S. government, and 
during 1992 it was considered that there was ‘a new window of 
opportunity for peace negotiations’. Washington organized its own 
peace congress in Madrid in October 1991 which established a 
diplomatic link between Israel and its Arab neighbours.  However, 
manoeuvers to establish a direct contact between Israel and PLO did 
in fact take place in Norway and it all started in a very informal way 
and outside the spotlights of international diplomacy. It remains a 
mystery whether it was just a lucky chance or whether it was clearly 
planned from the very beginning. Two Israeli academics, the three 
Palestinian representatives of the PLO, and a Norwegian couple 
‘came together under the auspices of a research institute in a small 
Norwegian town on 20 January 1993. None seemed likely candidates 
for a government mandated peace mission, yet the secret meeting 
that cold winter day launched a process that evolved into the “Oslo 
114 Fixdal  2012a, 4–9.
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back channel” that ultimately, some eight months later, produced the 
accord that was to change the face of the Middle East.’115
Negotiations in the early stage were ‘entirely informal and 
exploratory’ and Norway’s role was ‘modest and largely unplanned, 
developing as it went along’. Norwegians did not regard themselves 
as mediators but as facilitators. Following Waage, the host ‘never 
interfered in the negotiations or even were present when they going 
on’. However, the Norwegians established clear ‘“ground rules” 
that mandated total secrecy and the retractability of all positions 
put forward in the talks and prohibited “dwelling on the past 
grievances”’. The host was also responsible of the famous Oslo 
spirit that cherished the atmosphere of friendship and humour. As 
negotiations continued and Israeli participation changed into an 
official one, the status of peace talks was upgraded. At this point also 
Norway’s role changed and ‘from May 1993, Norway was no longer 
a mere facilitator, but also an active mediator. Norway’s new foreign 
minister, Johan Jörgen Holst, wanted to play an active, personal role. 
He wanted to be the key person, with complete responsibility.’116 
The setting of the negotiations was clearly asymmetrical and 
the host ‘did everything they could to ensure asymmetrical process. 
They strove to make all logistical arrangements just perfect’ and 
to empower the weaker site, the Palestinians. But in its mediator’s 
role Norway ‘did not involve being on equal terms with each of the 
involved parties’ in the end of the process and the Norwegians took 
‘a clear stand on questions related to the Declaration of Principles 
and on the negotiations over mutual recognition’. The Norwegians 
also kept the Americans informed on the process throughout the 
peace discussions which culminated into the signing of the Oslo 
 
 
 
115 Hilde Henriksen Waage (2005) ‘Norway’s role in the Middle East Peace Talks: 
Between a Small State and a Weak Belligerent’ Journal of Palestine Studies, 34(4), 
6–7; Hilde Henriksen Waage (2007) ‘The Minnow and the Whale: Norway and 
the United States in the Peace Process in the Middle East’ British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies, 34(2), 158.
116 Waage 2005, 8–12; Waage 2007, 165–170.
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Agreement in Washington on 13 September 1993 and a snapshot 
of Arafat and Rabin shaking hands in front of President Clinton.117 
5.2.  The Sri Lankan Peace Talks
In 1983, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (the LTTE, also 
known as the Tamil Tigers) opened up an armed campaign against 
the Sri Lankan government in order to create an independent Tamili 
state. The long civil war ended finally in 2009 with a military victory 
of the Sri Lankan forces over the Tamili Tigers. The last operation 
was, however, preceded by an effort to achieve negotiated peace and 
Norway was appointed, following the request of the warring parties 
(Sri Lankan government and the LTTE), a peace mediator in January 
2002 but the mediator’s role was preceded by a more unofficial 
role of a facilitator. Already in late 1999 Sri Lankan President 
Kumaratunga ‘publicly announced Norway’s role as a facilitator’ 
and with this move aimed to strengthen the peace process. However, 
it was not until the regime change in 2001 when mediated peace 
process was initiated, and the ceasefire agreement was signed in 
February 2002. That was followed by six rounds of negotiations 
before the LTTE withdrew from peace talks in 2003 and a couple 
years later escalating violence ended the efforts of reinitiated peace 
process.118 Thus, the peace process is now regarded as a failure even 
though it was first celebrated as a success. 
The Sri Lankan case has been used by Höglund and Svensson to 
analyse the toolbox of a mediator in asymmetric situation but also 
Norway’s interest and motives to participate in this faraway conflict. 
The Sri Lankan case also brings about questions concerning mandate 
and impartiality of the third party and the representativeness of 
parties in negotiations. The Norwegian policy towards mediation was 
‘based on impartiality, emphasizing ownership of the process by the 
primary parties, and seeking a high degree of internationalization’. 
117 Waage 2007, 160–2, 170–4.
118 Kristine Höglund & Isak Svensson (2009) ‘Mediating between Tigers and Lions: 
Norwegian Peace Diplomacy in Sri Lanka’s Civil War’ Contemporary South Asia, 
17(2), 175–7.
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Vice versa, ‘Norway was selected as a mediator because the parties 
saw it as an unbiased intermediary, which had the potential to gain 
access to both sides’. Norway had engaged with Sri Lanka previously 
through several development projects and thus it was a well-known 
actor. However, Norwegian impartiality was partly challenged due 
to the accused influence of the Norwegian Tamili Diaspora but also 
due to the argument that Norway was ‘too lax to terrorism and 
holds a generally sympathetic attitude towards non-state actors’.119
Norwegian mediator encountered a classical asymmetric situation 
among negotiating parties and both practices, even-handedness and 
equalizing, were applied during peace mediation situation. The 
mediator strove to change the imbalance of political capabilities by 
allowing the import of radio equipment, and after the incidents at 
the sea the mediator tried to change the status quo.  In the case of 
violations against ceasefire both parties were treated in equal terms 
and despite the imbalance of military capabilities the mediator 
aimed to maintain the current circumstances. However, beside 
material and legal asymmetries there can be recognized also ‘a clear 
tactical asymmetry as the LTTE committed more acts in violation 
of the cease-fire than the government did’ and the Nordic monitors 
were blamed of being blind toward this and the mediator’s strategies 
were criticized which broke further the trust to successful ending of 
peace process. Still, the main reason for failure of the peace process 
was not that of Nordic monitoring operation and the mediator’s 
strategy but in primary parties’ interests and policies and, among 
all others, lack of mutual respect and trust. ‘The Sri Lankan conflict 
has shown itself remarkably resistant to conflict resolution efforts, 
including international mediation.’ Mediating asymmetric conflicts 
is always dancing on the blade of a knife and primary parties easily 
accuse mediator of favoring the other party. In this situation it is 
challenging to retain impartiality.120 
Mandated by primary parties, Norway’s role as a mediator was 
weak and vulnerable as it was based on support on both sides and 
its credibility collapsed when Norway’s role was one of the main 
questions in the Sri Lankan elections in April 2004 which ended 
119 Höglund & Svensson 2009, 180–3. 
120 Höglund & Svensson 2008, 348–356.
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with the victory of a coalition critical towards Norway’s role. Both 
primary parties also capitalized the weak position of the mediator 
by rearming and rebuilding their military capacities during ceasefire. 
Another problematic setting was Norway’s double role as a mediator 
and an observer of the implementation of the peace process as part 
of a monitoring mission with other Nordic countries because neither 
the Sri Lankan government nor India, the influential regional power, 
did accept the involvement of the great powers or the UN.121  
Besides difficulties to preserve impartiality, it was as challenging 
to emphasize local ownership of the peace process. There were only 
two primary parties in negotiations – the Sri Lankan government 
and the LTTE – and this was criticized by many as ‘it excludes larger 
segments of Sri Lankan society. Important stakeholders, such as 
the Muslim minority, non-LTTE Tamili groups, and representatives 
of civil society, were left out.’  If we view the situation from the 
perspective of the LTTE, the question was a classical bargaining of 
their position as a sole representative of the Tamili area and therefore 
the mediation situation offered recognition to the LTTE as well 
as simultaneously marginalized other stakeholders. Höglund and 
Svensson note here a paradox that, due to the exclusive nature of 
peace negotiations, it was possible to achieve a ceasefire in a relatively 
short time but that simultaneously the two-party model ‘ultimately 
led to reduced legitimacy’ of the peace process. Mandated by two 
primary parties, Norway lacked a power to open up negotiations 
to include other stakeholders. Therefore, in a situation where two 
primary parties ‘had the veto power over design of the process, with 
a mediator without authority’, the Norwegian mediation goal of 
local ownership of process proved to be awkward and deleterious 
towards the whole peace process.122 
Furthermore, the Norwegian goal for the internationalization of 
the peace process and an effort ‘to direct the attention and wider 
engagement of the international community towards Sri Lanka’ ran 
into trouble with the emergence of the war on terror and the LTTE’s 
reputation as a terrorist organization hindered the development. The 
peace process did not raise international trust toward the LTTE and 
121 Höglund & Svensson 2009, 181, 184.
122 Ibid., 183–5.
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thus several powers like the UK in 2001 and the EU and Canada 
in 2006 listed it as a terrorist organization and thus excluded it 
from international community. Alongside this the LTTE grew more 
frustrated and finally ‘the possibility for Norway to convince them 
about the viability of peace talks waned’.123 
5.3.  The Norwegian Model
Why peace diplomacy was regarded nationally as an important goal? 
How these faraway conflicts became important targets of foreign 
policy prioritization?  Iver Neumann introduces a comprehensive 
interpretation on the interest of small states towards peace mediation 
from the perspective of the history of diplomacy. According to him, 
Scandinavian countries ‘have consistently spent sizeable resources 
on systems maintenance in such diverse areas as institution-building 
– the League of Nations and the UN, for instance; peacekeeping; 
development and disaster aid; and the role of third parties’ and a 
more active role as a peace mediator is merely a logical continuation 
of this approach.124 
Nonetheless, adopting an active third-party role as a mediator or 
a facilitator widened the scope of traditional state diplomacy. Third-
party activity in conflicts has been part of traditional diplomatics 
as long as there has been modern diplomacy but in a classic setting 
third party has participated in crisis management, for example, with 
military intervention and with guaranteeing peace treaties. This 
has been great power activity and while a great power has acted 
as a mediator, it has applied power mediation to persuade warring 
parties. Small states, however, adopted ‘the weakest form of third 
party diplomatisation’ and acted merely as a facilitator ‘that offers 
its services not as an active broker, but as a discreet presence with 
certain human and material resources to offer’. This was the role 
and the practice previously executed by ‘a sizable community of 
organizations in Geneva and elsewhere that specialize in facilitation, 
centring around organizations such as the International Committee 
123 Ibid., 182, 185–6.
124 Neumann 2011, 571–2.
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of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Centre for Human Development’. 
During the early post-Cold war years small states entered into this 
‘networked, multi-stakeholder ball’ which was previously dominated 
by international organizations.125 
The first state that adopted the new policy was Norway in the 
early 1990s. Several Nordic scholars – both Swedes and Norwegians 
– have studied how peace mediation became part of the Norwegian 
foreign policy agenda and how the role of ‘peace nation’ became 
a significant element of Norway’s international brand.  Neumann 
recognizes that the seeds of Norwegian peace diplomacy in the late 
1980s were sown by ‘Geneva/Oslo interface, with ICRC playing 
a focal role’. In 1989, following the assignment as the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, the former foreign minister Thorvald 
Stoltenberg recruited a key Norwegian presence at Geneva’s ICRC, 
Jan Egeland, to work with him. Working as a State Secretary in the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1990 to 1999 Egeland 
developed the so-called Norwegian model that preferred ‘to work 
at ad-hoc setups, drawing Norwegians who had networks in the 
relevant areas and fearing that the codification of the peace efforts 
he had initiated would hamper their development within the MFA’. 
A new momentum occurred when the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs established a separate section to deal with Peace and 
Reconciliation in 2000.126  
Höglund and Svensson discuss the country’s self-perception 
as well as international image or brand. Thus a reputation of 
being a skilled and effective peacemaker is important in order to 
gain visibility and a position in international community. Being a 
‘peace nation’ was also about international branding but having 
the peacemaking agenda was and is also part of national identity 
building. It is a narrative which presents a small northern country as 
‘a great, moral power’.127  
125 Neumann 2011, 573–4; Iver B. Neumann (2012) ‘After securitization. Diplomats 
as de-securitisers’ Baltic Journal of Political Science, No. 1, 11.
126 Neumann 2011, 574–6; Neumann 2012, 13–16.
127 Höglund & Svensson 2009, 177–180.
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Norwegians have presented ‘peace’ as an important part of their 
legacy and Norway is seen to be particularly suited for undertaking 
mediation activities. Neumann maps the historical legacies of 
Norway’s peace nation image from four sources. Firstly, he 
emphasizes the importance of Norwegian involvement in the Anglo-
American peace movement at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. 
Secondly, he pinpoints a link between Norway’s strong missionary 
tradition and peace image. Thirdly, he also links peace activity to 
internationalist workers’ movement. And fourthly, he underlines 
Norway’s active role in the League of Nations as well as in the UN. 
In particular, Fridtjof Nansen’s role as a national hero and an early 
pioneer of peacemaking and humanitarian work is prioritized. 128
Øystein Haga Skånland picks up four elements on which Norway’s 
image or brand as a great peacemaker has been built for national 
and international audience. Firstly, he mentions the advantage of 
smallness which underlines that Norway lacks colonial burden that 
is often intertwined with great power interests. And secondly, due 
to its smallness it does not have any reason to show off its muscles 
and thus Norway as a mediator is capable to form a confidential 
relationship and it would rather take the role of a facilitator than a 
mediator. Thirdly, Norway has deep roots in investing in peacemaking 
and it holds a natural legacy of humanitarianism and peace activism. 
Fourthly, there is a close cooperation among civil servants, NGOs 
and academic institutions in Norway.129 This kind of a combination 
of several actors and operating with private actors is also seen by Jan 
Egeland as main characteristic of the ‘Norwegian model’.130 
In many terms new peace diplomacy transformed traditional state-
to-state diplomacy more into a networked one in which the states 
are also networked with private actors and which also diplomatized 
non-state actors as they are part of the mediation process. Necessary 
128 Neumann 2011, 573–4.
129 Øystein Haga Skånland (2010) ‘Norway is a peace nation: A discourse analytic
reading of the Norwegian peace engagement’ Cooperation and Conflict, 45(1), 
38−41.
130 Neumann 2011, 575. See more about Norwegian style of mediation Ann Kelleher 
& James Larry Taulbee (2006) ‘Bridging the Gap: Building Peace Norwegian Style’ 
Peace & Change, 31(4), 479–505.
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redefinition of diplomacy alongside with the peacemakers’ role may 
also explain why the new active role has not been unanimously 
accepted in Norway and criticism has been continuously presented 
mainly from the political right which has argued that Norway’s true 
interests lie closer and that peace diplomacy removes resources from 
traditional foreign policy.131 
131 Skånland 2010, 41–3, 45–7.
66
6.  Call for Durable and Just  
 Peace 
Mikael Eriksson and Roland Kostić set a fundamental question: 
‘Why some peace processes fail during the implementation phase, 
while others endure?’132 The success of a peace process is traditionally 
measured by counting those which concluded to a peace treaty while 
the question of durability of peace agreements has been approached 
by categorically examining five years’ period after the signing of a 
peace treaty and listing cases in which peace has been preserved and 
which have fallen into a new armed conflict.133 However, this kind 
of approach does not discuss what makes certain agreements more 
sustainable than others and why certain agreements offer a basis for 
long term peace process while others do not. New approaches to 
durability of peace have concentrated on focusing how a mediated 
solution sets premises and enables or, in the worst case, prevents the 
building of sustainable peace for years onwards. 
One branch of discussion has concentrated on how different 
forms and styles of negotiations influence durability. It has been 
argued that peace in conflicts ending to the victory of one side is more 
durable than mediated solutions. Øyvind Østerud has provocatively 
argued that ‘lasting peace is more likely to following the victory of 
one party to a civil war than following a negotiated settlement’ and 
in that way trying to challenge the significance and the impressiveness 
of peace diplomacy.134 This argument is, however, heavily criticized 
by pinpointing that a mediated solution saves lives in the short term 
and, in particular, that the argument of durable peace which follows 
132 Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 5.
133 Ibid., 9.
134 Øyvind Østerud (2006) ’Lite land som humanitær stormakt’ Nytt Norsk 
Tidsskrift, vol. 4, 311. Citation by Helgesen 2007, 15. See also Fixdal 2012b, 43.
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military victory does not hold anymore. According to the statistics 
of the Cold War era, a great majority of conflicts ended in military 
victory in contrast to conflicts in which peace was negotiated. This 
overall picture has since changed and already in the 1990s in 42 cases 
peace was achieved through negotiation and in 23 cases by military 
victory. Nonetheless, if we examine the durability of peace agreement 
within five years’ period, there is a greater tendency in negotiated 
settlement of the renewal of violence in contrast to peace followed 
military victory. For example, ‘one third of 69 peace agreements 1989-
2000 resulted in civil war five years of signing them’.135
Non-interference suggested by Østerud is not seen by other Nordic 
scholars as a relevant option for peaceful third party intervention 
but instead the importance of local ownership of peace process is 
pinpointed by many as an essential element for durable peace. It 
is argued that external mediators may focus on short-term security 
and power-sharing issues rather than on reaching a comprehensive 
agreement in the long term. Furthermore, the solutions achieved by 
power mediation often introduce fixed solutions and norms that 
erupted legitimacy of peace treaty. In this matter, theory and practice 
are, however, contradicting and include a paradox:  according to 
theory, ‘the promise of a durable peace settlement ought to be high’ 
in the cases in which warring parties take responsibility of the peace 
process but ‘in literature on peacemaking, home-grown negotiations 
between the primary parties are seen as unusual’.136 Warring parties 
rarely start peace process on their own terms and a third-party help 
is needed to kick off the work. 
After all, if we accept the premise that ‘locally arranged 
peacemaking process are always the better alternative’, how then 
a third-party intervention in best terms would be able to support 
local ownership of peace process and recognize ‘the presence of 
traditional institutions and actors’ which could help to overcome 
societal divides.137  Thus, what is called for is a need for a hybrid 
135 Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 5; Helgesen 2007, 15. Between 1990 and 2007 
altogether 646 documents were signed that can be classified as peace agreements. 
Fixdal 2012b, 7.
136 Eriksson & Kostić 2013b, 162.
137 Ibid., 162.
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model of peacebuilding but also peace mediation. Emphasis on 
impartial facilitation executed by Nordic states supports obviously 
more local ownership than great power based power mediation but 
it does not automatically lead to durable peace as the Sri Lankan 
case proves. Beside the style and form of mediation, local ownership 
is linked to the very essence of negotiated peace. 
6.1.  Just Peace
The question of ‘just peace’ has been discussed in several recent 
studies and it is regarded as one of the most important issues in 
achieving a truly sustainable and durable peace. Many scholars 
regard justice as single most important element which enabled 
transformation from negative peace – end of armed conflict – to 
truly positive peace.  The question of just peace is related to just 
war tradition but following Mona Fixdal there cannot be drawn 
a straightforward linkage between jus post bellum (justice after 
wars) and the rightness of how the war was started and fought. 
According to her, the principles of postwar justice cannot be found 
in the concepts and principles offered by the just war tradition even 
though they are not irrelevant to the question.138 
She notes further that ‘while many share the goal of justice, 
there is no agreement on what justice after war is’. The relationship 
between peace and justice, according to her, should not be regarded 
as ‘two faces of a single good. They are, however, two values that 
prove much easier to support than to undermine one another.’139 The 
challenge is that if peace is equated with justice, it is not possible to 
‘analyze when these two values support each other and when they 
are in conflict with each other’.140 There are several cases in which 
peace and justice seem to clash. In some cases ‘the goal of justice 
can lead people to reject peace proposals that in hindsight seem 
better than any alternative’.141  Furthermore, Fixdal quotes Avishai 
138 Fixdal 2012b, 3.
139 Ibid., 158–9.
140 Ibid., 41.
141 Ibid., 5.
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Margalit’s point that ‘peace can be justified without being just’ and 
continues by arguing that the value of even a negative peace should 
not be underestimated as even just war is accompanied by deep 
suffering and pain. Still, she continues that there may be situations 
when justice is more important than peace and that ‘a minimum 
degree of justice is often a prerequisite for peace’. If peace agreement 
is seen only as unfair and a source of grievances situation escalates 
to discontent, conflict, and violence.142 
According to Fixdal, it is important to focus, instead of universal 
legal norms, more on ‘the process of negotiation and the joint 
agreement reached by adversaries’ while looking for just peace.143 
Thus negotiating and mediating practices and the mediators’ role are 
crucial for just peace. Mediators should try ‘to secure a set of peace 
terms that are as unproblematic as possible and that will also be 
acceptable to the parties’.144 The position of a mediator is challenging 
as following a general rule of peace diplomacy ‘mediators have 
to negotiate with the people who are responsible for the fighting 
and who control the weapons’ and thus the mediator should avoid 
positioning themselves to question war crimes and becoming a 
prosecutor.145 The authority which punishes and prosecutes remains 
elsewhere. Punitive peace terms are not a prerequisite for just peace 
and often it creates a fertile ground for a new conflict. How then 
the question of justice should be noticed as part of the mediation 
process aiming primarily to close down armed conflict? 
Cecilia Albin and Daniel Druckman have in their studies tested 
the relationship between justice and peace by analysing several 
conflicts. They have focused on ‘how the parties relate to each 
other and are treated in the process’. Their primary observation is 
that peace treaties are more durable when principle of equality is 
recognized but they then extend the argument to concern procedural 
and distributive justice. The procedural justice refers to transparency, 
fair representation, fair treatment, and fair play as well as voluntary 
142  Ibid., 158–9.
143  Ibid., 33.
144  Ibid., 160. 
145  Ibid., 38.
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agreement in the negotiation process while distributive justice covers 
equality, proportionality, compensation, and need. In their analysis, 
these qualities are operationalized and measured, but this kind of 
an analysis merely points out a positive relationship between justice 
and a durable peace but does not explain how justice is connected 
to peace or peace mediation situation and why it supports the 
durability of peace.146 
Eriksson and Kostić argue that traditional literature on peace 
mediation has approached the question from too narrow a perspective 
while concentrating only on objective issues like agreements and the 
amount of violence that are easily observed and measurable. The 
core question is, according to them, fairness of peace which is a very 
subjective issue. Thus they conclude that in a peace process there are 
‘a number of unmeasurable aspects, such as norms and influences’ 
and, furthermore, they argue that ‘conventional studies in this regard 
usually do not take account of the long-term processes that shape 
the outcome of peace’ but instead concentrate only on short-term 
goals of the peace process and the peace agreement itself.147 
They also emphasize the ‘link between the form of a mediation 
process, the peace agreement and the character and success of the post-
conflict peace’ and pinpoint that this relationship has been hitherto 
under-studied. Their overarching claim is ‘that peace processes and 
peace agreements, in terms of how they treat the primary parties, 
their participation and their concerns, can either lay the foundations 
for successful conflict resolution or engender social tensions that 
complicate and undermine the long-term prospects for domestic 
ownership and a sustainable peace’.148 Therefore, the presences and 
character of motives, interests, and normative settings of a third-
party mediator are crucial for long term success of a peace process. 
146 Cecilia Albin & Daniel Druckman (2010) ‘The Role of Justice in Negotiation’, 
in Kilgour, D. Marc & Eden, Colin (eds.) Handbook of Group Decision and 
Negotiation. Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation, Vol. 4. Dordrecht, 
Netherlands: Springer Science, 109–119; Cecilia Albin & Daniel Druckman (2012) 
‘Equality Matters: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
56(2), 155−173. See also Fixdal 2012b, 44.
147 Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 9.
148 Ibid., 17.
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According to this theme, the peace that follows many contemporary 
conflicts is often unsatisfactory and marked by a continuation of 
inter-ethnic tensions, lack of order, and an eruption of violence.149 
6.2.  Mediating Identities
The nature of war has changed and, as there are more parties to the 
conflict, it has become less likely that peace process will come to 
a successful conclusion and, in addition, the high intensity of new 
wars has created ‘a more hostile postwar environment’ than in earlier 
classical wars.150 Therefore, mediation of asymmetric wars needs to 
concentrate on issues which are relevant to new wars and find sore 
points that are the source of incompatibilities. A new kind of mediation 
process needs to acknowledge the importance of identities, collective 
memories, and history. These phenomena are usually attached to a 
long peacebuilding process following the end of an armed conflict but 
reconciliation process may also require a third-party mediator. Until 
recently the role of mediation as long term trust building has been 
an ignored question in studies on peace process. The notion of ‘just 
peace’ can be comprehended as a legal issue but also as an identity 
issue as many recent Nordic studies have done. 
Identity-based conflicts are more difficult to resolve via 
negotiations than classical wars on territories. Negotiations situation 
is often framed a zero-sum game and parties are not ready to make 
compromises in questions that concern the survival of society.151 On 
the negotiation table is placed the whole existence of society as it is 
based on shared identities and collective memories that have been 
simultaneously the target and the root cause of a conflict. It is easier 
to give up territory than yield on identity issues. Thus, ontological 
security may be more essential as an obstacle for achieving a peace 
agreement than the question concerning physical security but also 
an obstacle for achieving just peace. 
Karin Aggestam has scrutinized how just and durable peace 
149 Ibid., 24.
150 Fixdal 2012b, 45.
151 Eriksson & Kostić 2013a, 26
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arrangements may be constructed and implemented. She introduces 
a new term – recognitional just peace – that links the discussion of 
just peace more profoundly to conflicting identities and ontological 
security. The nodal point for successful peace process, in her mind, is 
the practices of acknowledgement, recognition, and apology which 
are attached to the broader issue of the politics of reconciliation 
that often includes antagonistic processes that relate to existential 
concerns and thus relate to the question of ontological security. 
According to Aggestam, justice and reconciliation constitute a 
symbiotic relationship and that it is the role of reconciliation that is 
so far undertheoritized. 
The prevailing peacebuilding dogma emphasizes political stability 
and national unity over the requirements of justice, difference, and 
distinct political communities. Instead of concentrating on the question 
how to govern a post-conflict society that is linked to ‘good governance’ 
and democracy, it is also crucial to look at collective memories as they 
have played a significant role in protracted conflicts. The mobilization 
of the past is a powerful force as it relates to emotions and motivation 
and guides people’s actions. The past, or more precisely how the past is 
collectively remembered and presented, builds a societal identity. The 
most recent armed conflicts are also struggles over memories and in 
the post-war situation contradicting narratives on how to remember 
(or forget) history of a conflict keep the conflict going on even when 
there is no open violence. The political and antagonistic nature of 
addressing historical injustices underlines the causes of a conflict and 
thus these questions are essential for reconciliation and a prerequisite 
for just peace.152 
Aggestam suggests the politics of recognition as a solution for 
mediating the deadlock into which the communities are hijacked by 
contradicting narratives of the past. Following Aggestam, ‘several 
peace negotiations outline interest-based strategies with sufficient 
material incentives as a way to bypass conflicting historical narratives 
and historical grievances’. Or, in several cases, collective memories and 
historical narratives are treated as a judicial question which belongs 
152 Karin Aggestam (2013) ‘Recognitional just peace’, in Aggestam & Björkdahl, 
Annika (eds.) Rethinking Peacebuilding. The Quest for Just Peace in the Middle 
East and the Western Balkans. London & New York: Routledge, 34–8.
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to the special court of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
According to prevailing peacebuilding practices, reconciliation and 
peacebuilding are depoliticized and therefore peacebuilding literature 
fails to recognize the conflictual nature of politics.153 It is obvious 
that collective memories and narratives play a critical role in (new) 
conflicts and therefore they need to be assessed and revisited as part 
of reconciliation. 
Aggestam makes a distinction between thin and thick forms of 
recognition. Firstly, thin recognition refers to the situation in which 
each party recognizes the other as an autonomous entity that has an 
agency in solving a conflict. This step has usually been taken already 
as part of peace negotiations. Secondly, thick recognition refers to a 
situation in which the other party understands and accepts the other 
party’s fundamental feature of identity, culture, and history or, in 
other words, ‘to acknowledge the other side’s historical grievances 
is a first step towards recognizing the fact that there are several 
narratives of the conflict’. Politics of reconciliation means, in practice, 
the will to open up and call into question the terms of inclusion 
and exclusion and to question who we are. Politics of recognition 
addresses the past in order to generate and enable forward-looking 
practices. Accepting diversity is about acknowledging the other 
side’s narrative and empathy is about expanding the horizons of 
understanding and co-constructing realities.154
Therefore, it seems obvious that questions concerning conflicting 
histories can and often should be negotiated and they could be 
recognized also by a third-party mediator. According to Aggestam, 
steps of thin and thick recognition should be followed by a mutual 
acknowledgement and apology. It is not enough to agree on the 
existence of alternative histories but it is necessary that each party 
makes some sacrifices on their own identity and compromises 
that often require making concessions and breaking taboos.155 
The recognition and the acknowledgement of historical narratives 
of sufferings and trauma through apology, symbolic gestures, and 
153 Aggestam 2013, 43.
154 Ibid., 43.
155 Ibid., 44–6.
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concessions support best just and durable peace but it is, in practice, 
difficult to achieve as parties have fortified themselves respectively 
behind the roles of the victim and the guilty one and often these roles 
resist compromises and friction in simplified settings.156 Inclusive 
transnational histories are required instead of exclusive narratives. 
The process of reconciliation often takes generations and the idea 
of recognitional just peace demands if this process could be sped 
up by noticing its importance and what could be the role of a third-
party facilitator in this process. The recent history of international 
peacebuilding offers more or less just examples on what could happen 
if these questions of identity and ontological security are not noticed. 
The most dramatic example is Bosnia-Hertzegovina where 
the Dayton Agreement ended the war in 1995 but simultaneously 
established fixed and inflexible structures that have prevented 
almost two decade’s emergence of true societal peace. Narratives 
of the 1990s war are still clashing, the myth of victimhood is firmly 
anchored to identities of three ethnic communities, and transnational 
narratives are suppressed.157 
All in all, studies on peacemaking have emphasized the 
importance of just peace as criteria for success of peace process and 
in that connection, for example, Aggestam and Wæver have given 
attention to question how third party mediation could support post-
conflict reconciliation. Asymmetric wars are about identities and it is 
often the collective memories that are also conflicting and because of 
that conflict often remains open after the end of an armed conflict. 
Thus, there is a need to mediate identities and collective memories 
to achieve sustainable peace and in that field new theoretical and 
empirical research is needed to understand this process better.158
 
156 Sirkka Ahonen (2012) Coming to Terms with a Dark Past. How Post-Conflict 
Societies Deal with History. Franfurt-am-Main: Peter Lang, 20–3.
157  See for example Roland Kostić (2013) ‘American nation-building abroad: 
Exceptional powers, broken promises and the making of “Bosnia”’, in Eriksson, 
Mikael & Kostić (eds.) Mediation and Liberal Peacebuilding. Peace from the Ashes 
of War? London: Routledge, 22–39.
158 See more Jay Rothman & Marie L. Olson (2001) ‘From Interests to Identities: 
Towards a New Emphasis in Interactive Conflict Resolution’ Journal of Peace 
Research, 38(3), 289–305.
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7.  Bridging a Gap between  
 Theory and Practice
In their book, Svensson and Wallensteen call for bridging over ‘the 
gap between theory and practice’ and note that many policymakers 
are unfamiliar with theoretical debates while ‘theoretical discussions 
are not always firmly anchored in the policymakers’ reality’.159 Peace 
mediation is certainly not the only form of policy where worlds 
of scholars and practitioners do not necessarily meet. The views 
and focus of scholars and practitioners often greatly differ from 
each other. Academic research aims to introduce a more nuanced 
and diversified interpretation of the whole peace process, develop 
theories that generalize peace mediation situation, and, in general, 
critically observe the peace process in its entirety. Practitioners’ 
expectations towards academic research underline more practical 
benefit and they await applied knowledge, guidelines for mediation 
situation, and case-based background knowledge to be applied by 
the mediation team. Nonetheless, if practitioners, diplomats, and 
politicians are expecting applicability from research, there is also 
an internal demand for applicability of research results among 
the researchers interested in conflict resolution and peace related 
activities160.
For both groups, academics and practitioners, the ultimate 
goal is the same: changing world into a more peaceful place and 
looking for the best tools to solve conflicts in a peaceful manner. 
The relationship between academic research and peace mediation 
practice is not discussed in so many words by Nordic scholars but 
a division can be recognized between those scholars who have had 
159 Svensson and Wallensteen 2010, xi–xii.
160 Wallensteen 2012, 460; Timo Kivimäki (2012) Can Peace Research Make Peace? 
Lessons in Academic Diplomacy. Ashgate Publishing, 21.
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a close relationship with peace mediation practitioners or who may 
have even sometimes participated in peacemaking operations and 
those who have adopted a more theoretical view and are, in practice, 
studying critically the role of the mediator. 
7.1.  Academic Diplomacy
In the field of peace mediation there seems to exist several scholars 
who have time to step away from their academic ivory towers to the 
field of peacemaking and, in addition, certain mediators like Eliasson 
have had clear academic credits. As scholars have an active role in 
the peace process it is justified to talk about academic diplomacy. 
Wallensteen uses the term academic diplomacy only when scholar 
takes the role of a third party to a conflict but Kivimäki uses the 
same concept for different kinds of peace actions by academics 
and this way he emphasizes the broad content of it.161 Academics 
may assume several roles in the field of peace work. They could be 
advisors, adopt various consulting duties or act as a third party. 
The first of these available roles is an advisor. This often takes 
the form of advising positions for the departments of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. Although advisory roles bring academics close to 
real decision making power, it is more likely to find students of these 
academics exercising the real decision-making power in peace-related 
political affairs.162 In his study on ecological conflicts, Gunnar Sjöstedt 
identifies the importance of scientific knowledge and academics’ 
involvement in the resolution process. Academics’ contribution 
has turned out to be valuable, for example, in conceptualizing an 
environmental issue. As one example of the usage of scientific and 
technical knowledge, Sjöstedt provides the dispute over the fate of a 
Czech nuclear plant called Temelin, in which diplomatic discussion 
among the Austrian and Czech officials was based on available 
161 Peter Wallensteen (2011a) ‘Academics in Peacemaking’, in Wallensteen Peter (ed.) 
Peace Research − Theory and Practice. London: Routledge, 231−237; Wallensteen 
2012, 457; Kivimäki 2012, 3.
162 Wallensteen 2011a, 232.
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scientific facts.163 Another example of an academic team that gave 
an important input, for instance, by defining relevant concepts for 
conflicting parties is the one led by Peter Wallensteen, related to 
the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, in which Jan Eliasson served as a 
mediator.164 Sjöstedt remarks that the need of scientific knowledge 
brings academics close to the actual conflict resolution process, 
which traditionally has been only dominated by official diplomats 
and relevant policy makers.165 
There are several relevant modes for academics to adopt a 
consulting role. Independent projects provide one option for 
academics to be involved in peacemaking. Even though these 
kinds of independent projects demand a short-term commitment, 
they are often able to provide a clear impact. As an illustration, 
Wallensteen represents a project called the Stockholm Process on the 
Implementation of Targeted Sanctions (SPITS) which was carried out 
by the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at the Uppsala 
University. The aim of the project was to deliver an input on the 
UN reform process on sanctions. The project was financed by the 
Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.166
Another consulting role for academics is the one of a commentary. 
In practice, this may refer to giving comments on peace related 
issues in the media or, for example, lecturing on peace related topics 
in seminars. In other words, commenting is about ‘communication 
research to the general public’.167
The problem-solving workshop is a commonly used practical 
instrument among academics in the field of conflict resolution. In 
reality, a problem-solving workshop can be implemented in a form of 
an academic seminar consisting of regular academic debate with the 
aim of clarifying problematic issues related to the conflict in case.168 
163 Gunnar Sjöstedt (2009) ‘Resolving Ecological Conflicts: Typical and Special 
Circumstances’, in Bercovitch, Jacob & Kremenyuk, Victor & Zartman, I. William 
(eds.) The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution. Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 225−8.
164  Svensson & Wallensteen 2010, 44.
165 Sjöstedt 2009, 236.
166 Wallensteen 2011a, 232.
167 Ibid., 233.
168 Wallensteen 2012, 461.
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The Middle East seminar in 1990 is one of the examples Wallensteen 
gives as a useful option of a problem-solving workshop in practice. 
The Department of Conflict and Peace Research at the Uppsala 
University, with Wallensteen himself steering the ship, organized a 
low-key, academic seminar on Middle East related issues. In order to 
guarantee the credibility of the seminar, Wallensteen saw it important 
that the seminar was to be organized in a way that it fulfilled the 
criteria of an academic seminar and that the participants owned 
academic credits. In the end, the seminar included participants from 
three groups: the first was Palestinians from the occupied territories 
and from the diaspora; the second group consisted of Israelis with 
political and academic backgrounds; and the third group represented 
the so-called neutrals, referring to Swedish and American academics 
with some Jewish personalities included.169 
Looking back it can be observed that that the academic seminar 
increased the confidence among the parties and later on served as a 
beneficial umbrella for direct talks in the Middle East peace process. 
According to Wallensteen, the role of formal and informal mediation 
efforts, including academic seminars, is to ‘shed new light on known 
situations’. Being a successful case, the Middle East seminar proved 
the claim that academic insights are useful for decision-makers 
involved in a peace process. As a consequence, the seminar gave 
a great boost for the work of Uppsala University’s Department of 
Peace and Conflict Research, and made it well known in the field of 
peace activities.170 
In addition, academics may become involved in peace processes 
in the role of a third party; in other words, academics in the usage 
of diplomacy for peace. According to Wallensteen, the integrity of 
a researcher forms the ultimate basis for an academic in the role 
of a third party, and gives him the authority to practice this role 
in the eyes of the belligerents. For Wallensteen, a clear example of 
academic diplomacy is the case of Bougainville Rebellion in Papua 
New Guinea, where he, as an academic, was invited in a local dispute 
169  Peter Wallensteen (2011b) ‘An Experiment in Academic Diplomacy: The Middle 
East seminar 1990’, in Wallensteen Peter (ed.) Peace Research − Theory and Practice. 
London: Routledge, 256.
170 Wallensteen 2011b, 261–2.
79
Mediating Asymmetric Conflicts
resolution process in the role of an advisor. 171 Instead of sticking 
into this rather narrow description, Kivimäki sees important that all 
actions aiming to bring conflicting parties together and encouraging 
parties to take part in conflict-prevention activities should be 
included in the definition of academic diplomacy. According to 
Kivimäki, there is a great menu of options available for academic 
peace diplomacy.172
Academics may have also important role in initiatives that aim to 
stabilize the tenuous situation and not let it turn into a conflict.  Kjell Åke 
Nordquist refers to them as ‘general prevention’ activities.  In the case 
of East Timor that Nordquist is studying these initiatives took form, for 
example, as an organized research network, an academic conference, a 
meeting for local political leaders and decision makers, and the support 
provided for the establishment of a reconciliation commission.173 
Even though academics may take the role of a third party to a 
conflict, the examples known of such activities are rare. One central 
explanation for that is surely a feature of confidentiality which is 
the crucial starting point for this kind of activity. There are several 
academic skills known to be valuable for a third party to a conflict, 
such as capability to listen, to extract essential points, and to draw 
conclusions from theoretical insights and to apply them.  Still, 
academics in the role of a third party are often highly vulnerable 
beyond their own control when compared to others practicing third-
part diplomacy, such as states. Yet, it is this obvious vulnerability 
that brings belligerents close to academics and makes it easier for 
them to trust academics as mediators. 174 
171 Wallensteen 2011a, 233.
172 Kivimäki 2012, 2−4. Kivimäki himself is known both as an actor in practical 
peace work and as a peace-researcher. He has been actively involved in a great 
variety of efforts such as peace dialogues and academic seminars focused on East 
Asia.
173 Kjell Åke Nordquist (2008) ‘Securing Independence and Peace in East Timor 
– Conflict Prevention Through Non-Governmental Actors’, in Mellbourn, Anders 
& Wallensteen, Peter (eds.) Third Parties and Conflict Prevention. Anna Lindh 
Programme on Conflict Prevention, 2008 edition. Stockholm: Gidlunds, 190−8.
174 Wallensteen 2012, 463−4, 475.
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7.2.  Challenges of Analysis and   
 Practices
Various active roles that scholars can take in the course of the peace 
process express the particularity of peace mediation in relation to 
several other fields of international diplomacy where similar kind of 
interaction is not possible or seen as natural. Still, active participation 
of academics in a peace process is just one particular dimension of 
broader question on how the gap between academic studies and 
policy practices can be bridged and how the expectations of scholars 
and practitioners can be brought closer together. As a conclusion of 
their study, Svensson and Wallensteen list ten implications which, 
according to them, are ‘applicable to mediation in practice and 
mediation research’ and where scholarly and practical interests 
meet.175 Even though these are a particular conclusion on the basis 
of particular study, they can be also treated as a new opening in an 
always challenging debate between academics and practitioners on 
how policymakers and practitioners benefit from academic research 
and whether research produces applicable results or not.  
Firstly, they give attention to the lack of professionalism and 
how self-learning in mediation process should be supported. Even 
though there are experienced mediators the likes of Jan Eliasson or 
Martti Ahtisaari, ‘in many conflict situations, diplomats, politicians, 
or representatives from civil society engage themselves as mediators’ 
without previous experience or knowledge on how to mediate in 
an armed conflict.  Even though every mediation case is unique and 
methods and style of mediation must be chosen according to the case 
in hand, there is a need to learn from previous mediation processes 
and experiences of mediators. According to Svensson and Wallensteen, 
more studies are needed to compare different mediators’ experiences. 
Furthermore, it is important to find ways to transmit this knowledge 
to new mediators. ‘There is a need to create systematic approaches to 
learning, sharing, training, and knowledge production in the field of 
international mediation’, as they conclude.176 
175 Svensson and Wallensteen 2010, 128.
176 Ibid., 128–9.
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As for the second implication, the authors pinpoint the importance 
of a mandate as a starting point for analysis of mediation and 
mediation practices. Every mediator is sent to the field by someone, 
which can be, for example, a government, an intergovernmental 
organization, or a nongovernmental body, and the mandate not only 
authorizes but may also restrain mediators’ choices. Thus, ‘there is 
a need for would-be mediators as well as mediation researchers 
to scrutinize the mandates’. Svensson and Wallensteen want, in 
particular, to place focus on how to minimize ‘discrepancies between 
mandates, on the one hand, and available resources, anticipated 
outcome, and phases of conflict, on the other hand’.177  
Thirdly, authors are of the opinion that specific styles in 
mediation have not gained enough focus in mediation research and 
thus they want to set mediation styles as a new research agenda. 
Their focus is on empirical and comparative approach on different 
mediators and are based on a belief that this kind of a study ‘could 
shed light on conditions under which different mediation styles are 
effective in bringing about peaceful resolution’ for conflicts and 
crises. Therefore, a more detailed description of different mediation 
styles in action together with empirical study on their success would 
be of great importance for practicing mediators to enhance their 
competence.178 Just recently Ways Out of War: Peacemakers in the 
Middle East and Balkans, edited by Mona Fixdal, has in its own 
terms responded to this call for empirical study but it is merely a 
beginning rather than an exhaustive study.
Fourthly, the authors discuss the difference between political and 
humanitarian mediation and argue that most often mediation is seen 
identical to political mediation, which underrates the role of various 
humanitarian mediation initiatives which continuously take place 
in the field. The relationship between political and humanitarian 
processes in conflict setting would urgently demand a closer 
examination. The fifth implication made is that building sustainable 
peace would require supporting a channel of direct negotiation 
 
 
177 Ibid., 129–130.
178 Ibid., 130–1.
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between belligerents and this should be the target in every mediation 
process.179 
The sixth implication Svensson and Wallensteen emphasize is 
that capacities and expertise on which mediators can rely are still 
too much on ad hoc basis. Thus, ‘there has to be an institutional 
setting for international mediation’ and that would make reacting 
easier and quicker but also change operations into less dramatic and 
more routine ones. Furthermore, institutional backing is required to 
manage the complicated relationship between the mediator and the 
media. Additionally, as their seventh note Svensson and Wallensteen 
emphasize the complexity of current asymmetrical conflicts that 
‘points to the need for broader approaches that can manage the 
multidimensional aspects of conflict’ but each case requires thorough 
analysis or diagnosis before the mediator can enter and choose who 
the potential parties of peace negotiations are.180 
The eighth implication arises an important question on the 
plethora of the third parties, how their roles lack coordination and 
how different third parties appear to be competitors. It seems that 
in a humanitarian mediation situation constellation is often more 
simple.  Therefore, it would be important to conduct a closer study 
on the competence of different mediation styles at different stages 
or settings of a conflict. Current mediation process calls for better 
coordination and division of labour and more research is required 
if this goal is to be achieved.181 This would require both further 
studying of the process but also the intervention of scholars by 
facilitating discussion between third parties.
The ninth implication of Svensson and Wallensteen calls for 
attention to intraparty relations. Even though the mediator’s role 
is to facilitate dialogue among parties, the intraparty divisions and 
tensions between doves and hawks, moderates and fundamentalists, 
are often crucial for creating a successful mediation situation. The 
move towards a common goal, a sustainable peace, would also, from 
time to time, require that the mediator could interfere in intraparty 
179 Ibid., 131–2.
180 Ibid., 132–3.
181 Ibid., 134.
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conflicts but of far the challenge of the intraparty tensions has been 
ignored in peace mediation literature as well among practitioners.182
As the last point, Svensson and Wallensteen direct their attention 
on how to define success and what would be the indicators 
measuring it. However, as they remind, ‘success of mediation is an 
elusive concept’.183 While other Nordic scholars have not literally 
concentrated on bridging the gap between research and practice, 
many of them have, in one way or another, discussed about how 
to define success of a peace process. Their approach towards 
peacemaking practices, in general, and to peace mediation situation, 
in particular, is more critical and, for example, Eriksson and Kostić 
criticize normative settings and ‘one-size fits all’ solutions that 
liberal peacebuilding set for peace mediation and thus demand 
that scholarly attention should focus on the role and motives of 
intervening third party. Mediators cannot in any case be purely 
impartial as they are also representatives of another culture. 
Therefore, according to them, studies on peace mediation should 
take ‘more into consideration the power, intentions and interests of 
third parties’.184 This kind of research agenda does not perhaps meet 
the expectations of applicability like practitioners have expected but 
it also raises, from a practical perspective, an important question 
on how it is possible to preserve or change a process into one as 
much locally owned as possible and how it is possible to remain 
open for local solutions and alternative models to build society and 
economics in long term perspective. 
182 Ibid., 134.
183 Ibid., 135.
184	Eriksson	and	Kostić	2013b,	159.
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8.  Concluding remarks
Nordic research on peacemaking is currently a vital and expanding 
field within peace and conflict studies. Several innovative and 
interesting studies have been published in recent years. Study on 
peace mediation is a branch of this broader framework but there 
can also be recognized a division between a narrow approach which 
focuses on mediator’s practices and styles and a broader approach 
which comes across with mediation while focusing on peacemaking 
process as a whole. It is perhaps not possible to talk about the 
existence of Nordic school on study on peace mediation as such 
but, at the same time, it is obvious that Nordic scholars interested in 
peacemaking and peace mediation are aware what the contribution 
of other Nordic scholars is and thus it can be concluded that Nordic 
researchers clearly discuss with each other. 
On the basis of this evaluation on Nordic research the following 
remarks on the future emphasis of research and broader suggestions 
for future development should be made.
1. Even though the amount of studies focusing on peace 
mediation has increased in recent years, it is also remarkable 
that research concentrates on few Nordic institutes and 
departments in universities and that a handful of scholars 
dominate the whole field. It would be highly important to 
broaden the geographical scope of peace mediation research 
and establish stronger basis for study on peacemaking and 
peace mediation, in particular, in Finland and Denmark. A 
new Centre for Resolution of International Conflicts (CRIC) 
may already have filled this gap in Denmark. 
2. Secondly, it is important to bring closer the narrow and 
broader approaches on the study on peace mediation. At the 
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moment the debates and approaches are separate but two 
approaches should not be regarded as exclusive as both can 
learn from each other. It is noteworthy that, for example, 
the Sri Lankan case is studied by Nordic scholars who focus 
purely on practices and styles of Norway as a mediator. The 
way peace process and third party’s role is linked to the 
failure of the whole process has not been discussed by Nordic 
scholars. Furthermore, the question of justice as part of Sri 
Lankan peace talks has been ignored. The core question is 
if it is relevant to focus on peace mediation practices and 
styles without taking into consideration the whole process 
but, vice versa, study on mediation practices and styles is 
also highly important for outlining the interpretation of the 
whole process.
3. Thirdly, even though the amount of peace mediation studies 
has increased, there is still a call for further empirical studies. 
Several Nordic scholars have been interested and focused 
in their studies on Nordic mediators – persons or states. 
It is recommendable that the scope should be widened to 
cover non-Nordic cases but also the role of non-state actors’ 
activity. Furthermore, besides analysing the current cases, 
historical studies on the recent past as well as on the interwar 
cases should be paid attention to and this would strengthen 
knowledge on peace mediation. 
4. Fourthly, it is important to scrutinize what particular challenges 
there are in the mediation or facilitation of asymmetric conflicts. 
Thus, it is crucial how mediation practices need to take into 
consideration certain questions, e.g. how to mediate identities, 
collective memories, and histories. These are often causes of 
a conflict as well as targets of warfare themselves which aim, 
for example, to destroy the sites of memory, strengthen certain 
identities, and deny others. After the end of a violent conflict 
struggles over memories and identities remain as part of a post-
conflict society restraining development towards sustainable 
peace. These kinds of questions have gained more attention 
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in peacemaking literature but so far they have not been dealt 
in the context of peace mediation. There is obviously a need 
to develop a new broader theory on mediation in different 
stages of conflict resolution.
5. Fifthly, the recent debate on peacebuilding emphasizes local 
ownership of peace process. Still, third-party intervention is 
often needed to end violence but the question remains of how 
it is possible to guarantee that already during peace negotiation 
there is sufficient local ownership. It seems that long term 
problems are seeded already in peace settlements but there 
is not enough study available to focus on the significance of 
initial peace negotiations for long-term peacebuilding. 
6. Sixthly, it should be suggested that, besides constituting 
its own branch of research field, peace mediation can also 
be considered a meeting point for research as well as for 
practitioners or policymakers. While theoretical discussion 
takes place more within the frame of studies on peacemaking 
in more general terms, the discussions on peace mediation 
focus more on practices and peacemakers’ perspectives. Thus, 
peace mediation can be used as a gate which enables a natural 
forum for the exchange of opinions and experiences. In order 
to develop this kind of interaction new kind of institutional 
forums are needed and here the Nordic framework would be 
the obvious solution. 
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1.  Introduction1
The aim of this paper is to chart the unfolding of peace diplomacy 
and in particular the development of peace mediation in the Danish, 
Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish foreign policies. At large, the 
conduct and organization of peace diplomacy of these four Nordic 
countries is probed against the backdrop of an altered international 
environment with both war and peace in transition.
Recent trends and developments in the sphere of international 
security obviously blur many of the distinctions part of traditional 
policies and undermine previous consistencies. The alterations 
also challenge established processes of conflict management and 
call for changes in the way it has been understood, conducted and 
structured. It has therefore been necessary to explore the utility of 
the traditional strategies applied and reflect on the options opening 
up as well as difficulties encountered in adapting to an altered setting 
of wars and conflicts.
While the concept of ‘new wars’ coined by Mary Kaldor2 remains 
contested, it is nonetheless clear that profound changes have taken 
place in the causes, dynamics and consequences of war. It has even 
become rather difficult to define and delimit wars by the drawing 
of various clear-cut boundaries around violent practices. Above all, 
the classical distinction between wars between states and intra-state 
wars has largely collapsed and if nonetheless upheld, it appears 
that while the number of deadly conflicts has significantly declined 
over the recent decades, the proportion of intrastate conflicts to 
interstate conflicts has grown markedly. In other words, there has 
been something of an upsurge in the local and intra-state conflicts 
 
1 I thank Jenny Saarinen for collecting some of the material used in the study.
2 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in the Global Era. 
London: Polity Press.
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whereas the classical state-to-state wars have been quite limited in 
number.3 
This implies more generally that a formative moment has occurred 
in the unfolding of violence and wars. Conflicts frequently amount 
to in-between situations with war and peace existing in parallel. 
There are considerable spatial and temporal discontinuities present 
with the consequent ambiguity challenging conceptions premised on 
viewing peace as normal and war as exceptional. In addition, there 
is far less equivalence between the parties with warlords, militias, 
pirates, mercenaries or criminal gangs contributing to a proliferation 
of the scene. Conflicts and wars seem to have become rather hybrid 
in essence in escaping any clear-cut categorization. Moreover, it has 
in many cases become difficult to identify the root causes of conflict 
for these then to be remedied by some particular measures of conflict 
management and peace-building. 
The changes also imply that wars have by and large lost their 
previous power political nature and in consequence, the classical 
Realpolitik approach is far less applicable than it used to be. It 
has become redundant as wars rarely unfold between states with 
sovereignty as a key concern. It then also follows that altered thinking 
and new approaches, solutions and exit strategies are called for as 
to the efforts of curtailing violence and regulating wars. Whereas 
the main emphasis used to be on preventing war through deterrence 
and by balancing the opponent through the creation of a credible 
counterforce, the emphasis is now increasingly on conflict resolution 
and regulation of conflicts.
This re-thinking and re-evaluation implies, among other things, 
that peace mediation has gained in centrality. It has not just become 
conceivable but has also turned increasingly acceptable. Thus, 
while the efforts of mediation were quite rare during the years of 
the Cold War, they have in the aftermath of that period increased 
considerably in number and have in fact become something of a 
3 For detailed information, see for example, Human Security Report 2012. Simon 
Fraser University, Canada (http://www.hsgroup.com); Lotta Themnér and Peter 
Wallensteen, ‘Armed Conflicts 1946–2012’. Journal of Peace Research, 50(4): 501–
521.
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standard approach.4 The applicability has changed in the sense 
that conflicts can with the end of the Cold War polarity be tackled 
through mediation and other efforts of conflict resolution without 
risking a grave deterioration and re-polarization in the conduct of 
international relations.
The change in the views concerning mediation is actually quite 
profound as it has turned from something questionable to a rather 
positive approach. It has been questionable due to the aversion 
brought about by the outbreak of the Second World War. Those 
events furnished mediation with connotations of appeasement.5 
Moreover, the aim of the rather ideologically premised confrontation 
between the blocs was victory, not compromise and the same 
attitude was largely extended to apply to the other disputes of 
that period, whether related to the Cold War or not. The battle 
was seen as existential in nature and it was waged between right 
and wrong, democracy and dictatorship, capitalism and socialism, 
liberation and imperialism. The aspiration towards compromises in 
the sense of mediation was hence viewed as morally questionable if 
comprehended as conceivable in the first place.
In fact, the increased emphasis on mediation may be interpreted 
in two quite different ways. In essence, it can be seen as standing 
in essence for a continuation of traditional state action, although 
adapted to altered conditions, or it can be viewed as an approach 
and activity that breaks rather profoundly with the state-centered 
tradition of peacemaking. It does this among other reasons in 
being premised on different thinking compared to the traditional 
and rather political approaches, but also in involving actors part 
of the civil society such as various prominent personalities, private 
groups or religious networks. In any case, mediation in its post-Cold 
War forms clearly tests the limits of conventional and state-based 
diplomacy and stands in several ways for a broadening and change 
of diplomacy.
4 Some 20 per cent of political conflicts were mediated between 1945 and 1962 
against 34 per cent between 1963 and 1989, and 64 per cent between 1990 and 
1996. See International Crisis Behavior Project Data Archive, www.icbnet.org.
5 For these arguments, see Peter Wallensteen (2009), Understanding Conflict 
Resolution. War, Peace and the Global System. London: Sage, p. 4.
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Mediation, that is being in the middle (mediare), belongs in 
essence to the realm of peacemaking and is in that context different 
from other related activities and approaches such as those of 
peacekeeping and peace-building. Whereas mediation primarily 
refers to a third party opening up and facilitating contacts and the 
use of channels of communication between protagonists for their 
differences to be settled, peacekeeping points to enforcement and 
peace-building entails, in turn, processes conducive to social and 
economic development. Mediation may unfold separately from 
the other two, albeit the tree can also co-occur or be mutually 
interwoven.6 Whereas mediation is closer to problem-solving and 
hence limited as to the underlying ambitions, peace-building entails 
rather far-reaching transformative ambitions. However, the level of 
ambition may also vary in the context of mediation as evidenced by 
the distinction made by Jacques Faget.7 Facilitators are restrictive in 
their approach and act, he argues, as intermediaries between warring 
parties and have little control over the negotiating process whereas 
formulators have a more significant role in exerting control over 
matters such as the site, formulation of the agenda and managing the 
information flows while conducting their mediation Manipulators 
are even more ambitious in aiming at actively interfering not just 
with the process but also with the contents and may even present 
ultimatums. Thus, the range and nature of good offices can vary to a 
considerable degree in the context of mediation.
With this variance in mind, questions are posed regarding the 
profiles of the four Nordic countries in the sphere of mediation 
and peace diplomacy at large. In what ways have they responded 
to the new challenges and utilized the various opportunities that 
have opened up in the post-Cold War international environment? 
What are their conceptual inroads grounding the policies pursued, 
6 For an analysis of this relationship, see Jaques Faget (2011), ‘The Methamorphosis 
of Peacemaking’, in Jacques Faget (ed.), Mediation in Political Conflicts. Soft Power 
or Counter Culture? Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 2–4. Also Touval and Zartman 
define and categorize mediation in similar terms, see Saadia Touval and I. William 
Zartman, ‘Introduction: Mediation in Theory’, in Saadia Touval and I. William 
Zartman (eds.) (1985), International Mediation in Theory and Practice. Boulder 
CO: Westview, p. 12.
7 Ibid., p. 8.
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how do the different concepts applied relate to each other, and are 
there changes to be traced over time pointing to a dynamic process 
not just in the sphere of peace diplomacy but also foreign policy 
more generally? It is also probed whether the Nordics belong to the 
facilitators rather than formulators or manipulators in their efforts 
of mediation. The concluding chapter summarizes the findings of 
the charting of the Nordic profiles but it also aspires to address the 
question whether there exists a joint Nordic profile in the sphere of 
mediation and if not, what is the meaning of the diverse departures 
and policies of the Nordic countries.
100
2.  THE CASE OF DENMARK               
2.1.  Responding to the Challenge  
 of Failed States
Conflict prevention and peace promotion are in the Danish case first 
and foremost embedded in efforts of coping with failing and failed 
states. The policy emerged at the beginning of the 1990s and did so 
for multiple reasons. 
The main one clearly consisted of that state failures and 
humanitarian crises occurred with increasing frequency. They were 
part of the turmoil that prevailed during the immediate post-Cold 
War years and impacted a number of regions: Asia, Europe, Latin 
America and particularly Africa. The fragility of a considerable 
number of states and their inability to provide basic services, 
including those related to security, had extensive consequences 
and contributed to the occurrence of genocide, humanitarian 
catastrophes, extensive flows of refugees, resurgence of pirates at sea 
as well as the emergence of terrorists and terrorist strikes.8 
In consequence, new departures had to be considered within the 
international community as also evidenced by the UN Secretary-
General’s document An Agenda for Peace, issued in 1992.9 
Regional organizations were redesigned, furnished with additional 
8 As noted by Lothar Brock et.al. in their analysis of fragile states, the reasons for 
fragility are not uniform. Instead, they vary to a considerable degree and impose 
limits on what external actors can achieve. See Lothar Brock, Hans-Henrik Holm, 
George Sorensen and Michael Stohl (2011), ‘Fragile States and Violence: The Limits 
of External Assistance’. Global Dialogue, 13(1) (www.worlddialogue.org/content.
php?d+498).
9 As to the early years, see David S. Gibbs (2000), ‘Realpolitik and Humanitarian 
Intervention’. International Politics, 37(1): 41–55.
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competences and provided with broader mandates as indicated 
for example by the development of ASEAN, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council and ECOWACS for the part of Eastern Africa.
In parallel, the coining of better, more coherent and consolidated 
policies took place in a number of countries, including Britain, 
Canada and the Netherlands.10  Denmark was thus one of the 
countries that during the beginning of the 1990s focused on state 
failures and developed new foreign, security and development 
policies with the fragmentation of states as a point of departure. This 
was done among other reasons because it was considered important 
to secure the results of the aid and development work underway 
or already carried out. It was noted in a number of cases that the 
results achieved through years of development cooperation could be 
destroyed once violent conflicts occurred and state structures broke 
down. It was therefore obvious that specific policies and approaches 
recognizing the enduring link between development and security 
were called for.11 The sine qua non for success therefore pertains to 
factors such as the legitimacy of the government and its competence 
and the capacities available for delivery of results.
Thus, in 1995 Denmark decided to enhance its preparedness 
in the field of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution by 
establishing an entity gathering experts to be employed at short 
notice in various preventive and peacebuilding missions. The entity, 
called International Humanitarian Service (IHB; Internationale 
Humanitære Beredskab) was initially part of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and was tasked to contribute to the efforts made 
by the governments or by the international community in the field 
of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution in order to enhance 
peace and stability. In its government programme, issued in October 
2011, the Danish Government made a distinction between ordinary 
development aid and means to be employed within a global frame 
10 See for example Tonny Brems Knutsen (1997), ‘Humanitarian Intervention 
Revisited: Post Cold-War Responses to Classical Problems’, in Michael Pugh (ed.), 
The UN, Peace and Force. London: Frank Cass, pp. 146–165.
11 For an analysis, see Hans-Henrik Holm (2001),’The Disaggregated World Order 
in the Making: Policy Towards Failed States as an Example’. International Politics, 
38(3): 357–374. 
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for stabilization, reconstruction and recreation of capabilities in conflict-
ridden areas.12 As a follow-up, the name of the body was changed to the 
Peace and Stabilization Response (FSB; Freds- og stabiliseringsredskabet) 
in order for it to be better in line with the contents as well as the nature 
of the projects initiated and work carried out. 
As argued by Hans-Henrik Holm, the Danish decision to develop 
policies and acquire competences with the fragility of states as a 
conceptual point of departure stood out as a logical consequence of 
the challenges encountered during the 1990s. The persistent problem 
of failing states both in Europe and Africa had created a need for new 
types of policy responses with development being increasingly linked 
to state-building, and it also called for cooperation and coordination 
between foreign policy, development policies as well as engagement 
in peacekeeping. “The new security policies have brought about this 
need for reassessment and policy change,” he concludes.13 
The need for better coordinated and more coherent policies was 
also underlined in 2009 in the context of an agreement between the 
major Danish political parties concerning defence14 and it figured 
as a central theme in the new Strategy for Denmark’s Development 
Cooperation.15 The whole-of-government approach ranging from 
diplomacy to development projects and humanitarian delivery to 
military activities was then as a follow-up applied in preparing a 
policy paper on the Danish engagement in Afghanistan and it also 
structured papers focusing on Somalia.16 The stress on the need for 
coordination and coherence further appeared as central themes in a 
major policy document published in 2010 by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs concerning Danish policies and contributions in regard to 
fragile states.17
12 Et Danmark der står sammen. Regeringsgrundlag. October 2011. Copenhagen: 
the Government, p. 38.
13 Ibid. p. 12.
14 Forsvarsfordrag 2010–2014. Signed in June 2009.
15 Freedom from Poverty; Freedom to Change. Strategy for Denmark’s Development 
Cooperation. Danida. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. July 2010.
16 See for example Politikpapir for Danmarks engagement i Somalia. Copenhagen: 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2011.
17 Fred og stabilisering. Danmarks politik for indsatser i skrøbelige stater 2010–
2014. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010.
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The latter document departs from that failing and failed states 
constitute one of the most acute challenges in the sphere of peace 
and security in various parts of the world. It notes that Denmark 
has pursued active policies in the fields of development as one of the 
key donor countries and has also contributed to quite complicated 
efforts of stabilization at various sites of conflict and struggle. In 
addition to continuing its own endeavours in regard to peacemaking 
and stabilization, Denmark aims according to the document at a 
strengthening of the aspirations of the international community at 
large in this area of vital importance. Furthermore, the document 
sets the goal for the part of Denmark that there has to be a 
coordinated whole-of-government approach spanning the fields of 
foreign, development and security policies. This is required in order 
for Denmark to be able to apply a broad array of instruments 
composed of military, political, humanitarian, stabilizing as well as 
development-related means in tackling various issues pertaining to 
the fragmentation of states.
The policies developed further depart from that Denmark opts 
for prevention as to the choises to be made in regard to the various 
phases of a conflict cycle. This applies to Danish projects but is also 
valid in view of facilitating efforts of conflict prevention in various 
other contexts: in Denmark’s cooperation with other countries, in 
the UN as well as in regard to various regional endeavours.     
The Government announced at the beginning of 2012 in the 
form of a joint statement delivered by the ministers in charge of 
foreign, development and defence policies that conflict prevention, 
stabilization and reconstruction in failing states remains a priority 
area in Danish policies. Also the level of ambition was specified in 
the sense that the focus will increasingly be on acute and particularly 
difficult cases such as those of Libya, Somalia and South Sudan.18 
Moreover, the number of fragile countries targeted should be limited, 
albeit the efforts should span over a longer period than has usually 
18 The new line was announced through a statement by Foreign Minister Villy 
Søvndal, Minister of Defence Nick Hækkerup and Minister for Development Aid 
Christian Friis Bach “En ny sikkerhetspolitik” (A New Security Policy), published 
in Jyllands-Posten, 20th of January 2012. The Danish partner countries consisted in 
2011 of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, the occupied 
parts of Palestine and Burma.
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been the case in the sphere of development policies. In essence, 
Denmark endeavours at tackling the true causes of instability, 
conflicts and terror rather than just focusing on the symptoms, the 
three ministers stated. There has to be competences and capabilities 
available that allow for rapid, flexible and effective responses to 
crisis. It was further stressed that the prime aim is one of locally 
rooted and tailor-made conflict prevention for longstanding and 
durable results to be achieved. Notably, Denmark should according 
to the statement refrain in the future from acting on its own as 
joint endeavours based on common efforts in the context of broad 
alliances are the best guarantee for success. The ministers therefore 
also stressed that cooperation with organizations such as the UN, 
EU and NATO adds to the prospects of achieving the desired results 
in conflict affected areas.
Denmark’s failed state policy was further specified, with emphasis 
on the whole-of-government approach, in a paper prepared in 2013 
for a ministerial steering group dealing with the failed states policy and 
efforts of stabilization. The paper presents diplomacy, development 
aid, military competence as well as civilian competences, including 
the police and emergency services, as the elements upon which 
Danish contributions rest.19 In addition, it outlines various ways of 
ensuring a better coordination of stabilization, peacebuilding and 
development interventions and advocates more effective planning, 
dialogue, coordination as well as mobilization of all the instruments 
and actors conducive to stabilization in fragile and conflict affected 
states. Moreover, the paper states that strengthening of Danish 
efforts will take place in collaboration with the countries themselves 
and through regional and multinational organizations being able to 
use mediation and dialogue to prevent conflicts from breaking out 
or deteriorating.
19 See Danmarks samtænkte stabiliseringsinsatser i verdens brænpunkter. The 
paper is available on the Foreign Ministry’s website and was submitted for a final 
round of discussion in September 2013.
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2.2.  Increased Emphasis on    
 International Cooperation
Overall, the doctrine developed implies that Denmark contributes 
to efforts of conflict prevention, stabilization and reconstruction in 
fragile and conflict affected states through international cooperation. 
Danmark’s participation takes place in the context of the UN, EU, 
OECD, NATO, World Bank as well as in the sphere of various 
regional organizations. In addition, the Policy Paper on Denmark’s 
whole-of-government approach lists the Nordic countries as partners 
of cooperation in a number of projects and it also singles out the 
United States, Canada, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Australia 
as frequently engaged in joint endeavours and countries applying 
similar approaches.20
The UN stands out, according to the Danish view, out as an as an 
important actor and partner of cooperation in tackling the issue of 
failed states. It does so owing to its legitimacy and the broad array 
of tools applicable also in efforts of assisting and remedying failing 
states. Yet the departure rests on the issue that there is still a need 
for further development and Denmark has therefore been pushing 
for better coordination of the tools and policies at the disposal of 
the UN. The strategy paper issued in 2010 notes that the overall 
efforts of the UN in some country-specific projects have stood out as 
fragmented, uncoordinated and void of any jointly agreed strategic 
direction.21 Denmark has thus aspired to improve the cooperation 
between various UN-bodies such as the Department of Political 
Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Peacebuilding 
Support Office and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. 
In addition, Denmark has opted for a better utilization of the 
experiences gained for example in the context of the revision of the 
justice and security sectors.
As to the EU, Denmark has been actively engaged in improving 
further the Union’s competence in the field of comprehensive 
20 Ibid., p. 11.
21 See Fred og stabilisering. Danmarks politik for indsatser i skrøbelige stater 
2010–2015. Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 21.
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conflict management. The aim has been one of contributing to 
the breaking down of various bureaucratic barriers hampering a 
maximal employment of the EU’s competences and resources. The 
various limitations have been a Danish concern and were hence 
included among the themes important in the context of Denmark’s 
EU Presidency in 2012. Consequently, and in order to improve the 
Union’s readiness to response to situations of crisis and its and 
to acquire capabilities and competences needed in handling post-
crisis challenges, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized, 
together with the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), a 
conference on “Ensuring a Comprehensive EU Approach to Crises: 
Readiness, Response and Recovery”. The conference took place in 
Brussels in February 2012. The paper underlying the preparations 
and introducing the themes of the conference stated that it is 
important to examine whether the structures and processes in place 
can ensure that relevant EU instruments are sufficiently integrated 
and coordinated. It was also noted that there exists a need to move 
towards greater coherence and consistency as to the activities of 
various EU-related actors, including the EU-missions, EU delegations, 
Special Representatives and Member States. 
According to the paper, another measure to be examined 
consists of further decentralization of decision making powers from 
Brussels.22  It was stressed that although decisive steps towards a 
more inclusive, multilateral and coherent external action of the EU 
have taken place, there are still institutional divides and operational 
obstacles that need to be remedied for the Union to be able to 
 
 
 
22 See the paper prepared and distributed by the European Council on Foreign Relation 
(2012),”EU External Action: From CSDP to ‘Flexible Engagement. Background Paper 
presented at the Conference on Ensuing a Comprehensive EU Strategy to Crisis: 
Readiness, Response and Recovery”. Further information is provided by the EU2012.
dk and ECFR information sheet “Ensuring a Comprehensive EU Approach to Crisis: 
Readiness, Response and Recovery”, 25th of January 2012. See also the introductory 
presentation by Foreign Minister Villy Søvndal at the conference, “The EU’s Conflict 
Prevention and Crisis Response”, The European Union Security and Defence Union, 
2012, 3(1): 7–8.
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conduct timely and effective policies in the fields of crisis prevention, 
management, and post-conflict development.23
A similar emphasis on coordinated and comprehensive approaches 
has been reflected in the various Danish policy-documents prepared 
in order to implement the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 
on Women, Peace and Security. The first National Action Plan was 
adopted in 2005 and then revised in 2007 on the basis of cooperation 
between representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry 
of Defence, National Police representing the Ministry of Justice as 
well as various civil society organizations.24
Although aiming in general at a focused impact in tackling the 
problem of failed and failing states, the Danish efforts of conflict 
prevention have nonetheless spanned Africa, Asia as well as the 
Middle-East. Out of these regions, Africa has clearly received most 
attention as a continent frequently plagued by the problem of 
fragmentation. Africa’s standing as a key target is also evidenced by 
that the various policy-papers outlining the strategic approach issued 
since 2004 have mainly focused on that continent. The papers have, 
among other things, dealt with ways of funding peace and security-
related projects, and these projects have been frequently launched in 
cooperation with the African Union (AU). It may further be noted 
that Somalia has, out of the different target countries, attracted most 
attention and piracy has been singled out as an issue-area warranting 
special treatment.25 
23 For evaluations concerning the development made, see among others, Stefan 
Lehne, (2013), ‘Promoting a Comprehensive Approach to EU Foreign Policy’. 
Carnagie Endownment. Europe; Richard Gowan (2012), ‘The Case for Cooperation 
in Conflict Management’. No. 59, European Council for Foreign Relations: Nicoletta 
Pirozzi (2013), ‘The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management’. EU 
Crisis Management Paper Series. Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces. DCAF Brussels.
24 Denmark’s National Action Plan for Implementation of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. Copenhagen:  Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Danish National Police, 2008.
25 See Politikpapir for Danmarks engagement i Somalia 2011. Danida. Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. The strategy on piracy was developed jointly by four ministries, 
Strategy for the Danish Counter-Piracy Effort 2011–2014. Copenhagen: Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. Ministry of Defence. Ministry of Justice. Ministry of Economic 
and Business Affairs, May 2011. 
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Denmark has in general supported the efforts of African countries 
to be involved in handling security challenges on the continent. 
The Peace and Stabilization Fund established in 2011 as an inter-
ministerial institution has in particular funded projects in East 
Africa as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan.26 For the AU to be able 
to take decisions and undertake actions of its own, Denmark has 
specially supported the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU, 
and regionally the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
IGAD) in East Africa, the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) in West Africa and Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) in Southern Africa have been singled out as 
recipients of support.  
Denmark’s most extensive endeavour, pursued together with a 
number of other countries, has taken place in Afghanistan. Both 
civilian and military means have been employed and the whole-
of-government approach has included political, strategic as well 
as tactical elements. Accordingly, also the first Danish strategy 
concerning Afghanistan prepared in 2008 was based on contributions 
from all relevant ministries. A task force consisting of the directors 
of various ministry departments was established. In fact, much has 
been invested in conflict management and peace diplomacy as the 
fact that Afghanistan ranks highest in 2013 among the recipients of 
Danish development aid also indicates.27
More generally, Denmark supports the International Dialogue on 
Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. The organization brings together 
conflict-affected and fragile countries, donor countries part of the 
OECD and civil society actors. The aim is one of catalyzing transition 
from conflict and fragility to more peaceful relations. The Danish 
Minister for Development Aid has co-chaired the organization and 
Denmark has in general actively contributed to the implementation 
of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. The New Deal 
26 For an evaluation of the policies pursued in East Africa, see Katja L. Jacobsen 
and Johannes R. Nordby, ‘Danish Interests in Regional Security Institutions in East 
Africa’. DIIS Report 2013: 14.
27 For a summary of the policy pursued, see the draft paper on the coordinated 
Danish policy of stabilization, op.cit. p. 2. The latest Afghanistan-strategy covers 
the years 2013–2014.
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figures as a key agreement between fragile states organized as g7+ 
and partner countries. Denmark has, as a partner country, been 
active in particular in South Sudan and Afghanistan in the context 
of the New Deal.
2.3.  The Administering of Coordinated  
 Policies
The whole-of-government approach as to failing and failed states 
initially emerged in 2004 and did so in the context of an agreement 
concerning long-term policies in the field of defence. The agreement 
was then followed up by establishing of an inter-ministerial 
coordination group consisting of civil servants from a number 
of relevant ministries. The next step, taken in 2010, consisted of 
setting up a steering-group consisting of directors of departments 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, the Prime 
Minister’s Office as well as the Ministry of Justice. The group has 
been mandated to take strategic as well as operative decisions and 
it has also been tasked with the administration of the Peace and 
Stabilisation Response (FSB). It meets regularly and may establish 
regional task forces such as the one dealing with piracy or issues 
related to Afghanistan. Furthermore, an inter-ministerial secretariat 
focusing on the Danish policies in regard to failing and failed states 
was established in 2009. It is hosted by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and consists of civil servants from the MFA and the Ministry 
of Defence.
In 2009 an entity called the Global Frame (Globalramme) was 
set up in order to provide financing for projects related to fragile 
states in Asia, the Middle-East as well as Europe. The annual sum to 
be spent on various projects has been 150 million DKK. As part of 
a revision of the previous policies, the Global Frame was renamed 
and the new Peace and Stabilization Fund also has a larger amount 
of means at its disposal.
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3.  THE CASE OF FINLAND
3.1.  Engaging the State
The Finnish efforts of developing a distinct profile and capacity in the 
sphere of peace mediation are of relatively recent origin, although the 
promotion of mediation as an integral part of the country’s foreign 
policy leans on previous experiences. These have accumulated over 
time including, inter alia, peace processes in Northern Ireland, 
Western Balkans, Aceh, the Horn of Africa and South Caucasus.
Two different factors seem to account for why peace mediation 
was placed on the national agenda around 2008-2009. Firstly, voices 
were raised in the public debate arguing that the various non-state 
activities in the sphere of conflict resolution and peace promotion 
should be complemented by policies pursued systematically by the 
Finnish state. These voices turned out to be quite influential and 
generated much attention. In fact, they amounted rather quickly 
to an almost nationwide consensus extending beyond the usual 
political cleavages. In consequence, it was broadly concluded that 
the state of Finland should indeed invest in, accumulate resources, 
generate competences and engage in peace mediation. Policies 
should be developed aiming at advancing a far more pronounced 
national role, but also to add to international awareness concerning 
the contemporary needs in the field of peace mediation.
For the second, the interest in the field grew further with the 
question of country branding turning into a national concern. A 
link between the two issue areas emerged as the Country Brand 
Delegation, established by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
included peace mediation in its final report Mission for Finland, 
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published at the end of 2010.28 Obviously, the Delegation was 
influenced by the former President Martti Ahtisaari being awarded 
the Nobel Peace Prize as well as the success in the Aceh peace process 
with Ahtisaari as the lead negotiator.29 The Delegation viewed these 
achievements as a potential to be utilized and developed for purposes 
of branding, and consequently various proposals were made to that 
effect. It initiated, among other things, an annual event, the Ahtisaari 
Convention, in order to bring together various international conflict 
mediators to discuss ways of settling ongoing disputes, but also to 
educate Finnish crisis management specialists as well as the public at 
large on issues pertaining to conflict resolution.
The Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded already in 
May 2010 to the various requests and recommendations by issuing 
guidelines for peace mediation.30 The aim expressed was one of 
Finland seeking ways to strengthen its role in brokering peace, 
reinforcing domestic peace mediation capacities and improving the 
preparedness to take part in peace mediation operations, but also 
to help develop the international peace mediation structures and 
in general impact the unfolding of the international system in the 
sphere of peacemaking. The profile searched for is that of Finland 
as a “vanguard of peace meditation”, although partnerships should 
be established with countries already having a pronounced profile in 
peace mediation such as Ireland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. 
A further landmark consisted of the government formed at the 
beginning of 2011 incorporating peace mediation into its programme 
for the years 2011–2015. It pledged, in particular, to prepare an 
Action Plan on Peace Mediation in order to “strengthen Finnish 
28 Mission for Finland: How Finland will demonstrate its strength by solving the 
world’s most wicked problems. Final Report of the Country Brand Delegation. 
Available at: http://www.architecture.com.au/i-cms_file?page=13538/mission-for-
finland-branding-report.pdf. 
29 For the various phases of the peace process, see Timo Kivimäki and David 
Gorman (2008), ’Non-Governmental Actors in Peace Processes: The Case of 
Aceh’, in Anders Mellbourn and Peter Wallensteen (eds.), Third Parties in Conflict 
Prevention. Stockholm: Gidlunds förlag, pp. 163–185. 
30 Peace Mediation – Finland’s Guidelines. Available at: http://www.formin.
fi/public/default.aspx/nodeid=40158&contentlan=28&culture=en_US#Peace_
Mediation.
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capabilities and participation, taking account of opportunities for the 
flexible use of resources through the establishment of a stabilization 
fund”. 
The Action Plan was subsequently prepared – in consultation 
with various civil society actors – and published in December 2011.31 
It was noted in the plan that the nature of the various conflicts to 
be tackled has changed profoundly and that there are hence reasons 
to emphasize the importance of international cooperation in order 
for the international structures, capabilities and competence to be 
strengthened. According to the plan, more effective tools have to 
be developed to prevent, contain and resolve conflicts in all stages 
of possible conflict cycles. Furthermore, Finland set itself the task 
of contributing to the coining of such tools, and pledged to do so 
in cooperation with like-minded countries, organizations and civil 
society actors. Still another conclusion pertained to that networking 
was granted the position of a main approach to be applied both in 
an international as well as domestic contexts and, more generally, 
peace mediation was seen as an integral part of a broader and 
comprehensive package of crisis management.
3.2.  Strengthening the UN-system  
 in the Field of Mediation
In setting priorities and aiming at improving international peace 
mediation structures, Finland has identified the UN as a major 
platform for action and networking. The aim of the policies pursued 
has been one of promoting mediation in order for it to become one 
of the core issue-areas in the policies of the UN.  
A partnership was established in 2010 with Turkey with the two 
countries initiating the Group of Friends of Mediation active in the 
context of the United Nations. The Group aspires at developing the 
mandate and competences of the organization in mediation-related 
questions by bringing together traditional as well as new and emerging 
mediators. The effort is one of raising the level of awareness within 
31 Action Plan for Mediation. Available at: http://www.formin.fi/public/default.asp
x?nodeid=23644&nodeid+1514&contentlan+2&culture=en-US
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the UN and the international community and, more specifically, 
to bring together countries from different continents and cultures 
to share best practices. In addition, the Group aspires to promote 
synergy and facilitate the emergence of a cooperative culture in 
the sphere of mediation. Moreover, it aspires to avoid overlapping 
authority for clear roles and coherence to prevail in the efforts of 
brokering peace.
The Group comprises of 37 member states (with the United 
States approved as the latest member) and it has also been joined by 
various regional organizations as well as the UN. There are hence 
altogether 45 members in the Group. It contributed to that the first-
ever General Assembly resolution (A/RES/65/283) on mediation 
in the UN system was adopted unanimously in June 2011. The 
resolution was jointly presented by Finland and Turkey.
As a follow-up of the resolution, a document on the various 
mediation fundamentals to enhance the prospects of success 
was prepared in September 2011 by the Secretary-General and 
subsequently presented at the General Assembly. The document titled 
UN Guidelines for Effective Mediation draws extensively from the 
organization’s own experiences but also leans on advice and insight 
provided by various member states as well as other actors experienced 
in peace mediation. The presentation of the guidelines at the General 
Assembly was followed by a ministerial meeting in September 2012 
organized by Finland and Turkey. The coining of the guidelines was 
broadly characterized as a landmark event and it has in general been 
felt that the UN is now on its way of making considerable progress 
in adapting its efforts in the field of mediation to the contemporary 
challenges in the sphere of international relations.32
The Finnish aim in this context has, according to Foreign Minister 
Erkki Tuomioja, been one of disseminating the guidelines as widely 
as possible and to contribute to that they become a tool commonly 
32 For further information on the approach of the UN in the sphere of mediation, 
available at: http://www.peacemaker.un.org. As to the design and management of 
mediation processes, see United Nations Guide for Effective Mediation disseminated 
by the Mediation Support Unit (MSU), based in the Policy and Mediation Division 
of the Department of Political Affairs (September 2012).
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used.33 Among other things, activities in the sphere of mediation 
should according to Finland be included in the UN’s regular budget 
in order to add to the prospects of predictable and stable funding. 
Moreover, the initiatives taken at the General Assembly should in 
the Finnish view be expanded also to apply to other forums and 
organizations of the UN, including the Security Council. In addition, 
Finland aims at enhancing the role of women in mediation among 
other things by strengthening the implementation of the UN Security 
Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. 
Finland will, according to the guidelines concerning the future 
UN-policies issued in July 2013, 34 continue to prioritize – along 
with a strengthening of the UN’s political operations (SPM) 
and enhancement of the responsibility to protect (R2P) – peace 
mediation. Also Finland’s financial support to relevant UN bodies, 
above all to the Mediation Support Unit (MSU), will continue. 
More generally, the aim is one of adding to the range of financing so 
that in addition to the western countries also others increase their 
voluntary contributions, albeit the long-term aim is one of including 
the financing of mediation into the UN’s regular budget.
 It is further noted in the guidelines that a precondition for 
successful policies consists of that there are capable and trustworthy 
Finnish mediators available to be assigned various tasks pertaining 
to mediation.
3.3.  Bolstering the Competences of  
 the European Union
Along with the UN, the European Union has been a major platform 
and target for the Finnish efforts of enhancing international peace 
mediation. As such, the Union’s strength in the sphere of soft power 
is seen as formidable, although it has also been argued that it 
33 See speech by Minister Tuomioja at the Friends of Mediation Ministerial 
Breakfast in New York, 27 September 2012. Available at: http://formin.fi/public/
Print.aspx?contentid=258834&nodeid=15145&culture=en-US&contentlan=2.
34 Suomen ulkoasiainhalinnon YK-strategia (The UN-Strategy of Finland’s Foreign 
Policy Administration). Ulkoasianministeriö, July 2013.
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remains to some extent potential in nature and therefore needs to 
be fully developed and widely employed.35 The EU has undoubtedly 
played a key role in several peace processes and it posseses a wide 
array of tools – such as the Instruments for Stability (ifS) or the 
option of nominating Special Representatives – but the Union has 
according to Finnish views not been very systematic in developing 
its own mediation capacities. The role of conflict prevention and 
mediation should be increased in the European External Action 
Service (EEAS): it should be ascertained that the preparation of the 
stability instruments of the Union is carried out on a broad base 
between the Commission and the EEAS and that the resources of 
the Unit for Conflict Prevention, Peace Building and Mediation are 
sufficient.36 
A considerable step forward was taken in 2009, during the 
Swedish EU Presidency, with the Council approving a Concept on 
Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities. Yet it appears 
that the existence of such an opening is not very well known, and the 
concept has also suffered from a slow implementation.37 At large, 
emphasis has remained on traditional crisis management with less 
stress on mediation and dialogue.
Notably, the structures and preconditions for active engagement 
in mediation are there but they need, in the Finnish view, to be 
utilized to the full. “It is our common responsibility to make sure 
that the division has adequate resources and necessary support for its 
actions”, stated Minister for Foreign Affairs Tuomioja in outlining 
the role of the EU in the sphere of brokering peace.38 
35 For these arguments, see the speech by Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja in 
Brussels, 25 April 2012 delivered at a conference on international peace mediation 
organized by the European Parliament. Available at: http://formin.fi/public/Print.as
px?contentid=247735&nodeid=15145&culture=en-US&contentlan=2.
36 See Finland’s Action Plan for Mediation, p. 13.
37 For a study of the EU’s profile in the field of conflict management and peace 
mediation, see Tanja Tamminen, ‘Towards Efficient Early Action. The EU Needs 
a Regional Focus and Proactive Tools to Prevent and Manage Conflicts’. Briefing 
Paper, 113. Finnish Institute of International Affairs, September 2012.
38 Op. cit., p. 2.
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In order for the EU structures to be developed further, Finland and 
Sweden have jointly proposed the establishing of a European Institute 
of Peace (EIP). The proposal was included in a letter and a non-paper 
addressed to the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton. 39 The EIP 
should, in their view, exist as an independent and non-profit think tank 
based on the common values of the EU.40 It could, more concretely, 
focus on mediation and dialogue in countries where the Union is not 
directly involved. The proposal has been discussed in the European 
Parliament and it was then requested that the EEAS undertakes a cost-
benefit analysis of the establishment of such an institute. The results of 
such an analysis were published in 2012.41 
A Draft Concept Paper, dating from April 2013 and attributing 
mainly to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, takes into 
consideration various suggestions concerning the mandate of the EIP. 
It focuses on the financing, field and range of activities as well as the 
division of labour within the planned EIP and, in general, takes up 
thoughts put forward in the debate in aiming at bringing the broad 
discussion to a positive end and the establishment of the institute.42 
A group of core countries, including also Finland and Sweden, have 
recently intensified their cooperation to secure the establishment of 
the institute which is expected to take place during 2014.
39 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, ‘Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb and 
Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt propose Establishment of the European Institute 
of Peace, 3.9.2010. http://.formin. Finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=199709&c
ontentlan+2&culture-en-US. The text of the letter is available at: http://the mediateur.
eu/index.php/publications-and-resources/260-discussion-paper-a-european-institute-
of-peace-value-added-risk-and-options.
40 See Heli Kanerva, ‘The Development of Governmental Structures of Finnish 
Peace Mediation’, in Piiparinen, Touko and Brummer, Ville (eds.), Global Networks 
of Mediation. Prospects and Avenues for Finland as a Peacemaker. The Finnish 
Institute of International Affairs: Helsinki 2012, p. 111. See also Gunilla Herolf, 
‘Establishing the Knowledge Base of a Smart Power: A Blue Print for an EU Institute 
for Peace’. Directorate-General for External Policies. Policy Department (EP/EXPO/
AFET/EWC/2009-01/06). 
41 See Peter Brorsen, European Institute for Peace: Costs, Benefits and Options. 
Final Report on a Study Commissioned by the European Parliament’s Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, October 2012.
42 See European Institute for Peace. “Creating a Hub for Peace Mediation, Informal 
Dialogue”. Draft Concept Paper, April 2013.
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3.4.  Other Measures on  
 the International Level
Finland has, in addition to activities in the context of the UN and EU, 
supported various regional organizations and in particular the African 
Union (AU) in their efforts of mediation. For the part of the AU, the 
aim has been one of contributing to the replacement of the current 
mostly ad hoc based activities with more permanent ones. Among 
other things, this objective has been furthered by the African Union 
Mediation Support Capacity Project that takes advantage of the 
African experience in the sphere of practical mediation work. Finland 
has also been part of supporting cooperation between the AU and the 
EU as well as the AU and the UN in issues related to mediation. The 
Finnish Action Plan on mediation departs from that these forms of 
cooperation and support will be continued also in the future.43 
The Action Plan also notes the central role of the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the field of mediation 
as well as conflict prevention and resolution. The aim in the case of 
the OSCE is according to the Plan one of strengthening the structures 
and measures that support mediation at level of the Secretariat and in 
field missions in the context of handling the conflict cycle.44 Recently 
the Conflict Prevention Centre of the OSCE has expanded its work 
in the sphere of mediation support. A framework document has been 
prepared and the aim is according to the Secretary-General Lamberto 
Zannier one of using the lessons gained during a pilot-phase to 
establish a full-fledged, fully institutionalized mediation support 
capacity. A Friends-of-Mediation Group consisting of Switzerland, 
Finland and Turkey as the key countries advancing the work of the 
Group has convened in Vienna for such a capacity to be created.
Attention is equally attached in the Finnish Action Plan to the 
Council of Europe as a body being closely connected with conflict 
prevention and peace-building because the respect of human rights, 
observance of the principles of the rule of law and support for 
democratic principles are the basic elements of mediation.
43 See the Action Plan for Mediation, p. 15.
44 Ibid,, p.15.
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Furthermore, Nordic cooperation is viewed as an important 
channel for making mediation effective. The Finnish Action Plan 
states that cooperation in the field of training will be strengthened 
and new forms of cooperation will be sought for in order to produce 
added value for mediation. Finland has, among other things, 
cooperated with Norway in efforts to initiate a genuine national 
political dialogue among the various actors in Myanmar. In general, 
the idea has been one of supporting the local actors to build the 
necessary capabilities or platforms needed in the settling of conflicts. 
In 2011 Finland initiated a Nordic network on peace mediation 
in order to facilitate contacts, identify possible areas of further 
cooperation and exchange of information in a rather informal 
and flexible manner.45 In addition to facilitating contacts between 
the relevant foreign ministry officials, it aspires to create linkages 
between various Nordic civil society actors, including researchers 
and research institutes. 
3.5.  The National Level
With mediation turning into an integral part of the Finnish foreign 
policy, there has been a need to back this up with efforts of developing 
various competences within the country itself. This includes the 
structures and competences part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The country continues, as articulated by the Foreign Minister, 
“to build on the mediation experience that it already has”.46 The aim 
is one of coordinating existing resources of the state administration 
and civil society so that these resources can be utilized fully in 
mediation-related activities.
The coordination, monitoring and planning of mediation has been 
anchored as a cross-cutting element in the activities of the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs with discussions taking place particularly in the 
45 See for example the speech delivered by Minister for Foreign Affairs Erkki 
Tuomioja at a peace mediation seminar held in Geneva in June 2012. Available at: 
http://formin-origin.finland.fi/public/Print.aspx?contentid=251896&culture=en-
US&cont.
46 Ibid.
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Security and Development Group of the MFA. Other branches of the 
state administration such as the Prime Minister’s Office, Ministries of 
Finance, Interior, Justice and Defence, all with an important role in 
regard to mediation, have designated contact persons for mediation 
issues. Cooperation with government representatives, civil society 
organizations such as the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) and 
Finn Church Aid, research institutions and universities, immigrant 
groups living in Finland and others involved in mediation takes placed 
among other forms through meetings within a national Mediation 
Coordination Group. Led by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
the Group serves as a platform of sharing information, identifying 
new areas of cooperation in the field of mediation and advancing a 
multistakeholder approach to mediation. Training of personnel takes 
place primarily in cooperation with the Crisis Management Centre 
(CMC), a body part of the Ministry of the Interior. 
A coordinator has been appointed within the MFA to work 
particularly with peace mediation and the ministry also hosts two 
special representatives of the Foreign Minister. The posts are currently 
held by Kimmo Kiljunen and Pekka Haavisto, with Kiljunen being 
among other things tasked with generating contacts with various 
relevant actors, including parties to conflict, and to add to the 
awareness as well as insight concerning regional conflicts in various 
parts of the world. His focus has been, in particular, in South East 
Asia, the paramount example being the National Dialogue process in 
Myanmar/Burma. In addition to providing advice, he is also entitled 
to make suggestions concerning mediation in particular cases. Pekka 
Haavisto has a similar mandate, although he is instructed to focus 
in particular on conflicts unfolding in the Horn of Africa with 
particular emphasis on Somalia and Sudan.
In addition to new structures and the establishment of the post 
of a coordinator, funding is also seen as important for an increase in 
the capacity of mediation. As noted in the Action Plan for Mediation, 
Finland receives international visibility and influence also in issues 
related to mediation through an allocation of economic resources.47 
The Peace Mediation Guidelines (2010) stated that “Finland has 
47 Ibid., p. 33.
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annually supported peace mediation with several million euros”.48 A 
separate appropriation out of the means reserved for civilian crisis 
management (altogether some 17 million euros) has been reserved 
for projects directly related to mediation. This appropriation has 
since the year 2010 been annually around 400.000 euros. According 
to the Government Programme, various possibilities for the flexible 
use of resources through the establishment of a stabilization fund 
are being examined.
One of the activities initiated on the basis of a recommendation 
of the Branding Group consists of organizing the International 
Ahtisaari Day. The event takes place annually to provide a platform 
for advancing debate on issues pertaining to mediation and in order 
to bring together both international as well as domestic experts in 
the field.
National competences have also been largely advanced in 
order for Finland to be able to facilitate peace mediation in 
various international contexts and to do so by contributing to the 
improvement and strengthening of various international peace 
mediation structures and supporting actors and partners engaged 
in the more informal activities (track 2) part of reconciliation 
and peacemaking. However, as noted by Foreign Minister Erkki 
Tuomioja, Finland has rarely acted as a mediator itself49, although 
it has at the same time experiences, preparedness and competences 
available to be applied in the field of mediation if so decided. 
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has cooperated, in the field 
of mediation, with the Finnish Institute of International Affairs 
(FIIA), Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) at the University 
of Tampere as well as the Åland Islands Peace Institute. The Åland 
Institute has, among other things, hosted a number of delegations 
from different regions plagued by conflicts in order for the visitors to 
be informed about the Åland Islands as a solution to a complicated 
 
 
48 Peace Mediation. Finland’s Guidelines, ibid., p. 13.
49 Ibid., speech by the Foreign Minister at a seminar on Peace Mediation, Geneva, 
June 2012.
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ethno-territorial dispute.50 The Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
has supported the visits, contributed to the spreading of information 
on the case and been part of organizing seminars on Åland as an 
example of peaceful governance in New York, Brussels and Geneva.51 
50 On the case of Åland, see Mikael Wigell (2013), ’The Åland Example as Norm 
Entrepreneurship’, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 20(1): 
67–84. For information on the visits by different delegations, see John Granlund 
(2010), ‘Det internationella kortet – altruism och egennytta som skäl till att föra 
fram Ålandsexemplet’. Report from the Åland Islands Peace Institute, nr. 2.
51 For the content of one of the seminars, see ’Autonomy – An Alternative to 
Secession? A Seminar on the Åland Islands as an Example of Peaceful Governance’. 
Seminar held in New York, March 15, 2001. Publications of the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, 7, 2001.
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4.  THE CASE OF NORWAY                     
4.1.  A New Field of Foreign Policy   
 Engagement
Initially, the decentralization of Norway’s foreign policy took 
off in the early 1990s in the field of development policies and 
humanitarian assistance. The conclusion was then drawn that 
the challenges encountered call for a much closer cooperation 
between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and various 
non-governmental actors.52 As a follow-up, the deviation from the 
traditionally quite state-centric pattern was also extended to apply 
equally to various efforts related to peace and reconciliation. The 
challenges met and the application of new approaches implied that 
the promotion of peace turned into an increasingly significant part 
of Norway’s foreign policy.
 
 
 
 
 
52 For an account and analysis of the early years, see Øystein Haga Skånland (2010), 
‘’Norway as a Peace Nation: A Discourse Analytic Reading of the Norwegian Peace 
Engagement’. Cooperation and Conflict, 45(1): 34–54. He views the White Paper 
of the Government in 1989 as having contributed to the articulation of a new 
approach, although ‘peace promotion’ still appeared in that context as subordinate 
concept in the official discourse and it was predominantly seen as a tool to be 
applied in the advancement of development aid, humanitarian assistance and 
promotion of democracy. See Government White Paper, no.11 (1998–1999). Om 
utviklingstrei i det internajonale samfunn og virkninger for norsk utenrikspolitikk. 
Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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As such, peace-related themes have for long been integrally related 
to the Norwegian self-understanding.53 Prominent Norwegians, such 
as Fridjof Nansen, have mediated in international conflicts. Nansen 
was a polar explorer, diplomat, and Norway’s representative to 
the League of Nations. In addition to helping refugees as well as 
displaced persons and relieving a wide-spread hunger in Russia, 
the Caucasus region, the Balkans, and Anatolia, he promoted 
talks between Turkey and Greece in the war in 1922. Nansen was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his achievements the same year. 
Overall, he left a legacy called the ‘Nansen-tradition’ in Norwegian 
policies54, and that tradition remained notable also during the years 
of the Cold War with Norway being involved in various processes of 
peace diplomacy such as facilitating meetings between parties to the 
war in Vietnam55 and initiating talks between Thailand and China.56
Crucially, the experiences gained and the linkages created within 
Norway implied that there was, after the end of the Cold War and 
during the 1990’s, preparedness within the political leadership as 
well as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to respond positively to 
initiatives taken and proposals made by various internationally well-
connected individuals or NGOs active in different conflict-prone 
areas. This openness and the broadening of the actors involved as 
well as engagement in networking and willingness to provide space 
also for other type of efforts than conventional government-centered 
diplomacy implied that Norway was able to spearhead peacemaking 
53 Among the many studies on this theme, see Sigmund Olav Bekken (2007), 
Identities and peace promotion in Norwegian foreign policy. Thesis presented at 
the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University. 
See also Kristian Dobinson og Geir Dale (2000), ‘Den norske ryggsekk. En analyse 
av “norsk’ fredsdiplomati’, in Geir Dale, et.al, (red.), Grenser for alt. Kritiske 
perspektiver på norsk utenrikspolitikk. Oslo: Spartacus Forlag, pp. 45–69.
54 The tradition was mentioned for example by Foreign Minister Støre in his 
presentation on Norway as a nation of peace, see Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr 
Støre, ‘Norge som fredsnasjon – myte eller virklighet?’. Speech at NUPI, 24 of April 
2006.
55 Rolf Tamnes, Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie. Bind 6.  Oljeolder. 1965–1995. 
Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, pp. 355–357.
56 See Iver Neumann (2011), ‘Peace and Reconciliation as System-maintaining 
Diplomacy: The Case of Norway’. International Journal, 66(3), p. 574.
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and utilize the increasing importance of peace diplomacy. It seems 
that Norway’s engagement during the first part of the 1990’s was 
almost always based on the same pattern: initiatives were taken by 
well-placed individuals and NGO-workers, and these were then 
followed up by contacts and talks that also included representatives 
of states.57 
Norway’s engagement in peace and reconciliation efforts in 
Sudan, Guatemala, Sri Lanka, Mali as well as the Middle East all 
seem to follow a similar pattern. Broad contacts and networking have 
been combined with more conventional approaches and competence 
has been backed up by the application of considerable financial 
means. The facilitation of contacts between the protagonists in 
Guatemala appears to have been something of a test case in the sense 
that a back channel for contacts through meetings in Oslo between 
representatives of the Guatemalan Government and the URNG 
(Unicad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca) was established 
already in 1990.
As to the Middle-East, the utilization of the established 
competences and created networks led in January 1993 to the 
initiation of a secret channel, the so-called Oslo channel, for talks 
between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel. 
The initiative was first launched and discussed between non-
governmental actors for the governments then to join the endeavours 
and approve the creation of such a channel. In fact, the Norwegian 
engagement in the Middle East was part of a broader pattern as 
the talks conducted with the help of the ‘Oslo channel’ functioned 
as a supportive and complementary tool for the public and official 
negotiations that took place in Washington. In general, the process 
was rather successful in the sense of amounting to what has later 
become known as the Oslo Agreement, and yielding a Declaration of 
Principles that cleared the way for the establishment of the Palestinian 
Self-Government Authority as well as a mutual recognition between 
57 For a more detailed description, see Øystein Skånland, Peace Promotion as 
National Identity. The Emergence and Reproduction of Norway’s Activist Peace 
and Reconciliation Efforts. Paper presented at the 2011 ECPR Conference in 
Reykjavik.
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Israel and the PLO.58 The Declaration of Principles was then signed 
in Washington between Isreaeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and 
the leader of the PLO Yassir Arafat in September 1993. 
The initial Norwegian success has later been followed up in various 
ways, above all by providing various forms of development aid and 
supporting the building of various institutions essential for a possible 
Palestinian state. Norway remained, despite the difficulties encountered 
in bringing the peace process to a positive end, a strong supporter of two-
state solution, but has also supported internal Palestinian reconciliation. 
That is why Norway decided in 2005 to normalize diplomatic relations 
with the coalition Government that included Hamas.59 
The gained experiences implied that peace diplomacy was 
provided with an increasingly central standing in Norway’s foreign 
policy. Engagement in bridge-building had already been singled out 
as one of the aims to be pursued in the field of foreign policy in the 
report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Parliament in 198960, 
but it turned almost self-evident after the signing of the Oslo Accords 
that Norway should engage itself in various peace-related activities 
and also aspire to create additional preparedness and competences 
in the field. Whereas the promotion of peace had previously been 
seen as an integral part of the development policies, it turned more 
autonomous and was upgraded into an important part of the foreign 
policy in its own right.61
In aspiring for an integrated and coherent approach, the concept 
of a Norwegian Model has been introduced.62 It rests, among 
58 Among the many publications on the process, see Hilde Henriksen Waage, 
‘Norwegians? Who Needs Norwegians? Explaining the Oslo Back Channel: 
Norway’s Political Past in the Middle-East’. Report 9/2000. International Peace 
Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).
59 Statement by Secretary of State Gry Larsen , ‘Tolerance and Dialogue. Presentation 
at Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 28th of  November 2012.
60 Report to the Storting, Stortingsmelding no. 11 (1989–90). 
61 See Government White Paper nr. 19 (1995–1996). En verden i endring. 
Hovedtrekk i norsk  politikk overfor utviklingslandene. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.
62 For an analysis of the model, see for example Kelleher, A. and Taulbee, J. L. 
(2006), ‘Bridging the Gap: Building Peace Norwegian Style’. Peace & Change, 31: 
479–505.
126
Joenniemi
other things, on Norway’s status as a small state and confidence in 
the country’s impartiality as to the conflicts to be tackled as well 
as Norway’s ability and competence to handle the issues at stake. 
Another essential ingredient consists of a rather flexible way of 
cooperation as well as a division of labour between the Norwegian 
Government, NGOs and academic institutions. Yet another feature 
essential in the context of Norwegian peace diplomacy pertains to 
endurance and the long-term perspective applied in approaching the 
settlement of conflicts. Thus, the aim is not merely one of achieving 
a cessation of violence and coining a peace treaty but also to set 
in motion and support political, economic and social processes 
conducive to a durable peace.63 Moreover, the Norwegian endurance 
and option of setting long-term aims rests on a broad political 
consensus underlying the promotion of peace and reconciliation. As 
argued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Petersen, “We are able 
to keep up our commitment regardless of changing governments or 
political currents, and we remain engaged even at difficult stages in 
a peace process”, 64
As part and parcel of efforts to move over from a mere staying 
with negative peace over to positive peace, development aid and 
humanitarian assistance has been extensively used to support the 
promotion of peace. The Norwegian Government has repeatedly 
underlined that peace and development are mutually dependent.  In 
2004 the Government presented a strategic framework stating that 
development policy should be an “important and integral element” 
of Norwegian foreign policy towards conflict-affected countries.65 In 
 
63 See ’Norge i fredens tjeneste. Norsk bidrag till fred och försoning’ (Norway in 
the Service of Peace. Norwegian Contribution to Peace and Reconciation). Rapport. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (07.07.2000).
64 See Foreign Minister Jan Petersen, ‘Norwegian Perspectives on International 
Peace and Security’. China Institute of International Studies Forum, Beijing, 20th 
of  March 2005. MFA Document Archive. Jan Petersen has also argued that the 
promotion of peace is part of a broader pattern of Norwegian public diplomacy, see 
Josef Batora (2005), ‘Public Diplomacy in Small and Medium-Sized States: Norway 
and Canada’, in Discussion Papers in Diplomacy. The Hague: Netherland’s Institute 
of International Relations, p. 16. 
65 Government White Paper nr. 11 (1998), op.cit., p. 8. 
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line with this, the 2009 White Paper on development aid presented 
conflicts as one of the three challenges for Norwegian aid policy.66 
At large, Norway’s engagement and participation has over the 
years consisted in one of its forms of acting as a mediator but above 
all a facilitator of negotiations with the responsibility for success 
lying basically with the protagonists themselves. Moreover, the 
country has contributed to a creation of back channels for secret 
negotiations and been an actor in the context of international 
coalitions set up to tackle a particular conflict. Norway has in cases 
such as Burundi, Guatemala, Haiti, Aceh, Mali, Nepal, Cyprus, 
Sudan, East Timor, West Balkans, the Great Lakes region and West 
Africa chosen to support other leading actors, but has, on occasion, 
also taken the lead in processes of peace promotion.67 In general, the 
aim has been one of focusing on a limited number of cases and to 
bring them to a successful conclusion.68 Furthermore, there has been 
a willingness to discuss with all of the parties of a conflict and it has 
also been of importance that Norway retains good relations with all 
of the major actors on the scene of international relations.
While many of the cases that Norway has dealt with in terms of 
peace promotion have amounted to a favourable outcome, others 
have not yielded the desired results. The cases of Sri Lanka and the 
Middle-East both stand for backlashes as the initial success has 
been reversed over time. As to Sri Lanka, the effort of brokering 
by initiating discussions in 2003 between the government and the 
 
66 Government White Paper nr. 13 (2008–2009). Klima, konflikt og kapital. Norsk 
utviklingspolitikk i et endret handlingsrom. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
67 The Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Norwegian foreign policy states 
that “Norway rarely appears on its own” in the sphere of peace promotion and 
reconciliation but engages itself as a general rule in combination with other actors, 
above all the UN. See St. meld. nr. 15 (2008–2009), p. 108. The Report states that 
Norway was then involved in peace diplomacy in some 20 countries and the more 
specific list provided offers information on the cases of Sudan, Somalia, Colombia, 
Middle-East, Sri Lanka , Pakistan, the Philippines and East-Timor. 
68 See the statement by Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, ‘Norway – a peace 
nation. Myth or Fact?’. The Nobel Peace Center, Oslo 24 of April 2006.
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Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) broke down in 2007.69 
This experience seems to have amounted to that Norway has to 
some extent shifted emphasis in accordance with the so-called joint 
work-principle.70 There is hence more stress on cooperation between 
various interested parties: the UN, and other multilateral agencies, 
regional organizations, neighbouring countries, other countries 
active in the sphere of peace promotion and NGOs. Norway prefers, 
in general, to cooperate with partners having the ability to respond 
rapidly to crisis and the option of gaining access to all of the parties 
of a conflict.71 
The latter approach is well exemplified by the support given to 
the former Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, in the context 
of the internal conflict and stalemate that emerged in Kenya after 
the December 2007 elections. Annan was mandated by the African 
Union (AU) to act as a broker between the parties, and he sought 
assistance from a group of advisers that included several prominent 
persons from other African countries. The intense diplomatic efforts 
of brokering succeeded in the sense that a power-sharing agreement 
emerged and an overt and extensive conflict could be avoided. 
4.2.  Impacting International Peace  
 Diplomacy
Norway has frequently cooperated with the United Nations in the 
field of peace promotion. This was the case already in 1990 when 
Norway was requested by the UN to facilitate the creation of contacts 
between the various actors part of the conflict in Guatemala. The 
more recent cases of cooperation consist of Norway helping to pave 
69 For an account of the process, see Kristine Höglund and Isak Svensson (2009), 
‘Mediating between Tigers and Lions.  Norwegian Peace Diplomacy in Sri Lanka’s 
Civil War’, in  Karin Eggestam and Annika Björkdahl (eds.), War and Peace in 
Transition. Changing Roles of External Actors. Lund: Nordic Academic Press, pp. 
147–170. 
70 The term used in Norwegian is ‘dugnad’.
71 See Vidar Helgesen, ‘Has Peace Diplomacy Lost Post 9/11: What Implications for 
Norway?’. FHS Publications, 3/2007. Oslo: Institut for forsvarsstudier.
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the way for various UN operations in Haiti. Furthermore, Norway 
has been engaged in direct cooperation with the UN Special Envoy 
and has contributed by providing resources for the UN operation 
(MINUSTAH) in particular by setting up a reconciliation fund. For 
the part of Burundi, Norway has acted as a member of the UN’s 
Peacebuilding Commission and has been tasked to lead the activities 
of the Commission in Burundi. 
In addition, Norway has set up a standby force for peace 
mediation which is administered by the Norwegian Refugee 
Council and has been at the service of the UN. The Government 
has repeatedly underlined that a substantial amount of Norwegian 
funding available for peace and reconciliation efforts has been 
channeled through the UN. 
The UN has in general been seen as pivotal for international peace 
and security with a competence to mediate, act as a peacebuilder, 
and function as a catalyst for justice and accountability. However, 
Norway has – in addition to cooperating with and supporting the UN 
– also aspired for reforms that aim at adding to the competence and 
resources available to the organization. The country has shared the 
view also held by a number of other countries according to which the 
ability of the UN to forestall and settle conflicts has been insufficient72 
and Norway has supported various efforts of remedying the situation, 
including the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. 
In addition to acting as a member of the Commission, Norway has 
contributed to the Peacebuilding Fund and supported, in particular, 
the Mediation Support Unit. In general, Norway has in various ways 
aimed at furthering the development of the multi-lateral, integrated 
approach to the UN’s peace efforts, i.e. an approach outlined in the 
Report of the High-Level Panel on UN System-Wide Coherence. 
Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg has co-chaired the Panel.
Notably, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) has been central in the Europe-related policies 
pursued by Norway. Support has in particular been provided for 
active involvement in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding in the Balkans, the Caucasus region and in Central Asia. 
72 See Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, “Norge som en fredsnasjon – myte eller 
virklighet?’. Speech at the Norwegian Center for Peace, Oslo, 24th of April 2006.
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As to other regions, Norway has prioritized Africa and has 
therefore also coined a comprehensive strategy to guide the 
policies pursued.73 Various forms of peace-related activities, most 
often in cooperation with the UN, African Union (AU) and other 
partners, have taken place above all in Sudan, the northern part of 
Uganda, Mali, Ethiopia and Eritrea as well as Somalia and Darfur. 
According to the strategy developed, Norway aims at strengthening 
the involvement of the UN in Africa and aspires to assist, as a key 
partner of cooperation, the endeavours of the AU in developing a 
civilian competence and capacity of its own in the sphere of peace-
related operations. Furthermore, Norway aims at promoting the 
participation of African women in various activities related to peace, 
both locally as well as internationally in accordance with the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1325, and the Norwegian Action Plan 
on Women, Peace and Security.74
Notably, a rather broad evaluation report on peacebuilding 
was published in 2004. The report, called the Utstein study, was 
jointly developed by the Evaluation Departments of the Foreign and 
Development Cooperation Ministries of Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway and the UK. Furthermore, a survey on the peacebuilding 
experiences has been carried out. The final report drew on four 
independent national studies to identify key findings for analysis 
and comparison.75 A peacebuilding strategy paper was drafted in 
Norway in 2002, albeit it was not provided with an official status.76
73 Plattform for en helhetlig Afrika-politikk. Oslo: Utenriksdepartementet, 2007.
74 Regjeringens handlingsplan for gjennomføring av FNs Sikkerhetsråds resolusjon 
1325 (2000) om kvinner, fred og sikkerhet. Handlingsplan, Mars 2006. Oslo: 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
75 ‘Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding; Getting Their Act Together. 
Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding’. Evaluation Report 
1/2004. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Dan Smith, Director of PRIO, acted as a 
consultant responsible for the study.
76 Ibid., p. 34. As noted by Wenche Hauge, a PRIO scholar in her contribution to 
the Utstein report, the strategy basically summarized experiences and lessons gained 
from the various cases of peace promotion in which Norway had been involved, 
above all the one of facilitating peace in Guatemala. See Wenche Hauge, ‘Norwegian 
Peacebuilding Policies: Lessons Learnt and Challenges Ahead’. Evaluation Report 
2/2004. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 11.
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4.3.  Institutionalization  
 of the Policies Pursued
Taking into account that the Norwegian activities started at the 
beginning of the 1990’s and did so mainly in an ad hoc-manner, 
the change over time has been rather significant. Quite established 
practices have grown forth and stable administrative procedures 
and structures have been developed. It should also be noted that 
the funding earmarked for the promotion of peace has increased 
steadily since 1993.
The financing for various peacebuilding projects emanates 
from two sources: the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (NORAD) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with 
the MFA financing, above all, cases and projects entailing peace 
promotion.77 In 1996 a special budget line was established within 
the MFA in order to have funds available that could be used flexibly 
for “measures contributing to the solution of local and religious 
conflicts creating refugees”. The funds set aside and the budget line 
established for peace promotion has then grown reaching the sum 
of 821 million NOK in 2008. Since then the amount earmarked 
for peace mediation has to some extent declined, although this has 
mainly occurred owing to adjustments in the set-up of the budget as 
funds previously appearing under the ‘peace and reconciliation and 
democracy’ item have been transferred to other items. In the 2013 
budget the sum proposed by the Government was 650 million NOK.
Overall, the institutionalization of the engagement in peace 
promotion has developed gradually. It was noted in an evaluation of 
the Norwegian policies carried out in 1996 that the policies pursued 
were mainly of an ad-hoc nature, and therefore the evaluators 
recommended some moves of institutionalization.78 In consequence, 
the MFA’s Department for Human Rights, Humanitarian Affairs and 
Democracy set up a Unit for Peace and Reconciliation. Four persons 
were assigned to the unit in order to focus on mediation and peace 
77 See the report carried out by Dan Smith, op.cit., p. 35.
78 Evaluation Report nr. 11 (1998) (Sørbø, G.M., Hauge, W., and Smith, D.), 
‘Assistance to Countries in Conflict. The Lessons from Experiences from Guatemala, 
Mali, Mozambique, Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi. Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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facilitation. The new entity was also requested to gather the lessons 
learned from Norway’s various projects and involvement in peace 
processes.79 In 2004 the Unit, mandated to report directly to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, was upgraded to a Section for Peace and 
Reconciliation. It employs currently 14 persons with some of them 
assigned to work as special envoys in regard to particular conflicts.
As to research and analysis, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource 
Centre (NOREF) was established in 2010 to improve the MFA’s contacts 
with research institutions and to contribute to the accumulation of 
relevant information and knowledge. In general, the ministry is linked 
to and cooperates with other Norwegian institutes relevant in view 
of peace promotion, in particular the Peace Research Institute Oslo 
(PRIO), the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and 
the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI).  The ministry has annually some 
30 million NOK at its disposal for research and analysis which is seen 
as important in view of the policies of peace promotion. 
An evaluation carried out within the MFA in 2008 noted that 
research on conflicts has been given a high priority in Norwegian 
foreign policy. It was further pointed out that the funding from 
the ministry has resulted in increased efforts on conflict prevention 
and peacebuilding (CPPB) research, and has contributed during the 
period reviewed to the emergence of some rather useful forms of 
networking. In addition, a dynamic and competitive literature has 
been created, and “a web of significant contacts for Norway, leading 
to some unique outcomes in terms of peace processes building on 
previous networks of contacts and access” has emerged.80 
In addition, also the Oslo Forum facilitates networking. It is co-
hosted by the Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Swiss 
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and it convenes regularly senior 
conflict mediators, high level decision makers, key process actors, 
analysts and experts from a variety of institutional backgrounds in 
a series of informal and discreet retreats. The annual events in Oslo 
have been complemented by regional retreats in Africa and Asia.
79 See Wenche Hauge, op. cit., p. 13.
80 ‘Evaluation of the Norwegian Research and Development Activities in Conflict 
Prevention and Peace-building’. Evaluation Report 8/2008. Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation (Norad). 
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5.  THE CASE OF SWEDEN
5.1.  The Formative Years
Conflict prevention turned into a key idea and core practice in the 
sphere of Swedish foreign policy during the 1990’s, albeit the turn 
was preceded by experiences such as the mediation undertaken in 
the years 1965–1968 during the Vietnam War between the United 
States and North Vietnam/NLF as well as Olof Palme acting as the 
UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative during the years 
1980–1982 in the war between Iran and Iraq.81 The legacy of UN 
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and his various peacekeeping 
initiatives and emphasis on preventive diplomacy also impacted 
the development of Swedish policies. Other mediation efforts by 
prominent Swedes include Carl Bildt’s assignments in the Balkans in 
the 1990s and onwards as well as Jan Eliasson’s various UN-related 
mediation-tasks in the Middle-East and Africa.82
 Notably, Sweden’s participation in 1995 in the first UN preventive 
deployment mission as part of the country’s internationalist and 
multilateral vision of international relations in Macedonia added 
further to the weight of conflict prevention in providing experiences 
 
 
81 See Ulf Bjereld, ‘Critic or Mediator? Sweden in World Politics, 1945–90’. Journal 
of Peace Research, 32(1): 23–35.
82 For a list of the various engagements, see Isak Svensson and Peter Wallensteen 
(2010), The Go-Between. Jan Eliasson and the Styles of Mediation. United States 
Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., p. 8.
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of success.83 The mission was also of importance in the sense that 
conflict prevention became pivotal as a concept and an approach 
in competition with a variety of other potentially available and 
related concepts such as peace-building and crisis management. As 
argued by Annika Björkdahl, “with the end of the Cold War, the 
Swedish foreign policy identity was in need of reconstruction and 
selection of the conflict prevention idea was part of the incremental 
reconstruction of Sweden’s foreign policy”.84
A Statement on Government Policy issued in 1994 declared 
that Sweden’s activities in the sphere of conflict prevention will 
be intensified. A study of Sweden’s participation in international 
military-based operations of peace-promotion concluded that the 
emphasis shall in the future be on preventing conflicts.85 Similarly, 
conflict prevention figured prominently in the foreign policy 
declarations issued in 1997and 1998, and it played an outstanding 
role in two Government Communications: the one on Human Rights 
in Sweden’s Foreign Policy86 and another on Africa on the Move. 
Revitalizing Sweden’s Policy towards Africa for the 21st Century.87
The increased focus on conflict prevention was conducive to the 
commissioning and publishing of a report on in 1997.88 Above all, 
the report Preventing Violent Conflict – A Study aimed at identifying 
long term objectives for future Swedish policies in the field of conflict 
prevention. Two years later another policy document, Preventing 
Violent Conflict – A Swedish Action Plan, was presented to the Swedish 
83 See Annika Björkdahl (2007), ‘Constructing a Swedish Conflict Prevention Policy 
Based on Powerful Ideas and Successful Practice’. Cooperation and Conflict, 42(2): 
169–185. See also Clive Archer (1994), ‘Conflict Prevention in Europe: The Case of 
the Nordic States and Macedonia’. Cooperation and Conflict, 29(4): 367-89.
84 This is the argument presented by Annika Björkdahl in her study premised on 
interviewing key actors part of the process. See Annika Björkdahl (2002), From 
Idea to Norm – Promoting Conflict Prevention. Lund: Lund University Press, p. 74. 
85 Ministry Publication Series 1995: 24.
86 Comm.1997/98: 89.
87 Comm. 1997/98: 122.
88 Preventing Violent Conflict – A Study. Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
Stockholm: Norstedts Trykkeri (Ds 1997: 18).
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Government.89 One of the priorities listed in the document consisted 
of a strengthening of the Swedish capacities for international conflict 
prevention in different policy areas, including mediation. In general 
the Action Plan aimed at enhancing a conflict prevention culture and 
presented a framework for conflict prevention in Sweden’s Foreign 
Service. The measures outlined aimed in particular “at bringing 
about a gradual change in attitude and a new approach”.90 The 
Action Plan was broadly disseminated in Sweden but it was also 
presented on several international arenas, including the UN General 
Assembly and the European Union.
A third publication, Preventing Violent Conflict – Swedish Policy 
for the 21st Century, took explicitly note of that international attention 
was increasingly focused on the importance of preventing violent 
conflicts and that policies of prevention were in general very much 
called for in addressing the new security challenges of the post-Cold 
War era.91 It further concluded that the international community 
in a broad sense – states, international and non-governmental 
organizations and other actors – needs to adopt a conflict prevention 
approach or what may be called a conflict prevention culture. The 
document testified to that the increased prominence of conflict 
prevention was integrally part of a reformulation and reprioritization 
of the Swedish policies. Changes were called for, it was argued, as 
violent conflicts were no longer to be seen, as used to be the case, 
in the perspective of the Cold War and the subsequent risk of major 
escalation: Therefore, “the international community can now to a 
larger extent seek to prevent armed conflicts by concentrating more 
on the unique character of each conflict and less on the relations 
between great powers”.92 
In addition to an analysis of the new security environment and 
the policies called for, the document focused on the way the Action 
Plan, issued in 1999, had been implemented, and it also presented 
89 Preventing Violent Conflict – Swedish Action Plan. Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
Stockholm: Printing Works of the Government Offices (Ds 1999: 24). 
90 Ibid., p. 15.
91 (Skr. 2000/01:2). Preventing Violent Conflicts – A Swedish Policy for the 21st 
Century. Ministry for Foreign Affairs: Printing Works of the Government Offices.
92 Ibid., p. 9.
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an evaluation of the preventive actions taken by the Swedish 
Government. In general, the document confirmed that “conflict 
prevention is a priority area in Swedish foreign policy”, and stated 
that “….this is a natural development of Sweden’s traditional policy 
of promoting peace and solidarity”.93 
In 2007 the Government issued a Communication providing 
general guidelines for Swedish action in the field of international 
peace-support and security-building activities. The aim was also 
to create a close link between foreign, development, security and 
defense policies. In addition, the aim was one of creating the basis 
for a more effective use of resources and to meet the raised level of 
expectations as to Sweden’s contribution in regard to the maintenance 
of international peace and security as well as fair and sustainable 
development. It was further noted that conflict-prevention, efforts of 
mediation and bringing about dialogue as well as imposing sanctions 
and contributing to measures of reconstruction are all areas in which 
Sweden aspires to be active with a view to preventing and averting 
conflicts and creating the necessary basis for lasting peace. As to 
the various means and methods applied in the implementation of 
such an approach, Sweden will according to the Communication 
continue to enhance the instruments of sanctions and strengthen 
Sweden’s capacity to act on mediation issues.94  
5.2.  Capacity-building in the Context  
 of the United Nations
Sweden contributed significantly to that the UN General Assembly 
adopted unanimously its first resolution on conflict prevention in 
2002. The initiative was made by Sweden and a considerable amount 
of resources was allotted in order for a positive result to be achieved. 
 However, the active engagement also impacted Sweden’s own 
policies. As noted, part-taking in various UN-related activities – 
above all the UNPROFOR mission in Macedonia in the mid-1990’s 
93 Ibid., p. 2.
94 See National Strategy for Participation in International Peace-support and 
Security-building Operations. Government Communication 2007/08:51.
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– provided incentives for integrating conflict prevention into the 
country’s foreign policy. The UN also offered a platform for several 
prominent Swedes to engage in the conduct of preventive diplomacy 
and conflict prevention, and these experiences then contributed 
significantly to the standing of peace diplomacy within Swedish 
policies. Jan Eliasson, Ambassador and later State Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, has been one of the persons assigned by the United 
Nations for various peace-related missions. He took part in 1980-
1986 in the UN mediation missions between Iran and Iraq, and 
served during 2007–2008 as the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-
General to Darfur.95
In addition to developing competences of its own, Sweden 
has set itself the task of promoting conflict prevention on various 
international contexts, above all the United Nations and the 
European Union. As to the UN, according to the Government 
Communication on Preventing Violent Conflict –Swedish Policy for 
the 21st Century, the aim consists of a strengthening of the UN’s 
prevention capability. Sweden thus contributed, together with 
likeminded countries such as Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands 
and Norway, to the establishment of an informal Group of Friends 
for Conflict Prevention of the Secretary-General96, promoted the 
creation of a permanent fact-finding mechanism and supported 
the UN Trust Fund for Preventive Action.97 Moreover, Sweden has 
cooperated extensively with the UN Department of Political Affairs 
as well as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.98 
The effort has, in general, been one of joining forces with other 
countries that also seek to strengthen conflict prevention as a central 
element of the international efforts to promote peace and security.  
Major steps forward were taken in the context of the 2005 
UN World Summit and in particular through the establishment 
95 For a more detailed profile, see Isak Svensson and Peter Wallensteen (2010), 
ibid., p. 8.
96 See Annika Björkdahl (2002), ibid., p. 107.
97 Government Communication  (May 2001), p. 14.
98 See Jan Eliasson (2004),’A Culture of Prevention – Sweden and Conflict 
Prevention’, in Anders Mellbourn, (ed.), Developing a Culture of Conflict 
Prevention. Södertälje: Gidlunds förlag. 
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of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding Fund as 
well as the Peacebuilding Support Office. As part of an effort to 
reform and strengthen the UN in the sphere of conflict prevention, 
Sweden joined the Steering Committee of the UN Peacebuilding 
Commission and supported the implementation and follow-up of 
the UN system’s Joint Action Plan for Resolution 1325 on Women, 
Peace and Security, adopted initially in 2000 by the Security Council. 
Furthermore, the Swedish Government adopted a national action 
plan in 2006 in order to contribute to the implementation of the UN 
plan. The national Swedish plan has inspired, it seems, several other 
countries and international organizations to follow suit.99
Sweden has more recently contributed to a reforming and 
developing of the UN system in terms of peace mediation and 
conflict prevention as a member of the Group of Friends of Peace, 
a group established in 2010 in order to advance and strengthen the 
development of a UN-culture related to peace-building.
5.3. Impacting the European Union
In aspiring for a more pronounced role as an international actor, 
the EU has increasingly engaged itself in crisis management, conflict 
resolution and prevention as well as peace mediation. Sweden 
has, as one of the Member States, contributed significantly to this 
development.
Conflict prevention and various related activities figured as EU 
priority areas already at a relative early stage, although the Union 
mainly limited itself to financial contributions instead of acting out 
as a mediator. Up to 2006 the EU’s engagement took place through 
the employment of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) and after 
2007 by applying the Instrument for Stability (IfS). Notably, the 
creation of a more consistent conceptual, political, and institutional 
99 The action plan covered the years 2006–2008, and another plan has been 
prepared for the years 2009–2012. Implementation of the UN Resolution 1325. 
The Swedish Government’s action plan for 2009–2012 to implement Security 
Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security. Government Office 
of Sweden, Stockholm 2009.
139
Peace Mediation and Conflict Resolution
ground started in the spring of 2001, and this took place during 
Sweden’s Presidency. A reference to conflict resolution was then 
included into acquis communitaire and the EU Programme for 
the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, the so-called Gothenburg 
Programme.100 Already the Commission Communication on Conflict 
Prevention that fed into the Gothenburg Conclusions made ample 
reference to the importance of mediation and activities related to 
dialogue.101
The emphasis on mediation has since the initial years grown 
significantly. In particular, the reviewing of the European Security 
Strategy in 2008 offered an opportunity to expand the dialogue on 
mediation and a strengthening of the EU’s capabilities. The process 
was again taken further during the Swedish Presidency.102 A number 
of high level meetings that brought together experts and officials 
also from the UN, OSCE and EU added to the awareness concerning 
the relevance of peace mediation. Furthermore, a dialogue was 
waged on all levels of the EU, including the Political and Security 
Committee which then tasked the Council Secretariat to develop a 
concept on EU Mediation. 
 Thus, in order to develop a coordinated and focused approach, 
the EU adopted the Concept of Strengthening EU Mediation and 
Dialogue Capabilities.103 The document coined in 2009 clarifies 
the EU’s ambitions and provides a policy basis for the Union’s 
involvement in international peace mediation. It defines mediation 
as “a tool of first response to emerging or on-going crisis situations” 
and allows for the EU to act as a mediator. It secures political 
support, technical assistance and financing to formal as well as 
informal efforts of mediation, and does so both at a high political 
100 See Presidency Conclusions, Göteborg, 15 and 16 of June, 2001, SN 200/1/01/
REV 1.
101 European Commission, Communication from the Commission on Conflict 
Prevention, COM (2001), 211, final.
102 See Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing 
Security in a Changing World. S407/08 (Brussels, 11 December 2008).
103 Council of the European Union, Concept of Strengthening EU Mediation and 
Dialogue Capabilities (Brussels: 15779/09, 10 November 2009).
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level and that of the grass-roots.104 A working group was tasked 
as a follow-up to develop an action plan in the field of mediation 
and dialogue. As noted by Antje Herrberg in her report on peace 
mediation within the EU, the concept was produced by the Swedish 
Presidency105 and this development took place in the context 
of the EU forming and launching the Union’s External Action 
Service (EEAS) and establishing the EU Delegations. As part of the 
development of the EEAS, a Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding and 
Mediations Instruments Division has been established and furnished 
with a mandate to provide support for EU actors – both the 
headquarters and EU Delegations. Yet, mediation-related questions 
are in particular handled by the Mediation Support Team (MST) and 
support for mediation is also included in the regular EU-budget.106 
In order for the Union to be able to respond to the growing 
need of conflict prevention, mediation and dialogue, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs  Carl Bildt proposed – together with his Finnish 
colleague Alexander Stubb – the setting up of a European Institute 
of Peace (EIP).107 The proposal was communicated in a non-paper in 
2010 to the High Representative.  A study was then commissioned 
to assess the EU’s practices and capabilities for specific mediation 
functions and evaluate whether these can be usefully complemented 
by other initiatives, notably the EIP.108 The various issues related to 
the EU’s engagement have then been discussed in a series of seminars 
organized by a Steering Committee composed of the Union’s External 
Action Service, the European Parliament and the Irish Presidency 
of the European Council. The seminars took place in 2013, with 
104 For an analysis of the mandate, see Catriona Gourlay (2013), ‘The European 
Union as a Peacemaker – Enhancing EU Mediation Capacity’. Background paper. 
European Policy Centre 
105 See Antje Herrberg (2012), ‘International Peace Mediation: A New Crossroads 
for the European Union’.. EU Crisis Management Papers Series. DCAF Brussels – 
ISIS Europe, p. 11.
106 Available at:  http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/conflict_prevention/index_en.htm.
107 On the Swedish position, see Carl Bildt, ‘A call for a European Institute for 
Peace’. Building Peace in 2013. Oslo Forum. Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian 
Dialogue, pp. 7–8.
108 Available at: http://tntexecutive.gr/announcements/the-eu-as-apeacemaker-enhancing-
eu-mediation-capacity/?lang=en.
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Sweden being attached to the arrangements, in Berlin, Paris, Sofia as 
well as in Brussels at the European Parliament under the rubric “EU 
as a Peacemaker”.  
5.4.  Support in the Context  
 of the OSCE, CE and Regional   
 Organizations
In addition to the UN and the EU, the Swedish policies of strengthening 
the international system of conflict prevention have also been geared 
towards the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE). Sweden set itself the goal of acting as a driving force for 
enhancing the role of conflict prevention within the OSCE already in 
the document on the Swedish policies to be pursued during the 21st 
century.109 Sweden’s contribution in the case of the OSCE has mainly 
consisted of funding and making experts available for organization’s 
secretariat or to serve in its institutions and field missions. Sweden 
has also been proactive in the implementation of the 2005 ministerial 
resolution on women in conflict prevention, crisis management and 
post-conflict rehabilitation.
In addition to the OSCE, also the Council of Europe (CE) 
has been viewed and approached as a relevant body in regard to 
conflict prevention and peace mediation. Beyond Europe and out 
of the various other regions, Africa has attracted most attention 
in the Swedish policies and has been the target of cooperation as 
well as assistance. Capacity-building and intense dialogue form the 
two key elements in Swedish cooperation with the African Union 
(AU). The AU Commission as well as other AU bodies such as the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have been 
targets of technical support, and Sweden has, in general, contributed 
to the African structures in the sphere of conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding have strengthened. As to specific countries, Ethiopia-
Eritrea, Liberia, Kongo, Sierra Leone and Sudan have been among 
 
109 Preventing Violent Conflict – Swedish Policy for the 21st Century (2001), p. 71.
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the recipients of Swedish support for measures related to conflict 
prevention.110 
The Folke Bernadotte Academy, the Swedish Government 
Agency for Peace, Security, and Development, has more recently 
been engaged particularly in Kenya in order to contribute to peace, 
reconciliation and development.111
5.5.  The Creation of National    
 Competences
Conflict prevention, including mediation, has in general been 
approached as a cross-cutting theme engaging various branches of 
Sweden’s foreign service, although in 1996 some adjustments were 
made in order to take into account the increased attention devoted 
to conflict prevention. The posts of an investigator and a secretary 
were created in February 1996 in order for a study on conflict 
prevention to be carried out. In consequence and based on the 
results of the study, a Reference Group comprising of representatives 
from the relevant departments of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
and from the Ministry of Defence was established. Moreover, a 
small Secretariat for Conflict Prevention was created in 1999 as also 
proposed in the study to ensure the pursuance of unified policies 
within the Policy Planning Unit. In addition, an interdepartmental 
Steering Group was created.112 These measures, and in particular the 
establishment of a Secretariat, testified to the increased weight of 
conflict prevention within the administrative structures of Sweden’s 
foreign policy. It showed, as argued by Annika Björkdahl113, that 
Sweden’s top-level decision-makers prioritized prevention. 
110 See www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2574/a/13945. On support to the AU and regional 
organizations, see the National strategy for participation in international peace-
support and security-building operations. Government Communication 2007/08:51, 
pp. 14–15.
111 See Folke Bernadotte Akademin. Årsredovisning 2012, p. 44.
112 See Björkdahl 2002), pp. 179–180.
113 See Björkdahl (2007), p. 179.
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However, she also notes that “a cross-cutting idea like conflict 
prevention cannot readily be compartmentalized into a Secretariat”, 
and in fact the Secretariat was relocated after two years to the Folke 
Bernadotte Academy. Conflict prevention was again approached 
as a fully cross-cutting theme integrated into the everyday routines 
of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. However, conflict prevention 
remains somewhat distinct in the sense that special means have been 
allocated for that purpose in the MFA budget.114  
In the context of the cross-cutting approach, issues pertaining to 
conflict, peace and security and related questions such as mediation 
are handled by the Security Policy Department within the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs. The Department is divided into four divisions, 
covering UN affairs, the European Union, and Euroatlantic issues, 
including NATO and the OSCE. The fourth division covers thematic 
issues related to conflict and development. The Security Policy 
Department currently has a staff of 43 persons, of whom 10 are 
attached to the division dealing with conflict and development. The 
Department also employs several senior advisers and coordinators. 
Some 145 million Swedish Crowns have been earmarked in the state 
budget for the year 2013 for activities related to peace- and security-
building.115
The fourth division also disposes of grants aimed at peace and 
security related activities and is tasked with steering the Folke 
Bernadotte Academy (FBA).116 As to various research entities, the 
Ministry cooperates in particular with the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the Department of Peace and 
Conflict Research at Uppsala University and the Institute for Political 
Science at the University of Lund.
The main objective of the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), 
established in 2002, is to enhance the quality and effectiveness of 
international conflict and crisis management, with a particular focus 
114 Ibid., p.180.
115 Central government budget revenue and expenditure 2013. Estimated central 
government budget revenue 2013, Sweden’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Available 
at: http://www.government.se/sb/d/2798/a/198909. 
116 See Departments and their functions. Sweden’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
Available at: http://www.government.se/sb/d/3367/a/377735.
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on peace operations. Within the scope of this overall aim, the FBA is 
prepared to offer good offices for conflict resolution initiatives, such 
as talks between parties to conflict. 117 Among other things, FBA is in 
charge of the Conflict Prevention in Practice Programme. The FBA 
budget in 2012 was approximately 213 million Swedish Crowns 
and the agency employed about  90 persons.118 
In recognizing the close relationship between security and 
development, the aim of conflict prevention119, the Swedish Agency 
for International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) was in 
1998 provided with an explicit mandate by the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs to develop a national strategy on conflict prevention.120 
Prevention has therefore turned into an integral aspect of Sida’s 
strategy and work in the field of development policies.  
117 See Förordning 2007: 1218.
118 See Folke Bernadotte Akademin. Årsredovisning 2012.
119 See the Government Document,  Peace and Security for Development. Policy 
for Security and Development in Swedish Development Cooperation, 2010–2014. 
Stockholm: Government Offices of Sweden (2011).
120 See UD/98/1567/IC and UD/99/1503/IC.
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6.  CONCLUSIONS
There seems to be some continuity but also a considerable amount of 
change present in the policies pursued by the four Nordic countries 
in the sphere of peace diplomacy. They have all been significantly 
affected by the end of the Cold War, although they have also 
been impacted by other changes part of the international security 
environment. 
It seems, against this background, that Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden have all made use of the altered conditions 
in ways of their own and, in doing so, developed profiles that are 
far from uniform. All the Nordics have been able to break away 
from their previously rather traditional and state-centered ways of 
conducting diplomacy and foreign policy and open up for new ways 
of thinking, implement new approaches and make room for various 
new groups in their conduct of external affairs. Various trends of 
decentralization and broadening of the customary sphere of foreign 
policy have been discernible in particular in the fields of conflict 
prevention and peace mediation.
Norway clearly stands out among the Nordics as a vanguard in 
the sense that it was early on in reacting to an altered setting of wars 
and conflicts and in providing peace mediation with a prominent 
role in the sphere of Norwegian foreign policy. This occurred 
already during the beginning of the 1990s and the start has then 
been followed up by investing more systematically into mediation 
and integrating brokering more permanently into the conduct and 
structures of the policies pursued. 
Also Sweden reacted at a relatively early stage, although the 
follow-up appears to have been somewhat less systematic at least 
for the part of mediation and the way conflict resolution has been 
incorporated into Sweden’s foreign policy. Finland, in turn, has the 
profile of a late-comer, albeit the country has over the recent years 
taken significant steps in order to incorporate mediation into the 
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conduct and structures of Finnish foreign policy. Denmark has for 
its part followed a rather steady path in having altered its foreign 
policy profile quite significantly owing to changes in both peace 
and war, albeit this has been done by focusing on the fragmentation 
of states as a key concern and without elevating mediation into a 
central aspect of the Danish policies. All of the Nordics have over the 
recent two decades and in the aftermath of the Cold War developed 
specific doctrines to support and guide their activities in the sphere 
of conflict prevention and peace policies at large.
A closer reading of these doctrines testifies to some similarities 
but it also shows that the four Nordics have actually chosen to 
apply somewhat different conceptual inroads in their efforts of 
adapting to and making use of the changes in regard to peace and 
war. They are quite similar to each other in the sense that their peace 
diplomacy has not just been narrowed down to place emphasis on 
negative peace. The four countries studied have neither limited their 
endeavours to the cessation and containment of war, nor is their aim 
merely one of managing conflicts. Instead, the various more limited 
aspirations have been complemented by the far more positive ones of 
peacebuilding. The latter, i.e. the effort of tackling the more profound 
roots of violent conflicts, have among other things taken the form of 
combining conflicts resolution with policies of development. Thus, 
all the four Nordic countries have linked their policies of conflict 
resolution with those pursued in the field of development aid rather 
than approaching development as something distinct and isolated 
from wars and conflicts.
As to the country-specific profiles, the conceptual emphasis has in 
the case of Norway been overwhelmingly on mediation. Engagement 
in brokering in the context of violent conflicts has stood out as the 
prime departure and has been prioritized in relation some other 
departures. Finland has for its part followed a similar path over the 
recent years. However, the Finnish and Norwegian choices appear 
to be somewhat different from those made by Sweden as mediation 
has in the Swedish case not figured as a prime conceptual departure. 
It has rather been approached as one aspect of the broader policies 
of conflict resolution. Denmark has an even more distinct profile of 
its own as it has not been process-oriented in its policies of tackling 
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conflicts. The point of departure has instead consisted of focusing 
on the causes of conflict and the unfolding of peace and war has 
therewith been anchored in states and their ability to exercise power. 
In consequence, the fragmentation of states has been elevated 
into a core departure and seen as something to be counteracted for 
conflicts to be mitigated and peace to prevail. Thus, Denmark does 
not merely aim at facilitating communication and contribute to the 
establishing of contacts between belligerents. The aim is above all 
one of impacting the circumstances conducive to war and conflicts. 
It is quite far-reaching and entails transformative ambitions with 
the specific aim being limited to the adding to the competence 
and capabilities of governments to cope with the challenge of 
fragmentation.
What is common to the four Nordic countries is, however, 
that they have endeavoured at a strengthening of the standing of 
mediation and related departures in the sphere of international 
relations and international organizations. They have not confined 
themselves to a mere renewing and altering their own approaches 
and policies but have also aspired to extend such an ambition to 
apply to international relations at large. They have pushed quite 
successfully for reforms in the context of the UN, EU, OSCE as well 
as the Council of Europe but have also contributed to the creation of 
region-specific competence in various parts of the world.
However, it may also be noted that the Nordics have combined 
engagement in mediation and mediation-projects of the own and 
involvement in the reformation of the international system differently 
from each other. Finland has on the one hand prioritized the impacting 
and reforming of the international system but has on the other hand 
not complemented this approach by engaging itself systematically in 
specific, mediation-related projects of its own. In contrast, Norway 
has been active on both of these fronts in developing projects of its 
own as well as impacting the international system. Denmark and 
Sweden seem in this regard to be located somewhere in-between to 
the extent that their policies are comparable with those pursued by 
Finland and Norway in the first place. It appears, however, that all of 
the Nordics have concluded that their engagement in mediation and 
other peace-related activities can only take place in cooperation with 
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some other and like-minded countries and in a manner supported 
by some international organization, above all the UN. This clearly 
points to an internationalization of the policies pursued.
The impact of renewing their policies is also detectable in the 
way the structures and conduct of foreign affairs have developed 
in the four Nordic countries. Thus, Norway has chosen to provide 
mediation with a standing of its own with a distinct section, personnel 
and means earmarked in the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
for that purpose. Finland has moved towards a similar direction, 
albeit it has done so in a clearly less pronounced manner. Denmark 
and Sweden have decided to handle conflict prevention and related 
matters in a cross-cutting manner, although Sweden tested for some 
years in the 1990s a system of providing conflict prevention with 
a separate standing. It can also be observed that the cross-cutting 
principle has in the Swedish case been complemented by establishing 
the Folke Bernadotte Academy as a separate entity in charge of 
various activities related to conflict prevention, although the FBA 
remains attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Denmark, in turn, has a profile of its own with an emphasis on 
the whole-of-government approach. The approach applied in regard 
to the fragmentation of states is thus inter-ministerial in nature with 
various procedures in place and bodies established in order to make 
sure that the policies pursued are well coordinated and broadly 
anchored within the government as well as in the various ministries. 
The Danish policies are hence not just cross-cutting within the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs but also the government at large.
As the nature of wars has changed profoundly in the post-Cold 
War era, so have the forms of peacemaking. Conflicts are asymmetric 
in nature, and there is a corresponding need for asymmetric 
diplomacy in which participation in peace negotiations is not limited 
to states. Thus, the role and impact of various civil society actors in 
the sphere of conflict resolution and foreign policy more generally 
has grown in all four Nordic countries. The development has clearly 
contributed to a de-centering and broadening of the traditionally 
quite state-centered policies. It seems that the broadening started 
initially in the sphere of development policies but has then spread 
over to other spheres of foreign policy thereby also impacting the 
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way issues related to mediation and conflict prevention has been 
handled within the foreign ministries. The establishment of the 
Coordination Group within the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
is a case in point testifying to the emergence of new connections and 
constellations. One form of the broadening underway pertains to 
the increasing links with research institutes and researchers. 
Various forms of research have been increasingly integrated into 
the making of foreign policy, and this trend has been quite visible in 
the spheres of mediation and conflict resolution. This trend is quite 
pronounced in Norway as well as Sweden but somewhat less distinct 
in the cases of Denmark and Finland.
In general, all the four Nordic countries have cooperated 
extensively with other countries and have in general also aspired 
for an internationalization of the policies pursued in the context of 
conflict resolution. It appears, however, that they have rarely been 
engaged in cooperation between themselves in this sphere despite 
their rather advanced cooperation in most other fields. Finland and 
Norway have joined forces in the case of Myanmar and Nordic 
observers were employed in the monitoring of the ceasefire agreement 
in Sri Lanka to strengthen the impression of impartiality but the 
conclusion nonetheless remains that there does not exist any joint 
Nordic profile in the sphere of mediation and conflict resolution. 
It may also be noted that the Nordics have quite forcefully and 
successfully impacted various international organizations such as 
the UN and yet not extended this endeavour to apply to the Nordic 
Council of Ministers and the Nordic Council. They have, as such, 
engaged themselves during the recent years in a rather vibrant 
cooperation in matters of security and defence but not enlarged this 
cooperation also to apply to questions of mediation and policies of 
conflict resolution.
The underlying reason could be that their conceptual inroads 
and profiles quite clearly differ from each other. Finland and 
Norway stand rather close to each other and Sweden has a more 
or less comparable profile while Denmark is more in a category 
of its own with its emphasis on the fragmentation of states as a 
conceptual inroad. However, the four Nordic countries are rather 
similar to each other in a broader perspective due to their emphasis 
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on conflict resolution and peace-making. They have distinct profiles 
but their policies do not conflict with each other. They are rather 
complementary in nature and thus provide a potential ground for 
cooperation premised on a division of labour. 
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